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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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The Position of the People's Deputy

18020016a Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 10, Jul 89 (signed to press 23 Jun 89) pp 3-14

[Materials prepared by V. Dymarskiy, Yu. Kudryavtsev and V. Nekhotin]

[Text] The meeting was held on 4 June, one of the free days while the 1st USSR Congress of People's Deputies was in session. On the request of the editors, it involved the participation of a group of people's deputies, as follows: V. Zolotukhin, permanent correspondent of the newspaper *FRUNZEVETS*, Turkestan Military District; V. Zubanov, party committee secretary, Khartsy Steel-Wire Plant; K. Lubchenko, docent, Moscow State University; V. Palm, academician, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, department head, Tartu State University; N. Petrakov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, deputy director of the Central Economics-Mathematical Institute; A. Yanenko, rector, Novosibirsk Engineering-Construction Institute; and V. Yarin, machine operator at the Nizhnyy Tagil Metallurgical Combine imeni V.I. Lenin.

The participants in the meeting shared their initial impressions of the work of the new supreme authority and expressed their views on the role and place of the party and the soviets in our society and their view on the latter's renovation. Following is a transcript of the exchange of views.

Hopes and Concerns

V. Zubanov. Honestly speaking, I did not expect such democracy at the congress. Although now, when I recall the first day, I can see that we could have worked even faster and more efficiently. The congress established a number of precedents which are bound to affect all social life. The first is live broadcasting, the qualitatively new level of glasnost. It is no longer possible for our future fora—republic or oblast—to violate it. The second is elections on an alternate basis which, it is true, for the time being are merely try-outs. However, we have already been able to consider several candidacies and it depended on us whether or not to include them in the ballots. The third and, in my view, the most important, is the real absence of areas closed to criticism. Managers on all levels have probably begun to realize that they are answerable to the people for all their actions.

The emotional tone of most speeches was natural. All too many problems have accumulated in our country, all too long did the people remain silent, and there was a great

deal of pain. I believe that even with the most efficient organization of the congress we would not have been able to avoid emotionality.

V. Zolotukhin. The fact that in the heat of emotions common sense and the desire to understand what the speakers were saying were frequently lost is a different matter. This was particularly obvious during the first days.

Not everything in the work of the congress was satisfactory. Its forms changed substantially. However, in terms of the content and the essence of the decisions which were made, in my view we did not advance all that much. The old approach could be felt also in the fact that, for example, by the fault of the Muscovites, many people had relied on their preparedness and their previously formulated program with which they came to the congress.

A. Yanenko. A great deal of sensible ideas were contained in the suggestions of the "Moscow group" and the Baltic area deputies. I do not conceal, however, that I voted against the Muscovites. Personally, I was insulted by their arrogant attitude toward the provinces, which was apparent in many of their speeches, as though the other deputies had nothing worthwhile to say. The efficiency of the congress would have been much greater had the "Moscow group" not lost tactically. Nonetheless, I am convinced that it would have been worthwhile for all delegations to be prepared in advance and to disseminate the motions with which they had come to the congress. This was done (if at all) at the very last moment.

There was virtually no preparatory stage, for which I blame the organizers of the congress. Essentially, we could only take a guess as to the problems which would have to be resolved.

V. Yarin. The presidium tried to organize the proceedings. The problem was that this was conceived as the latest effort on the part of the apparatus to impose something on others. I recall also the time when we deprived ourselves of feedback by rejecting the roll call in voting. We are now harvesting the results: telephone calls by the hundreds, and efforts to exonerate oneself and to prove that "I was not one of those."

K. Lubchenko. We took poorly into consideration the entirely natural psychological differences among the representatives of the different regions and among groups of people rallied by common interests. Let us consider the question of alternate elections for the Supreme Soviet. From the abstract viewpoint the idea was excellent. I, for example, supported it warmly until I was able to understand the views of the Baltic area. We could have deprived entire areas of the possibility of having their own representatives in the Supreme Soviet. By submitting this motion to the congress, the "Moscow group" lost a great deal in the eyes of the majority. As a result, many intelligent and good specialists were kept out of the Supreme Soviet. Clearly, the group should

have assessed the situation more soberly and determined what, in the final account, was preferable politically, such as reaching a compromise and coordinating interests or else sticking to its own views. Generally speaking, this is a very serious and essential problem.

N. Petrakov. A major leap forward was made in the area of glasnost and freedom of speech, and in the emancipation of the people. However, I could not say the same about democracy. The rights of minorities were not clearly defined. Actually, the only thing that a minority can consider as being protected is the possibility of making its statements public as official materials. Procedures for open, secret and roll-call voting have not been developed, although in many situations they are very important.

It was obvious long before the congress (as indicated by life itself) that two most important problems had to be discussed: the condition of the economy (and, naturally, the matter of ecology) and relations among nationalities. They are closely interrelated, for it is precisely the condition of our economy that triggered requirements governing the sovereignty of republics in which means of economic self-protection assume a particular meaning. This is the root of the social and political tension in the country. Unfortunately, in the course of the debates undeservedly little was said about economic problems. The choice of the speakers was, in my view, not entirely right: writers and journalists spoke boldly and interestingly. The result, however, was not a meaningful debate on the most important matter: the reasons for the economic crisis and the ways of solving it.

V. Zolotukhin. I was in touch with Tashkent every morning. Some voters voiced their support. Others were indignant at the fact that many of the deputies were being passive. But what did they understand by being active: to take the floor and deliver thunderous and sharp speeches? I consider activeness as the ability to achieve a specific objective.

V. Yarin. Incidentally, I suggested the following to the "Moscow group:" Let us choose three or four items, settle them and just go on. My proposal was rejected. I am not dramatizing the situation but I fear greatly that any given group of deputies who failed to achieve their targets at the congress may begin to heat up new passions. Unfortunately, as it is we have passions more than we need. In politics all emotions, in my view, should be controlled by reason. I believe that the deputy groups should have made their positions clearer.

K. Lubenchenko. The essence of any parliament is the struggle among different programs. Naturally, this takes place within the limits of civilized pluralism. But look at the irresponsible statements which came out of our mouths! Deputies are being rated as intelligent and stupid. There is also talk about some kind of storm troops. We saw the reaction to all this! It may have been that a person spoke uncautiously. The damage which this

causes to the common cause, however, is quite great. We have enough problems and no need for new ones.

V. Palm. The harm this causes is great. At present our People's Front, the progressive segment of the party, has been able to convince the people that the main task is for the republic to gain its independence within the USSR, to make participation in it advantageous to all and to abandon extreme formulations of the question. But tell us how to talk with the people after all those accusations which were voiced by some speakers, especially addressed at us?

V. Zolotukhin. Unfortunately, lack of information as well as low political standards and low debate ethics were displayed at our congress.

N. Petrakov. Let me also add to that lack of political responsibility on the part of the deputies as well as competence, economic in particular. Many of them had won the elections by making broad programmatic promises. Thus, according to some estimates the cost of meeting all such promises would be about 500 billion rubles! This does not include the solution of ecological problems, the assessment of which is difficult. The Aral alone would probably double that amount.

K. Lubenchenko. During the congress we repeatedly violated the letters of the law, as the voters noted. We told them and told ourselves about a rule of law state but we display an unusual light-heartedness toward it and we are ready again and again to replay, to vote once more, all for the sake of achieving results. A people's deputy could say that either someone who he does not like should leave the congress or else that he would resign his mandate. Such a person should be told to do it and go. As a whole, however, we are not ready for this and it appears that we still fail to understand the entire gravity of the problem.

V. Zolotukhin. Some deputies asked from the rostrum: Where were our scientists and what did they suggest to the workers? Such statements also were applauded.... I know many workers who are intellectuals in terms of their way of life and thinking and the way they perceive and assess all that is happening in society. Why pit one against the other? I believe that in a rule of law state equal attention and respect should be paid to the voice of anyone—worker, peasant or intellectual.

V. Zubanov. Attempts to pit the working class against the intelligentsia indeed took place. But then let me take as an example my own brother, my parents and my wife's parents, who are all workers. I personally am a full-time secretary. Whose interests am I defending as a deputy? A great deal here is confused. Lenin, as we know, belonged to the nobility; Engels was the son of a factory owner, but no one would dare to say that they poorly defended the interests of the workers.

Let me say frankly that the deputies did not always reflect the views of their voters. Also, not everyone is

satisfied with the elections to the Supreme Soviet. However, it would be difficult to expect anything else, considering the obvious imperfection of the electoral law itself, the basic shortcomings of which (the system of district meetings above all) must be corrected.

V. Zolotukhin. In my view, the congress reflects the deployment of social forces and interests as they were in January-March, during the electoral campaign. Live broadcasting brought into motion psychological mechanisms as well: the voter can no longer be indifferent as to who was elected in his district, and what was his actual contribution to the work of the congress and to the formulation of constructive programs and decisions.

In many areas elections were a formality. Today the sociopsychological situation in those areas has indeed begun to change. We have formulated a clear procedure for the recall of deputies and I am confident that the structure of the next congress will be somewhat different. Unquestionably, a great deal depends on the political standards of the deputies and the voters, the level of maturity and the competence of public opinion.

Proceeding from the Realities of Life

V. Yarin. I believe it important to determine the extent to which the congress, the congress debates, and the deployment of forces in it reflect the actual situation in the country and the complex and sometimes conflicting processes which are developing in society, the state and the governmental structures, politics and economics. They both reflect and influence them. As member of the Central Committee I attended the plenum which was held while the congress was in session. I believe that it was precisely under its influence that a variety of viewpoints were expressed at the plenum and no one considered this a tragedy. However, in my view such an influence should not be confused with interfering in the internal affairs of the CPSU. At the congress, however, we heard statements of this nature which, in my view, are simply politically groundless. I must point out that no civilized country prescribes to its parties what their internal structure should be. In our country, apparently, there are those who believe that if there is democracy everything is permitted.

V. Palm. The objective reasons for this must be kept in mind. A party without rivals, proclaiming that it expresses the interests of the entire people, cannot separate itself from public control. Therefore, until Article 6 of the USSR Constitution has been deleted (according to which the CPSU is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system), however it may be reorganized, the party will not assume the place which we would like it to have.

Let us recall that in Leningrad the party apparatus tried to use the old methods to impose its will on the voters, and failed. In our country, in Estonia, the party, taking into consideration the demands of the autonomous social movements, including the People's Front, which

included many party members, abandoned the administrative-command behavior and adopted all the progressive suggestions submitted by these movements. The result was that all three leaders of the republic—the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman and the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers chairman—were elected people's deputies defeating the other candidates.

A. Yanenko. Are you not contradicting yourself? You claim that party workers who conscientiously implement their obligations and promptly respond to the realities of life are honored and respected by the people. Perhaps the problem may not be in Article 6 of the Constitution.

I consider as entirely accurate and sensible for the ruling party to formulate the general, the strategic line of development of the society. The task of the party members is to implement it. The methods through which such a policy is implemented is a different matter....

What about the 96 percent vote for M.S. Gorbachev, the party's Central Committee general secretary, for chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet? Does this not mean total trust in the CPSU? Or else the fact that 87 percent of the participants in the congress were party members?

V. Zolotukhin. I agree that in that same Leningrad the elections were lost not by the party but by specific leaders. I am confident that if all party members in the city and the oblast had actively joined in the struggle for their leaders and in organizational work, they would have won. The question is whether these people are real leaders followed by the party masses. In our country, unfortunately, candidates for the positions of first secretaries are nominated by superior authorities. Had they been suggested by the party members themselves, the authority of the leaders would have been much greater.

V. Palm. In my view, you are nonetheless making a superficial assessment of events. Before claiming that the party won the elections one should determine the following: What is the party? Are we not confusing the party with its apparatus?

Under the conditions of a one-party system, naturally, the bulk of the politically and socially active population is within CPSU ranks. However, these people by no means mandatorily hold the same views as the apparatus. In my view, what exists in the party itself now are serious contradictions and diverging interests. They clash among each other, including at the elections. In the electoral campaign, for example, I opposed two members of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and enjoyed the support of the People's Front which includes, as was pointed out, many members of the CPSU. Therefore, who won the elections: the People's Front or the party? Who among us represents the party: Is it I, who represent some party members, or my opponents who are supported by other party members?

Question. Our discussion leads to the following question: What are the differences between the program of the People's Front and the position of the leadership of the Estonian Communist Party?

V. Palm. The People's Front drafted its program earlier and the republic's leadership essentially accepted it. Within the People's Front itself, however, there is a wing which holds extreme positions on the matter of independence, and another, an opposite wing which is close in its views to the progressive segment of the party's leadership. In Tartu, my native city, the People's Front, the CPSU Gorkom and Raykom, the university, the soviet authorities and the press all act in harmony, although in different ways. For that reason we believe that perestroika in our country is irreversible and that it won a political victory.

K. Lubenchenko. Nonetheless, let me point out the following: it was said here that deleting Article 6 of the Constitution would mark a step toward pluralism and democracy or, in general, that it would be a progressive step. However, is it possible to influence political reality this way? The CPSU and its present status and role are an objective fact and however we may be changing legal norms, if one way or another the CPSU remains (such juridical standards could be deleted altogether) it would remain an objective fact, it would not become something else.

What appears, however, is another problem which perhaps should be the subject of a separate discussion and debate: the establishment of Soviet parliamentarianism under the conditions of a single party system. This topic remains totally unstudied.

V. Palm. Essentially, however, we do not have a one-party system. Within the CPSU, as we pointed out, there are opposing forces which disagree with other perhaps even more than do different parties in other countries. Incidentally, the proceedings of the Congress of People's Deputies confirms this observation. And when we are speaking of the constitutional status of the CPSU, what we actually mean is its apparat.

A. Yanenko. Nonetheless, we should not equate the party with the apparat. I am confident that 90 to 95 percent of the party members are worthy of this title, although many of them became inactive during the long period of stagnation and from the habit of obeying decisions made by someone else, of agreeing to have someone else think for them and become part of their flesh and blood. A very bad situation has developed with the party reserve. Yet the party needs a fresh spirit. It is important to seek capable young people, including among those same "informals."

I repeat: the party is not to be blamed for all the difficulties experienced by our society. For some reason many critics forget the positive things which it has accomplished. Had there not been the April 1985 Plenum, the majority of today's deputies could not have even dreamed of a parliamentary mandate. Problems

piled up over decades and now, unquestionably, we must undertake to solve them. Obviously, they cannot be solved in 1 or 2 years.

V. Zubanov. We frequently play the following trump card: the party found within itself the strength to initiate social renovation. However, something else must be said to the people as well: the party acted like a sensibly thinking person, for the country was on the brink of a precipice. It either had to fall or find other ways. It is true that in the past we frequently saw the precise lack of such sensible thinking....

V. Palm. Let us not forget, as we debate, that there is a force which could prove to be more powerful than the party: economics. It is not inconceivable that economics can put everything in its proper place quite quickly. According to quite competent economists, a financial crisis is brewing. The resolutions adopted at the congress set a 2 year term for the implementation of steps aimed at improving the financial situation. I believe that this is too long: I fear that unless extraordinary steps are taken, everything we are discussing will turn out totally meaningless. An economic collapse could radically change the sociopsychological situation.

N. Petrakov. This may not be the right time for engaging in an overall economic analysis. Nonetheless, I would like to mention this problem in connection with the functions of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The greatest achievement of human civilization is the division between legislative and executive power, which includes the area of economics. For more than 6 decades this was essentially practiced in our country on paper only. Naturally, the Council of Ministers submitted the 5-year plans for consideration by the Supreme Soviet which ratified them. The entire procedure, however, was pure formality. Today this can be easily proved: this notorious budget deficit, as N.I. Ryzhkov said at the congress, has existed in our country for quite some time. However, it was carefully concealed by the Ministry of Finance. One does not have to be an economist to realize that the disproportions in the national economy, which were discussed even during Brezhnev's times, cannot be combined in the least with a positive budget. This applies to an even greater extent to our budget, which accounts for the lion's share of the economy: virtually all capital investments "move" through it. A.I. Lukyanov justifiably described the old Supreme Soviet as the "apparatus." Therefore, this apparatus Supreme Soviet (which also included independent-minded people who, however, were mired in the inertia of thoughtless voting) has cost our people many billions of rubles. Let us recall simply the last session of the previous parliament. The approved budget had a net deficit of 35 billion (plus 63 billion borrowed from the bank). However, the minister of finance did not mention even a single word about how to cover this deficit and no single deputy raised the question or submitted a motion. Yet if nothing is used to compensate for no more than those 35 billion, it means

that we are relying only on the printing press, with all its consequences. That is the way the budget was approved, and the people were proud that finally the truth had come out.

And then there appeared the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers 15 March decree on financial improvement of the economy. I do not even mention the fact that this document was half a year late (the measures it included should have been formulated at that same Supreme Soviet session); in my view, it conflicts with the principle of a legitimate economy. To begin with, the party's Central Committee should not pass government resolutions. Second, the steps earmarked in the decree amend, to a certain extent, the annual and 5-year plans, something which should be done only with the knowledge of the Supreme Soviet, which gives them legal status. The executive power, however, proved yet once again that it is doing what it wants, knowing that the Supreme Soviet will "swallow" anything.

It is also worth looking at the way this decree contemplates finding 29 billion rubles (clearly, another 6 billion to be printed). I am citing three figures only: saving on centralized capital investments, 7.5 billion; additional reduction of the administrative apparatus, 50 million; curtailing social programs, 1.8 billion. However, 7.5 billion is no more than 6 percent of the sum total of centralized capital investments. That is all that the ministries managed to procure. Meanwhile, the 1.8 billion rubles withdrawn from social programs account for nearly 50 percent of all appropriations for such purposes. Please note the following: Where are such savings coming from? They come from wage increases to rural librarians (this sounds particularly blasphemous in the light of the statement made at our congress by Academician Likhachev, who pointed out what few academies are being allocated for culture). This also affects extending prenatal and postnatal paid leave and food in kindergartens and nurseries.... If this is being considered, a consultation with the Supreme Soviet is mandatory. Had I been a member of it, I would have recommended above all that we reduce unfinished construction and make the volumes of capital investments consistent with the possibilities of construction organizations. Instead, we initiate thousands of construction projects in our country with an average work force of 10 to 12 people per project.

The conclusion is simple: one of the principles of democratic management should be control by the legislative over the executive branch. The new Supreme Soviet must, through its commissions, extend strict control over the activities of the Council of Ministers, the Gosplan and other ministries and departments.

V. Yarin. Obviously, we indeed need a gradual approach. It would be naive to presume that in our very first congress we would be able clearly to distinguish between legislative and executive functions and between soviets and the party. Generally speaking, I for one cannot well

imagine how a soviet can exist without the party or the party without a soviet. Naturally, it is not a question of who should substitute for whom.

V. Zolotukhin. We already mentioned Article 6 of the Constitution. I fully agree with the fact that the party is the leading and guiding force. However, I question the view that it is the nucleus of the political system of society. It is the soviets of people's deputies that should be such a nucleus. At the time that the Constitution was adopted, this article reflected the actual state of affairs in the society. In revising the fundamental law, clearly we should define more specifically the place of the party and its functions and tasks. I believe that we must codify the fact that in our country it is precisely the soviets that are the nucleus of the political system.

The slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" will be implemented when the local soviet will be able to make political decisions, when it will have economic power and its own budget, acquired independently of ministries, departments and enterprises located on its territory and, finally, when the soviet will be able to influence public opinion.

It is only then that we shall begin to deal with the departmental apparatus as well. I recall the letter of a pensioner, which was published in the press. He said, addressing himself to the congress deputies: "You will have as much power as you yourselves take!"

N. Petrakov. Yes, this is true. Initially, however, I believe that contradictions with the apparatus are perfectly possible. Why? Not because it consists of some kind of evil people but because they have simply not become accustomed to control. Initially I predict that in this clash the advantage will be on the side of ministries and departments, for they have a greater amount of information at their disposal. However, the situation should gradually change. It is presumed, to begin with, that the commissions of the Supreme Soviet will include not only its members but also people's deputies, many of whom are specialists. Such commissions will be given, furthermore, the right to set up expert groups, as they deem fit and not as the ministers wish. Finally, I believe that the ice has cracked in the information area as well. We can already see how it has expanded: figures for military and space expenditures and foreign debt have been quoted. It is to be hoped that the members of the commissions and the experts will be granted broad access also to restricted information if this is required for their work. Therefore, this process will develop through contradictions to consolidation.

The practice of work by commissions to which the minister will have to defend his programs and in which the deputies will count the money should teach both sides to make competent decisions. Today all deputies wave a single magic wand: conversion. Naturally, this is a major reserve but it cannot cover all the necessary expenditures. Conversion cannot be achieved without

additional capital investments: a plant which is producing tanks, let us say, cannot be simply converted to making beds.... In my view, one of the main sources is found precisely in the civilian sectors, in the rejection of gigantomania about which a great deal was said at the congress.

Let us consider at this point the question of building a petroleum and gas chemical complex in Tyumen Oblast, about which KOMMUNIST also wrote. It is not even a question of whether the project is good or bad. I believe that, in any case, we cannot implement it for the simple reason that we cannot make such big investments over such a long term, when we need investments with a quick turnover. I do not even mention the fact that we do not have the necessary technical-economic substantiations or alternate options, projections about the situation on the world market for such goods, or an ecological evaluation; there are no estimates of foreign currency or overall returns. Nonetheless, approval has been given for talks and for signing contracts. In this case we have, on the one hand, an international consortium whereas on our side we have a few ministries, each one acting separately....

I submitted a deputy question in which, specifically, I suggested that a procedure be established according to which no single project worth, shall we say, in excess of 2 billion rubles could be passed by the government without the expert evaluation of the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, once again I have gone back to the problem of the struggle against illegality.

V. Zolotukhin. While I go back to the claim that the congress is accurately reflecting the state of affairs in the country. Let me repeat that if there were to be elections today, the composition of the deputies would be clearly different. Actually, this is an assumption. Meanwhile, we must work on the basis of the realities of life.

Toward the Renovation of Society

A. Yanenko. In my view, the most difficult problem is that of understanding the nature of socialism and its new face. Today we do not know what socialism is. For generations it was something which we considered sacred and now it turns out that we were not following the right path.

Above all, I would not like to see socialism as a society of consumers. The attitude of the people toward labor has changed as a result of equalizations and deductions. It has not become the type of yardstick which it should be. I would very much like to see in our country working people enjoying honor and respect. Unfortunately, in recent years, with the appearance of cooperatives, there has been, in my understanding, yet another reassessment of values: a certain segment of the population has begun to earn fabulous amounts of money essentially not as a result of its labor.

V. Zubanov. I am convinced that our long-term socialist future depends, above all, on the economy. This is the

foundation of everything else. It must be focused on the socialist market, although essentially the laws of the marketplace are the same for both capitalism and socialism. When people asked from the rostrum of the congress who had invented leasing and the cooperatives, deputy P. Bunich accurately said that they were invented by mankind. There are things that people accepted thousands of years ago; there are normal economic laws which cannot be ignored and which must be observed in our work; there are various types of ownership, such as leasing—state, cooperative and private (which, incidentally, is not prohibited by the Constitution). We must convert from the distorted methods of economic management to the normal distribution of profits within enterprises. A normal tax system must be applied.

As to the power of the soviets, we are merely determining its principles. I believe that the party or any social organization must operate within the framework of the Constitution. It has the right to formulate a strategy of development and submit it to the people, present it at elections and, having obtained mandates, implement its plans. The real power of the soviets is impossible without freedom of the press and, therefore, criticism. Otherwise any talk of democracy is nothing but noise.

Naturally, socialism is a union of free republics. Not separate states but precisely republics which have concluded an alliance because it is to their advantage, and which work jointly, proceeding from the interests of each republic and of the Union as a whole.

V. Palm. The main question is what type of state system do we wish to have. If we proceed from the formula that a "strong center means strong republics," this would essentially become a unitarian state. To the Estonian people, however, this is unacceptable! Our formula is that "strong republics mean a strong Union." We favor true equality, absolutely voluntary and equal Union relations, granting Union republics the right to a veto. Furthermore, we believe that such a right should be granted also to autonomous republics and autonomous okrugs on matters affecting their specific population. No one has the right to destroy Northern nature, however much petroleum it may have!

K. Lubchenko. Does this wish not indicate that the Baltic republics would like to have a "weak center?"

V. Palm. Not a "weak center" but a strong Union. A Union of republics. What, generally speaking, is a "center?" Who does it represent?

K. Lubchenko. It represents a federative principle.

V. Palm. Federative also means joint republic.

V. Zolotukhin. In speaking of our vision of socialism we must not, I believe, ignore also the question of changes in the social structure of the society. The present division into classes and strata is quite arbitrary.

V. Zubanov. Yes, there also are people who speculate on such a lack of clarity and who are trying, as we pointed

out, to pit the working class against the intelligentsia, forgetting the peasantry. Clearly, there are those who find such pitting, which is improper in a rule of law state, to their advantage.

K. Lubchenko. The social structure is defined by the structure of production forces, is this not true? The industrial revolution and the appearance of machines and factories were what created the working class. This was followed by automated industry which requires an entirely different type of worker. Is this the same working class which preceded the second revolution? Naturally, it is not. At the same time, a proletarianization of engineering labor is taking place, which turning it into normed labor.

Why did we deny the existence of the second industrial revolution? Because during it a new production system and new technology appeared, creating a new class or social group. The working class, in our old understanding, is not an ideological part of this system.

V. Zubanov. A class is defined (among others) by the attitude toward the means of production. What is the attitude of our intelligentsia, the workers and the peasantry? In our country the means of production belong to the state. We must determine who really manages them and only then determine who is a worker, who is an intellectual and who, perhaps, is a member of some kind of different class.

A. Yanenko. Let us, however, go back to the economy, to the problem of the market. How will a person feel under the conditions of the functioning of a market? It is important to consider this factor above all. Furthermore, what distinguishes a socialist from a capitalist market?

V. Zolotukhin. I believe that the distinction lies in the correlation between private and social ownership. By virtue of existing circumstances, social or, more precisely, state ownership is substantially bigger on the socialist market than is private ownership. However, nowhere in the world is there a "pure" market, for this would mean chaos. Everywhere we find state economic control. We could try, by using artificial props, such as social competition and state inspection, to replace competition and use the clash of opinions and views based on different social interests with criticism and self-criticism. However, this would yield nothing good. In the final account, it is only the economy that will truly put everything in its proper place.

V. Palm. Do we not find in our image of socialism elements of utopia? We say "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work." But what does "according to his work" mean? If we proceed from the theory of the market or the theory of value, one could easily prove that in the foreseeable future any economy should be a market economy. A nonmarket economy is impossible if we wish to advance. Our main difficulty, all these years, has been the lasting concept that we can build a socialism without a market.

The elimination of the market means the elimination of what has been created in the course of many hundreds of years in the development of mankind; it means a retreat, i.e., going back to the primitive forms of state or semi-feudal capitalism, which was particularly familiar to Russia. In the 1930s we combined a kind of slave-owning sector, which was focused within the Gulag system, with a feudal sector which consisted of the kolkhozes. This included elements of serfdom, for without the lack of internal passports the peasants were unable to leave their villages. Plant workers were given noneconomic incentives. Naturally, this had nothing in common with socialism. A developed production process cannot be managed on the basis of negative incentives. Marx himself said that the more developed a production process is, the more important a positive incentive becomes. In the final account, such incentive means the profit earned by the manager-owner.

The problem, however, is that if we broaden the range of ownership and owners, the amount of such an appropriated profit becomes increasingly great. This means that we require an increasingly intensive development of production forces in order not to consume that which should go into reproduction. This links us also with utopianism in the draft submitted by G. Popov, whom I respect, concerning collective ownership. In the immediate future, until the level of output has reached a qualitatively new level, it is impossible to have several actual owners.

K. Lubchenko. I consider the problem of socialism on the logical and specific-historical level. On the former, there are two aspects: socialism as a scientific category and as an ideological concept. In the first case I agree with Marx, although he uses at this point the term "communism." Let us look at what he says in "*German Ideology*:" "To us communism is not a **condition** which must be established; it is not an **ideal** which reality must fit. What we describe as communism is the **actual** movement which removes the present condition."

I view socialism as a progressive, a conscious movement aimed at bringing justice. I entirely agree with the fact that the share of socialism in some aspects could be higher in countries which we do not describe as socialist. In other words, if we bear in mind the level of reasonable management of the system and the level of justice reached in different areas, the result is that socialism acts as the universal category, which simply means the progressive dynamics of society.

However, it was not accidental that Marx and Engels described ideology as being a nonscientific phenomenon, interpreting it as the result of the ideas of the dominant class, aimed at perpetuating their rule. It was on the basis of that ideology, as seen by Lenin, that we developed a kind of religious system, having dogmatized our understanding of socialism to its extreme. This became a stricter system compared to the actual religious systems with Jehovah, Christ or Mohammed at the top. The reason is that our system is of a comprehensive abstract

nature. It does not allow, in general, for the possibility of determining our own attitude toward "God." This god-communism totally dissolves within it a self-aware individual....

V. Palm. The time has come to take the positions of sober scientific analysis of socioeconomic phenomena and, on this basis, to formulate plans, projects and programs. There simply is no other way of advancing.

K. Lubchenko. Perhaps the understanding of the nature of socialism on the specific-historical level in our country and what it is in general, what is its new feature, would be helped if we were to establish its values. If we speak of socialism as a movement, as the elimination of the current imperfect condition, this means, first of all, establishing a reasonable society, a scientific approach and a scientific management of all processes. Second, it means a moral approach. Third, it means restoring the sovereignty of the individual. This does not apply to the cold and callous egotist who developed in recent decades but a person who is creating these main values, whose feet are planted on the homeland, the land. Finally, renovated socialism also means a rule of law state. It combines reason with freedom. It means popular rule based on the rule of law. However, here we have a major problem. We have proclaimed the principle of the supremacy of the law. However, the point is that a law may not express an aspect of legality which is merely an ideological means or a slogan. The supremacy of such a law is a fiction. Furthermore, a law may not express in a truly juridical form rights, obligations and responsibilities. This is another fiction, for we cannot build a rule of law state on the basis of the supremacy of such a "law."

Hence the problem of the rule of law. A law must be legal. For the time being, many laws are illegal. We have a kind of positive sanctioning of illegality. Let us recall ukases which are being criticized today. Yes, perestroika must be able to defend itself but it must do so without presenting a mortal threat to democracy itself! We created these ukases without thinking about what they could lead to under our specific circumstances.

Furthermore, a law cannot be legal if it essentially can be invalidated with departmental rules. Consequently, this type of "supremacy" of the law is equally unsuitable. A law is not legal, furthermore, if it is not consistent with objective reality. We proclaimed "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work." However, is it possible to grant power to a law which must be based on the principle of socialist justice, i.e., on paying for labor in accordance with its quantity and quality, under the conditions of the existence of socioeconomic privileges which are totally unrelated to labor results? Under such circumstances there can be no rule of law state and we have no right to say that we are taking a step toward socialism without having resolved this problem.

Finally, a law is not legal unless it reflects the basic foundations of society, the system of production relations functioning on the basis of the equality among those to whom it applies. It seems to me that the comrades who spoke before me described socialism precisely as being a market which includes the universal interest as its central feature. We must find a way of combining within the market this universal interest with the interests of every individual person and individual area.

V. Zubanov. But is it possible to structure a rule of law state if there is no soap on the market, if there are shortages everywhere? The consequence of this is corruption and crime.

K. Lubchenko. A rule of law state cannot be achieved without having the most basic items, this is true. We must begin with economics. At this point, however, it turns out that we have not solved the problems of ecology, the use of troops, etc. Obviously, economics and the political structure are interwoven within each other.

V. Zubanov. In any case, we must create the type of system in which man will feel good morally, psychologically and materially.

To begin with, we must be able to tell the people: we had 10 problems and we have solved three of them. Another seven may still be there but if we start a real movement, there will also be greater confidence and matters will develop better.

K. Lubchenko. Let me point out yet another thing, I consider important. Unfortunately, we have awakened a desire not only for revolutionary and radical speeches but also for drastic action. I fear that we shall raze the old world to the ground without thinking of the fact that we will also be destroying the bricks from which everything must be built. One can build and restructure only by using that which already exists. This must not be forgotten.

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PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Science-Intensive Output and Defense Industry Conversion

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[Article by Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Kuznetsov, postgraduate student, Department of Economics, Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, and Feliks Vladimirovich Shirokov, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences]

[Text] The problem of conversion (we are using this term which, of late, has already been accepted in various

publications, although in this case it would have been more accurate to describe the conversion from military to civilian industry as reconversion) of science-intensive industrial sectors is assuming today prime significance, for at least two reasons.

To begin with, the structural reorganization of the economy requires the utilization of the entire intellectual potential of society, the scientific one above all. Furthermore all (with the exception of instrument manufacturing) science-intensive industrial sectors (those in which the cost of science exceeds 5 percent of that of commodity output) are today concentrated in the defense complex. The defense complex is the monopoly owner of the absolute majority of high-technology production facilities. How to transfer it to civilian production? This fundamental problem of conversion is no less important than the traditional question of what civilian goods should replace the production of military items? There will always be types of goods which meet special long-term social interests (not only defense but, for example, space). For the time being they cannot yield any significant direct results. However, their high technical standard could lead to the dissemination of the most advanced solutions throughout the economy. Had we had an efficient mechanism for technology transfers, for example, the national economic efficiency of our space programs would have been substantially higher, and the question of shutting them down would have simply become groundless.

Second, today the entire developed world is entering a new economic era in which information becomes the main economic factor. Unless we begin to implement information industry programs in the immediate future, it would be no exaggeration whatsoever to say that by the end of the century we would find ourselves on the fringes of contemporary civilization.

The first step in the implementation of this program will be closely related to war industry conversion, partially for the reason that the sectors which produce technical facilities for the information industry developed in our country essentially under the influence of defense requirements and, to this day, are part of the defense complex. The main feature, however, is found elsewhere: the development of information is based on the unobstructed exchange of the results of research among scientific subdivisions, companies and countries. Necessarily, the war industry presumes barriers in the way of such exchange of knowledge and technologies. Should such barriers be excessively high, economic stagnation inevitably develops.

What type of mechanisms for technological exchange between military and civilian production are encountered throughout the world? How did the Soviet mechanism develop? What should be done to change it? These problems require extensive discussion. Should we fail to solve them we would be unable to attain the desired objectives of conversion.

I

A close look at the events which took place in the developed capitalist countries following the reduction in military expenditures, as was the case after World War II, for example, would reveal a mandatory change in the economic mechanism of interaction between military and civilian industry.

Three mechanisms of exchange of technology and results of NIOKR between military and civilian industries can be singled out in postwar history. The first developed in the United States, where the Department of Defense established the overall trend of scientific and technical progress in high-technology sectors and supported a broad range of investigative basic and applied research. What is important here is precisely the function of the centralized formulation of scientific and technical priorities and ensuring their observance. Naturally, the fact that this task was and remains a function of the military considerably increased the cost and limited the transfer of technology to civilian industry. In Japan, for example, such functions are being implemented much more efficiently by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. However, the mechanism of limited secrecy for individual military NIOKR, as established in the United States, and subsequent declassification of confidential projects, ensure their active commercial use. Furthermore, each military program stipulates the use of technologies developed within it for peaceful purposes.

Currently an active reverse transfer of technology from civilian to military industry is taking place. For example, the microprocessor was not developed and applied for the first time by the military. The leading corporations in the U.S. electronic industry have long been capable of conducting virtually any type of basic and applied research without relying on Defense Department orders. Thus, defense orders placed with IBM account for even under 4 percent of its volume of sales. Such circumstances make changes in the technological policy of the U.S. Department of Defense: priority is given to the task of finding the most advanced civilian research and using it in the implementation of military programs. This is by no means always possible, even despite the financial support guaranteed by the Defense Department.

The second mechanism functioned in the 1950s and 1960s in Western European electronic industry. Defense research there was not of an investigative nature but was reduced to duplicating and improving on U.S. military NIOKR. No breakthroughs can be achieved this way, for which reason there was no technology transfer whatsoever. Furthermore, the defense industry was protected from competition through state orders, while civilian science-intensive sectors, which had essentially no technological policy of their own, were forced to resort to the market duplication of American results.

The result of the unquestionable priority of the status of military science-intensive production and its stability, occasionally bordering on ossification, and insufficient

competition in the civilian sectors was that the Western European countries found themselves unprepared for the "microprocessor revolution" which developed starting with the mid-1970s. The lagging of Western Europe in the area of advanced science-intensive production behind the United States and Japan remains significant to this day, despite the development of wide-scale intergovernmental "LV," "ESPRIT" and "EURICA" programs.

Be that as it may, civilian science-intensive goods are being produced in all developed capitalist countries on a varying qualitative basis of elements, the market for which operates independently of orders placed by military departments.

Such is not the case in the USSR: technological exchanges between civilian science-intensive sectors in the national economy and the defense industry are reduced, on the one hand, to transferring to the civilian consumers substandard goods—elements and technological equipment which, for one reason or another, do not meet the requirements of priority military output, and the absorption by the latter of the results of civilian NIOKR with no visible returns whatsoever, on the other. A kind of "wasteless production" develops, within which military customers select the highest quality goods they need while the remainder is left to the manufacturers of investment science-intensive items (data processing devices, industrial electronics, etc.). With the exception of extremely limited imports, this is the latter's only source of complementing items. The obvious rejects, which do not meet the requirements of such second priority items, become part of the technological area of household electronics and other civilian scientific-intensive output. That is precisely why here the cost of assembling, adjusting and repairing items is so disproportionately high. Therefore, independent civilian microelectronic production facilities to which defense subdivisions could transfer advanced technology simply do not exist. Meanwhile, research collectives are actively working in civilian VUZs, scientific research institutes and design bureaus, the results of which are frequently of defense value. Furthermore, civilian science and, partially, civilian machine building have such scant equipment that a researcher, in order somehow to implement his ideas, is forced to seek the support of the military-industrial complex, for he has no other alternatives: he not only cannot rely on the help of a risk capital financing institution (so far, we have no such institutions in our country) but, as a rule, his project is rejected by the civilian sectors for lack of funds.

"Wasteless" production and "scientific and technical corvee" are two interrelated aspects of the domestic mechanism for technological interaction between the military and civilian sectors in the science-intensive industrial sectors. The task of conversion is to radically change this mechanism.

II

On what socioeconomic interests could we rely in the implementation of this task, and what will be the social forces which will oppose it? A dogma, which greatly hinders the solution of the problem of conversion, is the concept that the domestic defense complex has no particular long-term economic interests.

The priority status of defense industries guarantees them a stability but, at the same time, also creates a monopoly. Any monopoly begins, above all, by securing the conditions for its future growth. The limits of this growth are determined, on the one hand, by the need to go through developed procedures of public control over the amount of funds allocated for defense production, the efficiency of their use and the real possibility of steadily turning to the civilian sectors and the world market for the latest technologies, on the other. Since in the type of administrative management system we have such restrictions are inoperative, the growth of monopoly structures related to the defense complex has become hypertrophied.

It is also determined by the particular method used for involving the USSR in the international exchange of knowledge and technologies. The specific nature of contemporary high-technology output consists of the special role which is played by scientific research and design. A scientific and technical autarchy in the present world is impossible, and efforts to pursue such a policy lead to catastrophe. The growth of science-intensive technologies is based on a variety of forms of intergovernmental technological transfers: from the purchase of equipment and patents and the creation of joint enterprises to the exchange of students, scientists and specialists.

Any country lagging in its technological development begins by borrowing technologies. Such was, for example, Japan's industrial strategy in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union was not sold some new technologies because of their "dual" (military and civilian) purpose. However, even when purchases were possible, it was believed that under the conditions of a chronic scarcity of convertible currency it was unreasonable to purchase that which could be "borrowed for free." For these two reasons the practice of duplicating technical models, goods and blueprints, originating from the developed capitalist countries was widespread. Many design and scientific institutes dealt essentially with "adapting" borrowed science-intensive products. Such a strategy continued to be effective until the mid-1950s. Until then the industrial secret rested in the technical prototype as such, for which reason priority was given to the technology of its manufacturing, the unsanctioned borrowing of which was difficult and at that point, in frequent cases, simply impossible. That is precisely why increasingly the USSR was forced to turn to purchasing foreign equipment and technology.

Starting with the mid-1950s, we can single out four periods in the technological interaction between the USSR and the developed capitalist countries. The first lasted until the beginning of the 1960s. Within that period, computers, means of communications and other

equipment for twin purposes did not as yet play a decisive role in ensuring a country's defense capability. For that reason Soviet scientists and specialists had access to even the most advanced developments of foreign laboratories and had the opportunity not only to borrow technical prototypes but also to exchange scientific and technical ideas with their foreign colleagues.

Soviet computer designers visited leading foreign companies. For example, the structure of Manchester University's ATLAS machine design was used in designing the BESM-6 machine. It was largely thanks to the implementation of advanced ideas (ideas and not finished designs) that the success of the Soviet BESM-6 machine was secured and, at the same time, the myth of its autarchic originality born.

Starting with the beginning of the 1960s, the arms race turned into a "technological race." The radioelectronic industry assumed a strategically important significance in the development of armament systems. Immediately two alternatives appeared: to adopt either the American way of technological interaction between civilian and defense industries or the Western European, which was largely imitative. A very controversial third way was chosen. Defense industries, particularly those engaged in producing one-of-a-kind equipment, tried to focus on their own developments, while general-purpose equipment was created on the basis of Western technical prototypes. This was a means of ensuring priority for the defense industries: considering the scarcity of resources, they were being given a priority and, sometimes, a monopoly right to scientific investigations. The USSR Academy of Sciences Department of Technical Sciences was disbanded and its institutes transferred to the various departments. By this token the closed nature of the military sectors, which had already become apparent by the end of the 1950s, and their insufficient contribution to civilian economic sectors became increasingly apparent: the active shaping of "wasteless production" began. It was as of then that we took legitimate pride in the creation of space and defense science-intensive items and while wondering about the low quality of civilian goods.

Let us note that, in itself, borrowing from foreign technical experience is entirely justified. However, it was necessary to improve on the borrowed prototypes by applying our own ideas and, above all, to try to exhibit them on the world market. At that point the scientific and technical exchange between our country and the developed capitalist countries would begin to develop. In practice, however, this did not take place and quite soon the fulfillment of military orders clashed with the low standard of civilian production of high-technology items and their weak scientific support.

The significant increase in world petroleum prices after 1973 gave priority to energy-saving technologies and to the development of commercial science-intensive industries was drastically intensified in all developed countries. Since then such countries have followed a single

model of interaction between military and civilian high technology. The defense industry is based on an exceptionally well developed market in science-intensive goods, which prevents its monopoly and protects it from stagnation. Conversely, since that time the Soviet economy has been increasingly oriented toward ditch digging, for which reason the need for civilian electronics was neither pressing nor urgent. The existing need was met as was deemed needed by the defense departments, and the establishment of a "wasteless" production was completed. Subsequently it could only expand, with a stable growth of formal indicators, such as the volume of industrial output, which suited both domestic monopolies, represented by the radioelectronic ministries, as well as the central planning authorities.

Securing total secrecy in the overwhelming majority of science-intensive industries was elevated to the rank of state policy. Under those circumstances not only the transfer of technologies to the civilian economic sectors but, frequently, also the use of borrowed new developments in defense industry itself became impossible. An idea would be developed to the point of a prototype and, subsequently, would disappear without a trace within the defense complex, as though vanishing into a black hole.

Objectively, the strengthening of such monopoly structures could only benefit our military opponents. After the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan, at the end of 1979, an embargo and a breaking of commercial contacts with the USSR in the high technology area followed. Many companies closed down their offices in Moscow while others sharply reduced their personnel and stopped operations. The activities of KOKOM were sharply enhanced. The strictness applied in its export control varied according to the groups of commodities and technologies. In a somewhat simplified manner we could single out two groups: equipment and technology, the sale of which to the USSR was categorically forbidden, and commodities deliveries of which was undesirable but, in general, possible. The violation of the first prohibition entailed the use of far-reaching penalties, including jail sentences and forbidding companies which had violated the ban to export their goods to the United States. Supplying the USSR with goods included in other "soft" KOKOM lists was possible but only if a license to this effect had been procured. Such a license was greatly determined by a statement naming the end user.

Naturally, circuitous ways could be found as well. In such cases, according to our assessments, the cost of such purchases was several hundred percent higher, for the foreign suppliers wanted to be compensated for their risk and, along with the truly necessary equipment, we had to purchase also items which the seller wanted to unload but which we did not need all that much. Incidentally, this is one of the reasons (although not the main one) for the frequently inefficient nature of imported equipment.

This placed civilian science-intensive industries under double diktat. It was impossible for them to make a free choice of the necessary commodities on the world

market in selecting the most advanced science-intensive goods. Like the domestic market, this market became a "sellers market," which dictated both prices and delivery conditions. From the viewpoint of economic interaction, the main long-term task of conversion is, precisely, the elimination of this type of situation, which leads to the stagnation of civilian science-intensive industries and, after them, of the entire economy.

To this effect, it is necessary to remove the monopoly of some structures. To begin with, this applies to the central planning authorities, to which economic development is expressed exclusively in terms of the growth of official indicators. Since the result of changing the interrelationship between civilian and military industries would lead to removing from economic circulation low quality science-intensive output and a temporary drop in its growth rates of output, they oppose such changes. Second, it is the machinery of departments producing "high technology" goods, their sectorial institutes and foreign trade organizations that are interested in the existence of the embargo. It protects the domestic industry from competing against the latest foreign technology.

The embargo suited particularly well the personnel of foreign trade organizations, for under such circumstances their activities become virtually uncontrollable. Purchases of complex equipment are the result of lengthy discussions, in the course of which, as a rule, the initial asking price is lowered. The art of trading lies, precisely, in achieving a maximal price reduction without worsening the quality of purchased goods. It is very difficult to achieve this in ordinary deals, for the catalogues include referential prices of equipment. Contracts in which perhaps even some of the purchased commodities are subject to an embargo are a different matter. In this case one could agree on as high an initial price as one wishes and then lower it down to a level which is defined, among other factors, by the size of the bribe to the seller by the purchaser. Therefore, a reduction in the KOKOM lists, which becomes inevitable as a result of changing the mechanism of interaction between military and civilian production, becomes unsuitable to a large number of people.

The defense industries have achieved a number of truly major scientific and technical successes. This, however, cannot be used as an argument in opposing the need for the radical reorganization of the existing mechanism of technological exchanges. To begin with, the reason is that our departments are not short of expertise in undertaking projects involving extensive reports (the question becomes merely one of price). Under these circumstances, military programs are not simply unjustifiably expensive but, sometimes, even ridiculous in terms of their objectives. Thus, one of the central newspapers recently reported on the extensive development of an entirely secret propelling device for achieving velocities exceeding the speed of light. Second, whatever scientific and technical breakthroughs occurred were not thanks to

but despite the monopoly structures developed in domestic microelectronics and other high technology sectors.

The restructuring of "wasteless output" and the conversion of foreign exchange expenditures and their reallocation for civilian needs and the demonopolizing of high-technology sectors are the three main trends leading to an efficient conversion.

In our view, in the immediate future there will be an growing trend toward the reallocation of foreign currency. Such currency will have to be spent for the purchasing of complete systems for the production of household electronic items, which are new to us, such as video recorders, for example, and the implementation of programs for the technical retooling of the light and food industries. Therefore, we must consider the foreign economic support of conversion. We must display on the world markets civilian goods produced by the defense complex. Possibly, within the framework of conversion, we should set up joint enterprises with companies from the capitalist countries. This may interest corporations in the United States, Western Europe and South Korea. The powerful intellectual potential of the country makes it possible to organize, if not now but at least the future, the production of equipment based on essentially new ideas such as, for example, neurocomputers and their software, and structures for parallel data processing. The marketing of such items would enable us to benefit from the "advantages of the lagging," which is the lack of substantial inertia in advancing down tried technological directions.

The demonopolizing of science-intensive sectors is also related to changes in the system of control over international technology transfers. The studies conducted by American specialists have indicated that strict export controls in this area are ineffective. The point is that the efficiency of technological transfer is determined by the possibility of duplication, using the equipment available to the receiving country and depends on the overall intellectual level of its economy. Therefore, the strictness of U.S. export controls is significantly differentiated, taking into consideration the forms through which technology is transferred and the cooperation conditions. What is important is that the control itself and the procedures for the protection of secrets which surround it are subordinated to the more general objectives of ensuring an efficient transfer of technology (from science to production, from the military to the civilian area and from one sector to another) between U.S. companies and their foreign partners. The situation which has developed in our country is rather the opposite.

Secrecy is an economic concept. It is a barrier on the path of technological exchanges. Therefore, a radical reform in the procedures for protecting secrets is the most important component of the economic conversion mechanism.

III

The main objective difficulty of conversion is that many apparently obvious solutions in respecializing defense industries (such as, for example, the production of heavy-duty tractors instead of tanks) are today economically inexpedient. The economy is already frequently saturated with traditional equipment, the production of which would be the simplest to organize at defense plants. What to do in this case? One could, for example, undertake to develop the export of items of which there is a relatively surplus (heavy earth removal equipment, or traditional agricultural machinery). Thus, tractor machine building, should the new technological transfer mechanism become operational, could start working for export as of now. In general, the problem of conversion should be solved in the context of the problem of the structural reorganization of the entire economy. It should not be reduced in the least merely to changes in the defense complex, such as respecializing some of its capacities for the production of civilian goods, for under the influence of defense needs the entire economic structure became deformed.

If the production of any kind of military item is stopped, changes spread along the entire chain of related production systems: from the manufacturing of equipment to the extraction of raw materials. Perhaps from the national economic viewpoint conversion means the reorientation of technological chains which run through the entire economy rather than individual production lines. We also need to improve the efficiency of the entire reproduction structure of the economy. This is a more general task which, essentially, includes conversion. We can hope to be successful only if both tasks are considered jointly. It is only then that a range of options and the possibility of a choice would appear in resolving the problem of conversion.

Some of the technological equipment needed for redirecting defense output could be produced only by civilian machine building. However, as it were, it is overloaded. Therefore, the unique cadre potential of the defense industry must fulfill some manufacturing orders which would make it possible to tune up the existing equipment for the production of baby carriages, for instance, instead of missiles.

In our view, the conversion should consist of two stages. The purpose of the first would be to eliminate the specifics in the functioning of defense and civilian production facilities. The main factor here would be to ensure the use of the technological equipment installed in the defense enterprises. The economic efficiency of the first stage is relatively low because of the extremely insignificant range of conversion choices. It would become substantially greater in the second stage, when the mechanism of technological exchange between military and civilian capacities begins to operate, when "wasteless production" becomes restructured and civilian goods are manufactured, including the fixed assets with which to produce them. The first—

transitional—stage is the conversion of defense capacities exclusively through the efforts of the defense complex; the second is the conversion of the entire economy based on the domestic economy and the world market.

The basic contradiction between the long-term and short-term interests of society are also manifested in the course of the conversion. The objectives and tasks of the enumerated stages are, to a certain extent, mutually conflicting. Indicators of the share of civilian goods in the overall output of the defense complex, frequently cited in the press, are merely the short-term conversion indicators. From the long-term viewpoint, conversion must become one of the main impetus in the structural reorganization of the economy. Consequently, we need a program for reorganizing the reproduction structures of the economy, within which the conversion scenario would be formulated as well. The Commission on Problems of the Development of Industry, Power Industry, Equipment and Technology of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union could assume control over the formulation, updating and implementation of this program.

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Border of Trust

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[Article by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Khokhlov, deputy editor, party building department, *KOMMUNIST*]

[Text] To begin with, Galina Rudenko resigned from her party position as raykom instructor and now, together with her family, she is managing a livestock farm. Officially speaking, she is "making her personal practical contribution to the solution of the food problem." Naturally, her life became not easier but much clearer. There was work and there were results. Milk production may be below that of a Danish or Dutch farmer but is much higher than the kolkhoz average. As one of the results of new economic relations in the village, Rudenko's farm is regularly shown to guests as one of the progressive achievements of the rayon. Her name was mentioned also at the plenum of the Voronezh Party Obkom, as a lesson to managers-party members who lack initiative or who think conservatively. She has earned the type of reputation and respect which she could not have had as an anonymous raykom instructor.

Surreptitiously, a change in moods occurred. Whereas abandoning the party apparat and becoming a lessee is in itself an unusual step, other facts in the same order seem quite well motivated and do not amaze anyone. Three instructors working in the socioeconomic department of the gorkom are persistently requesting to be released in order to go into production. They would like to work in their specialty. The chief engineer of the repair and construction administration refused to go to work at the raykom, unwilling to take the risk of losing his 380 rubles

per month for the 230 rubles paid to an instructor. His explanation was, please forgive me but I have three children. The raykom secretary, influenced by all such sudden concerns, seriously considered for a while to take a position as kolkhoz agronomist. This too must be understood.... The CPSU Obkom is greatly worried by the condition of the rayon unit: never mind vacancies for instructors, finding a secretary would be quite a problem!

This trend is consistent with the spirit of today's radical ideas. The transfer of "cadre capital" from the party to the economic area could take place entirely effortlessly. The apparat stratum is not all that strong as is usually believed and, as far as finding jobs is concerned, it turns out that many employees can look on their own. Today the outcome of the project is beginning to be more worrisome than the fate of people. Could we reduce the range of obligations of the party apparat, along with its staff, without any harm? Is this process not taking place all too rapidly? What are the possible consequences of structural changes in management? Practical experience is conflicting and the answer is by no means simple. For party committees, despite constant instructions and appeals not to become involved in economic activities, are continuing to control *urbi et orbi*. They deal with the food problem on a personal, practical, political and organizational basis; they use all available methods in replacing economic managers, procurement workers and absent economic mechanisms. Right or wrong, such is the reality. Let us look at it.

The Voronezh chernozem supplies more than one oblast. Most of the food is shipped from here to other cities. Breakdowns may be reflected in Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk or Moscow. The oblasts here also have a powerful multisectorial machine building industry, and developed electronic, chemical and power industries. The attention of the people of Voronezh, nonetheless, is focused on the agrarian sector. Anyone not working in the countryside or in the processing sectors is, one way or another, helping those whom are. The oblast party committee takes a strict approach on this matter.

Last year the work done by the obkom included two plenums on food supply matters, for the first time involving a detailed discussion of the difficulties experienced by processing enterprises. The grounds for this were extremely serious. In the course of the three preceding 5-year periods investments in agriculture had increased by 35.7 percent but only by 5.7 percent in processing. The result was a most severe distortion. Increasing crop yields, milk production and livestock weight were being lost because of the impossibility of preserving and processing them into food products. Annual losses in dairy and meat products were estimated into the thousands of tons.

The study of the plenums' documents leaves a conflicting impression. Despite the great relevance of the topic, specific economic analysis has clearly prevailed over political innovation and progressive views on the agrarian economy. The reports and resolutions were

based on orders backed by the party's authority: what to build, where to accelerate matters, what technology to use in sowing, how many quintals per hectare to harvest, how much milk per cow to produce, how to process all of this and how many kilograms of food per capita to obtain. There were figures, targets and more figures and more targets. However, such fixed levels by no means guarantee full food sufficiency.

"A figure is not a dogma, the more so since the assignments of this program are already being outstripped by us," said A.I. Torokhov, deputy head of the agrarian department. "The task was to change the attitude toward the processing industry as being secondary. This was the main objective and we were able to achieve it.

Soon it will be 10 years since Aleksandr Ivanovich has been working at the obkom. An engineer by training, he added to it higher political instruction by graduating from the Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. He has learned the essence and fine aspects of party work. To this day, however, he considers himself a "sectorial" person. His line of thinking is straight: the main thing is for everything to be normal in the sector, for the sector to work better, for otherwise why would he be there? In a certain sense, it is simpler to observe figures and targets. Based on reports, he would see something falling behind, he would draft materials for the secretariat, which would "encourage" various people, and that would be all for the rest of the year. The agrarian department as well was reduced with the reductions in the obkom apparat. Only nine out of 22 people remain. Furthermore, there is a vacancy for a manager, and two other people are in training elsewhere. This made necessary a reassignment of obligations and the elimination of the old principle of sectorial management. However, it appears as though better times are coming for the area under Torokhov's management. Aleksandr Ivanovich is pleased:

"When have we had such a thing in the past? Our department dealt exclusively with the harvest and the silaging. The raykom first secretaries avoided it: do your processing, I have no time. Now they themselves come and describe the situation and the support which is necessary. I can calmly raise such questions on any level and I know that I will meet with understanding. My wretched enterprises are benefiting! For example, we must build 30 cheese making shops in 2 years. They are being built, although they are not included in the program. Reality has forced us to do this."

The problem of updating processing enterprises, which account for one-quarter of the entire Voronezh industry, was formulated and accepted at the obkom plenum slightly more than a year ago. The initial view was assessed as follows: 30 percent of the enterprises did not meet the standards of hygiene and technology; only 20 percent of them met modern requirements; the age limit of the equipment had been exceeded by 100 percent and more than one-third of it was not operational. It was roughly at that time that I paid an official visit to the

area and was able to see in person the condition of some plants and combines. Let me not get into the details: it is better not to know the conditions under which, occasionally, butter, cream, cheese, sausages and canned goods were produced. Suffice it to say that the sector was literally collapsing. There had been cases of shop walls to crumble down before any reconstruction could be done.

One year passed. A new combine has replaced the meat combine that had collapsed. It was completed within a few months. The module shop for sausages, which stood alone, is now surrounded by a major construction area: a processing complex is being built here for the oblast consumer union. Six million rubles are being invested annually in construction, and the promise is that everything will be completed in 2 years. On the level of this sector, this is a gigantic enterprise. However, it is even more interesting to see the large number of small projects which are being built throughout the oblast. The cliché that they are growing "like mushrooms after rain" is ideally pertinent in this case. Something is being built, rebuilt or expanded in every rayon. In a word, the omnipotent dispatcher has activated his levers, and materials, equipment and installations have arrived.

The "dispatcher" is, in fact, experienced. This is not the first time that he is displaying his ability to rally forces and achieve objectives by using the "attack method." He set the task of building in each farm a hay storage, and that was accomplished. The idea developed that each animal husbandry farm employing more than 15 people should mandatorily have a health recovery complex with a sauna. The oblast press was carried away by this initiative while the people laughed: obkom fabrication, they said, showing off. Yet the saunas were completed, 1,000 of them, and one could visit the various farms and question whether even privileged sanatoriums have such a facility.

The housing program, being incomparably bigger, had to be curtailed. In this case the following method was followed: initially, some of the most backward outlying areas were chosen and all forces were thrown there. Today in the countryside, as in urban microrayons, there are new construction projects, building cranes, and in a single year entire streets lined with brick houses appear, along with schools and stores. The funds are substantial but the outflow of people from the villages of Voronezh has stopped and a reverse flow is already beginning. Last year 30 people resettled in Novokhoperskiy Rayon and almost 700 went back to the Verkhnekhavskiy; currently more than 1,000 are expected.

"What did I tell you! Just wait, and in 5 years people will be running away from the cities," cheerfully said Ivan Andriyanovich Ivlev, the obkom secretary, addressing the rayon managers. He starts counting on his fingers: there is the ecological situation and material difficulties, and wages do not grow endlessly. Furthermore, the people are fed up with waiting 15 years for housing. They will go to the villages! We must be prepared for this.

One cannot easily doubt the activities of the Voronezh Oblast CPSU Committee. The nobility of objectives which are directly aimed at the individual and the convincing social results somehow settle the question of the inadequacy of methods. I believe that it is precisely for this reason that a reciprocal understanding has developed between the oblast's party leadership and the directors of sponsoring enterprises, although plant bookkeepers keep counting losses and writing off the costs. There exist certain strict prerequisites and the obligation to implement resolutions of plenums and bureaus. However, there also exist more respectful partnership relations and the ability to convince and that of making conscious choices.

"When we adopted the program for reconstructing the processing industry at the oblast and rayon committee plenums, all we had were words," recalls today Gennadiy Sergeyevich Kabasin, obkom first secretary. "We were urged on by the great need, by hopelessness and lack of choice. We did not force anyone but concentrated on explaining, taking people around, showing things."

It was thus that the directors and secretaries of party committees of the leading enterprises in Voronezh were invited to visit the dairy combine. They were shown, in order to wet their appetites, a rich set of exhibits: the type of goods which could be produced. They were then shown the actual miserable variant in the stores, after which they visited the shops. This back trip taken by the representatives of group "A" from the age of electronics and robotics to the start of the industrial age explained a great deal and, subsequently, no further propaganda was necessary. They concentrated on helping the urban residents, their own workers. Any construction project in the countryside, be it a hay storage area or a home for a kolkhoz member would, in the course of time, be reflected on the food shelves. The conscientious director understands this. However, by agreeing to assume the burden of sponsorship and the expenses, such a director cannot fail to notice that outlays on sponsored construction projects were two or three times higher. The equipment was not manufactured in series but as unrelated units, excessively expensive and not always meeting existing technological standards. Alas, this was inevitable. Noneconomic control cannot be efficient.

The result was that, in promoting a good project, the obkom was approving of waste. Furthermore, this allowed the practicing of administrative-command methods and thus hindered the application of the new principles of economic management. Was this fair? Logically, this seemed to be the case. With the same volume of work outlays could have been lower and results much higher had relations among enterprises, and sectors, both urban and rural, been organized on a strong economic foundation, with an organized market and prices. But let us ask the vital question: What about the bricks? The economist would quote the list price; the smart operator would quote the "black market" price. The answer of the director of Novonadezhdinskiy Sovkhoz, Anninskiy Rayon, was as follows: In 1 month

one person can make 5,000 bricks. He knows what he is talking about. He has 70 workers assigned to the brick plants. A great deal of construction is going on in the sovkhoz. This is a kind of original "currency:" the pay for hiring one person for 1 month is 5 cubic meters of timber. If timber and bricks are available, one could go to the machine builders in Rostov or Poltava and exchange some of them for equipment for the meat combine. Fifteen tons of Ural metal is traded for 1 ton of meat. "Tell us," the Voronezh people ask, "how come you have surplus metal?" "We insisted that the state order issued to us be reduced," the people of Ural explained to their partners who had as yet been unable to obtain such an opportunity: to lower meat procurements to the Union stock and practice direct bartering.

This is neither a state supply system nor is it wholesale trade. It is something in between, which is not subject either to governmental or market control but which develops a particular form of influence. It is at this point that the universal substitution of economic instruments appears: the party "instruction-order," which makes possible the transfer of forces and resources from town to country.

By developing a market for materials and means of production, a precapitalist barter system was established. A more efficient production management was developed through consumer demand: the rationed distribution of sugar, tea, soap and washing detergent. The hope that the ruble would put everything in its proper place was not justified, for the ruble is increasingly losing its power. The ordinary mind accepts these and many other socioeconomic complications as a result of the reform, which is quite different from the proclaimed objectives. However, in the human mind shortcomings could paradoxically turn into virtues. In the social organism a shortage is nothing but a shortage, and all it means is the lack of consumer qualities. The new mechanism has not been completed and the sum total of contradictions is what shapes the outlines of the present specific stage.

The March 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum substantiated the inevitability of a transitional period between "the situation from which we are beginning our movement and the time when the new economic mechanism will begin to function at full strength." "The need for such a transitional period is objectively determined by the present condition of the economy and finances, monetary circulation and the situation on the domestic market," the plenum's materials read. Steps were formulated consistent with the tasks of that period. The necessity was acknowledged of adopting a variety of forms, including active governmental participation. Under such circumstances, however difficult it may be, it is important for the party committees not to resort to bureaucratic administration and totally to abandon their power pressure methods but systematically lead the collectives to the new economic management forms.

Of late the Voronezh Obkom has noticeably changed its work style and is learning how to "manage without ordering." However, it is still excessively managing where no such management should exist. It would be much simpler not to interfere, not to assume the obligations of someone else, and to be rid of extraneous functions. In fact, however, this is impossible. Not without humor, an obkom official described his failure in converting to strictly political methods. The people heard him out and agreed: everything was proper, that is the way we shall act, but what about finding us a transmission belt for the fan.... In another case, they asked for cement or cables. What to do: one should assist while implementing a political assignment. I witnessed a talk between I.A. Ivlev the obkom secretary, and economic managers and the chairmen of the rayon executive committees and village soviets. All of them invariably ended the meeting with a counterclaim: "We need your help." Let me cite yet another fact which, in my view, reflects quite accurately the deployment of forces. Every Thursday Igor Georgiyevich Kuzin, the second secretary of the Voronezh CPSU Obkom, attends the conference of the city's executive committee. The reason is not that the deputy chairman, who chairs the meeting, is inexperienced or poorly familiar with the situation. He knows his work. However, the presence of someone, a "ranking official" is needed. It has been proven that if Kuzin is not present, the meeting will be attended by lower ranking officials on whom, essentially, nothing depends.

Naturally, on each such occasion a debate has taken place. A thought was given as to what is obstructing the transfer of rights to the rural soviet or to that same city executive committee. More than anything else, power is based on economics. The matter with the budget is simple. The amount of withholdings from enterprise profits is determined, and that is where the funds come from. What about material resources? If such resources are not distributed among the various rayons and rural soviets, they would receive absolutely nothing. At that point the discussions break down. What kind of power is it without materials, without equipment? In any case, one would have to beg the kolkhoz chairman or enterprise director. Therefore, today there are three authorities acting on the territory of the rayon and the oblast: the soviet, which is nominal; the economic, which is material; and the party, which is the real. Since the party committee has the management instruments in its hands, it undertakes to rally the forces at the transitional stage, when interests diverge so greatly, while the mechanism of the natural allocation of priorities has still not been created. Actually, how could one sit idly by, waiting for the end of the reform while under one's very eyes villages are rapidly becoming deserted or the processing system is convulsing?

Despite all this, one should not be in a hurry to accuse the party workers of failure to understand or of underestimating economic methods. Virtually all rural raykom secretaries are peasants. They have personally felt the

sharp twists in agrarian policy and remember the way the people were separated from the land. A great deal of efforts were needed, and many a year had to pass before the rural resident could once again become the master of the land and for the leasing method to assume its proper place. Haste can once again lead to failure. "Before one can run one must learn how to walk," was the way this was expressed by I.A. Korsakov, first secretary of the Olkhovatskiy Party Raykom. Starting with next year, the entire rayon will begin to work on a cost accounting basis with payments based on gross income and end results. However, it took 5 years to adopt this system. For 3 years, with the support of the Voronezh Agricultural Institute, with which a contract was signed, the collective contracting method was mastered. The first secretary himself studied economics in order to be able knowledgeably to discuss all problems with specialists. Some results became apparent only on the third year.

That is how one must work: manage thoughtfully, without haste in areas where a gradual and considered approach is necessary, and firmly acting as required by the circumstances, as well as patiently developing strong economic relations in the approach to the new aspect of socialism. This would be the best method.... but no more time is left.

The natural development of events involved meetings, street marches, and leaflets on poles and fences. This was on the eve of the second elections for people's deputies. The peaceful and remote Olkhovatka could not remember such heightened passions. This particularly affected Korsakov, the rayon first secretary. After 5 years of facing an ugly crowd, a series of anonymous letters and telephone calls, he was forced to experience a blow at the authority of the rayon party organization. The election was boycotted! It was hard on a person when familiar people would pass him by on the street, pretending not to notice him. However, matters become 100 times worse if entire collectives alienate themselves. It was during that most difficult time that our conversation took place. Ivan Atradyevich was stunned by the blow and kept talking about himself as though summing up his life:

"There I am, 'the supreme bureaucrat.' I was born in a peasant family, I grew up without a father, who died in 1942. There was secondary school, technical college, army and institute. Twenty years in party work. I did not strive to gain power, there was sweat and blood. However, when I could see results I would be inspired. I started work at 5:00 a.m. and stopped at 11:00 p.m., with no day off. My door was always open. No other way of life is possible. Now everything seems to be forgotten. I can no longer do such work. What could be worse than to fear the people?!"

Sooner or later, this state of stress will blow over. The time will come for a sober analysis and at that point, without feeling sorry for himself, he will draw the strict conclusion affecting the entire party committee: they relied too much on their authority. They were carried

away by production affairs and economics and ignored the qualitative changes in the moods of the people. Political methods, about which there was increasing talk at plenums and meetings, were given priority although actually they were not mastered. "Initiative groups" appeared in some labor collectives and indeed seized the entire initiative by organizing meetings and distributing leaflets.

The new situation made visible the previously unknown reverse side of power. They had told the people, in print and orally: the party is responsible for everything. Now, comrade party secretary, go and answer to the people. Not in general terms but specifically. Why is it that soap is now being rationed as in times of war: there is not enough to wash the children or the laundry. Why is it that in an oblast in which 20 percent of Russian sugar beets are grown, where everyone has sweated over such beets and people are even recruited to weed the fields, the ration is 1.5 kilograms of sugar per card? Let the secretary answer as best he can for failures and blunders in overall political matters. Occasionally such failures are ricocheted from the center to the "local bureaucrats." The "locals" have no right to reject responsibility. They are the authorized authorities and, without resorting to general economic categories, which are useless in this case, they must always explain to the people the reason for the difficulties and what is the solution.

The meeting is the most acute but not the main sector of political struggle. Positions which one may have thought were forever held by the party committees are being lost. It was always believed that the party trains and places cadres. But who "places" them today? And if so how? An unsuitable person was chosen to be kolkhoz chairman in Verkhnemamonskiy Rayon. The people were glad to have one of their own! He began by distributing the honey which had been set aside to feed the bees, making it appear as though it was his personal generosity. Six months later he showed up at the raykom: remove me from that position, I can see that this is not my job. Meanwhile, however, production in the kolkhoz had been undermined and discipline had declined. Unsuitable people were elected to run two plants in Voronezh. The new directors did not work out. Yuriy Viktorovich Ofitserov, a progressive and energetic sovkhos director in Verkhnyaya Khava, one of those who needs no urging, bluntly told first secretary Albert Mikhaylovich Visloguzov: If the labor collective council begins to interfere in any one of my decisions, I shall resign immediately. Any raykom secretary knows how difficult it is to choose, train and prepare a real manager, and then he starts worrying that he may lose experienced and capable people. This is worse than economic irresponsibility. It is social waste.

Cadres are the first question which the personnel of the party apparat ask with concern. The second is discipline. When a discussion on discipline was started once more in the office of N.M. Leontyev, first secretary of the Novokhoperskiy Raykom, the straight question was asked: Had someone been abrogating laws, resolutions

and ukases? Nikolay Mikhailovich laid his hands on a pile of newspapers. But were the mass information media to be blamed here as well? He did not intend to blame journalists specifically. He was thinking of something else. One could not fail to see that public opinion had become extremely strict toward managers while surrounding loafers, drunks and scoundrels with an atmosphere of tolerance. Consider the question of planning and performing discipline. Today it is very easy to refuse to work. In the neighboring rayon a head of a carpenters' brigade demanded, on behalf of the collective's council, that the assignment be reduced but the pay not be reduced. We talk a great deal about cost accounting and independence, without feeling answerable for the results of economic activities. We hold meetings at the peak of the hay mowing season, ignoring the old peasant rule that 1 day of work provides food for an entire year. We argue about things when we should not. Shall we go on?

As we can see, the raykom secretaries, particularly those who have recently come to party work, are also beginning to ask embarrassing questions, in the spirit of the times. The essence of those questions is not a speculative pitting of democracy versus discipline, autonomy versus obedience, or hay mowing versus political struggle. They feel that the old control instruments are sliding out of their hands but, for the time being, they have no handle on the new ones.

The third and most serious concern is that of the party's authority. Mistrust in it means not simply personal inconvenience, when biting statements are being made in your face or behind your back. This also implies rejected cadre recommendation made by the party committee or questioning an initiative launched by it. It is easy to guess what would happen to the reconstruction program for the processing industry if the obkom influence were to be reduced. Yet such a likelihood does exist. The only solution is a change of tactics.

In the past sponsorship relations were based on the statutory discipline of enterprise directors and party committees. Strictly speaking, these were relations involving managers and not the collectives. Cost accounting and internal plant democracy led to the opening of cracks which are becoming increasingly wider. V.M. Meshcheryakov, general director of the Elektronika Scientific-Production Association, described the situation as follows: the enterprise helps agriculture and the processing industry in all possible ways and has never failed in its obligations. The equipment alone it supplies is worth 3 million rubles annually.

"As conscientious people, we absorb such losses," Vitaliy Mikhaylovich explained. "However, there is constant disapproval in the collectives. This is a direct violation of the Law on the State Enterprise. Before cost accounting came, we purposefully kept some 'surplus' unskilled manpower which could be sent to the kolkhoz or the vegetable base. Today at the head plant alone the personnel has been reduced by 700 people and, at

planning sessions, when the question of sponsorship arises, there is an outcry. There is no surplus manpower. And what will happen if all brigades without exception were to adopt cost accounting? The situation would become even worse!

It is at this point that the party influence ends. So far it was still possible to explain why the kolkhoz cannot pay the full price of sponsorship services. The collective was told the following: you are unwilling to purchase potatoes at 5 rubles per kilogram. One could tell the people that the interkolkhoz meat combine, built at the expense of the plant, made it possible to process the products locally, which was of great advantage to the farms and led to having more sausages in Voronezh stores. Internal plant cost accounting makes noneconomic coercion impossible and "noneconomic persuasion" senseless.

It would be pertinent, in this connection, to recall the conclusion drawn at the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the inadmissibility of pitting the interests of the working class against those of the peasantry, for this could lead to major difficulties in the development of the entire society. In this area any distortion is dangerous. Clumsy management would alienate the sponsorship collectives from the countryside and, under the present circumstances, this would mean the collapse of all programs.

The Voronezh Oblast and city party committees have been able to reduce by nearly one-third the number of urban residents sent to do farm work, after payment for sponsorship services, although at a lower rate but nonetheless within the possibilities of the farms, was introduced. Some rayons refused such aid altogether. Why pay an unskilled worker, who barely begins to work before lunch and after lunch sits down to rest. Better to hire seasonal manpower from labor surplus areas. Today this has become possible. Yet another good change has taken place: defense industry enterprises are promptly accepting "civilian" orders. Finally, there is a variant compromise solution to the problem, suggested by the "sponsors" and supported by the Voronezh Gorkom: having estimated all the losses for next year, to redistribute such funds among kolkhozes and let them pay for plant services. All that remains unclear is how to implement the idea. Making such computations on the state level is a highly labor intensive project. Territorial economic self-management is only at its beginning. Meanwhile, the contradiction is growing while, with it, the practical foundation of many of the decisions made by the oblast party committee, with their extreme practicality, figures, list of projects and personal responsibility of bureau members for specific work sectors, is weakening.

What will happen next? This contradiction does not belong in the category of insoluble problems. We know that proper economic relations will develop and they will become relatively well coordinated with democratic relations. It will not be necessary to compensate for inadequate economic instruments with party resolutions. Real

cost accounting reduces the risk of making collective errors. If responsibility is expressed in precise figures, and wages are consistent with real living standards, and if one can see their direct connection with any choice that is made, the decision will not be made carelessly. At that point "a simply good person" will not be appointed director or "one of our own people and not one of theirs" will not be voted deputy.

However, for the time being, unfortunately, there are few reasons to hope for a self-tuning mechanism. In the same way that a designer's idea must be embodied in metal, the ideas of reform, despite their absolute support by the majority of the people, need their own "engineers and foremen." Prescriptions and precedents do not work in a new project. Cost accounting and democratic relations are all new, despite their numerous variants and different actual conditions. The transitional period is a time of instability, contradictions, pluralism of interest and constant clashes among them. What is needed is a leader who, under such difficult circumstances, would not lose track of the main task. It is in that sense that we speak of the special role of the party and assign practical projects to its professional personnel. If not they, who?

Despite all the errors and tactical blunders committed by gorkom and raykom secretaries, these are experienced and trained organizers. As a rule, they are also well familiar with economic and soviet work. Many of them have worked as kolkhoz chairmen, enterprise directors, chiefs of administrations and associations, and executive committee chairmen or deputy chairmen. The instructors are mostly young people who have quickly proven themselves as specialists.

Not even statistically could a printed electoral leaflet claiming that these were "functionaries who feared to leave their seats" be proven. The recent reorganization in the party committees in Voronezh Oblast has substantially changed and rejuvenated the apparat. The average age of an obkom worker is 43 and nearly one-half of them have worked here for less than 1 year. In the gorkoms and raykoms—there are 40 of them in the oblast—75 percent of the personnel are under 40. In a normal working day few of them will be found in their offices. Most of them are on the road, visiting farms, construction projects and primary enterprises. Here is another worrisome figure: there are 82 vacant positions. This is 10 percent of the total. The figure is too high, particularly after the reduction. The obkom sector for work with cadres listed the reasons briefly: dissatisfaction with wages and work procedures, diminished authority of party agencies, lack of social protection for the party worker, and difficulties in providing them with housing.

Naturally, the work load increased after the reduction of the apparat. The dismantling of one-half of the departments did not eliminate existing concerns in the least. The situation, as we saw, does not allow as yet for the possibility of doing "purely party work." It is simply that the obligations of the former entire department have

now been assumed by one or two instructors. Nonetheless, the reduced agrarian department of the obkom receives a thousand letters monthly which must be thoroughly checked and answered "in the essence of the question raised;" meanwhile, as in the past, A.I. Torokhov and G.F. Panevin, the deputy heads, take turns in receiving visitors. I was pleased to notice on Panevin's table the book "*Istoriografiya Krestyanstva Tsentralnogo Chernozemya*" [Historiography of the Peasantry of the Central Chernozem]: apparently, there was some time left to study history more profoundly, and not simply to leaf through Agropromizdat pamphlets. Gennadiy Fedorovich confirmed that he had read history, economics and Chayanov. He has some time left for thinking and studying... some time after 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. Until then there is the ordinary obkom day with its endless sequence of current affairs, 70 to 80 percent of which consists of making telephone calls and drafting reports.

An even more difficult situation due to the shortage of personnel prevails in the urban and rayon party committees. For example, I.G. Kuzin, second secretary of the Voronezh Gorkom, has eight people under him. This is the entire personnel of the socioeconomic department with an almost endless range of obligations which include "everything other than medicine." Having worked together with Igor Georgiyevich, V.M. Meshcheryakov, head of the Elektronika Association, as is the habit of a director, computed the value of this worker and said: He should be paid as much as they pay me. However, currently the second secretary earns less than a chief of shop. The wage of a first raykom secretary is lower than that of a head of livestock farm. Indeed, today the "seat of the functionary" is not all that attractive.

The produce store in Novokhopersk sells its items at cooperative prices. We visited the store. Yes, compared with the state store, it is more expensive but, unquestionably, one could buy something here: there are several varieties of sausages, a good selection of meat, and quite a wide assortment of vegetables, canned fruits, and sweets which are being offered today to the population of this remote rayon center. We visited the store as a "brigade," consisting of the obkom secretary, the raykom secretary, the chairman of the executive committee, and the chairman of the rayon consumer union.... The sales clerks tensed, and the few customers for this time of day looked at us curiously. All of a sudden, we heard a voice with the intonation of someone chairing a meeting. An elderly woman was calling on others to buy faster and more, for tomorrow the store would be empty. The indignation which this sudden attack triggered in Nikolay Mikhailovich Leontyev was clear. However, the raykom first secretary restrained himself and calmly began to argue with this militant customer who, as it turned out, was not a local. Leontyev was unanimously supported by the line of waiting people: we come here every day, they said, and we see the same things on the shelves. What are you talking about! The "agitator" waved an arm and left with her belief intact in the

inviolable rule that since a commission of party members had come, the display of goods was exclusively for showing off purposes.

Years of failed hopes and unfulfilled promises make it necessary today as well to look at the reality of renovation through the foggy lens of mistrust. The "filter of skepticism" will not disappear by itself. Time and convincing results will be needed. However, it hardly makes sense to prop it artificially, for normal life and work necessarily presume a 100-percent clear and totally undistorted vision.

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INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

Morality, Justice, Humanism

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[Notes on philosophy by Vladimir Yakovlevich Lakshin, doctor of philosophical sciences, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences corresponding member]

[Text] From our school days, we were taught to look at the classics of Marxism, essentially, like church fathers, every line infallible. All other philosophers who had written before them, be they materialists or idealists, were only the raw material, smelted into unrecognizability in the blast furnaces of Marxism. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? Everything that was useful in their speculations went into Marxism, and consequently did not deserve particular gratitude on our part. The rest was the dross of errors and delusions, processed once and for all and dumped on the trash heap in the back courtyard.

One feels like exclaiming: "Down with the reputation of school textbooks!" No one possesses the final truth, and anyone who can extract an alleged fragment of new knowledge is right.

With emotion and avidity, I followed the train of thought of Kant and Rousseau, Hegel and Feuerbach, even though they too turned out to be surpassed by the latest philosophy. After all, each in his own way, they helped me understand myself and my time. I want to more profoundly understand the theory of Marx and Engels, its rightness and its omissions, what kind of soil it arose in and what it perceived.

In order to do this, we must learn to look at life and man historically, and not go all out to create something absolutely new. We must take from humanity's spiritual heritage, including from Christianity, Renaissance humanism, Marx, from everything that can serve to develop contemporary morals and, more broadly, contemporary world contemplation.

1.

The "social contract" which Rousseau once described was preceded by the "moral contract."

Human morality, which apparently started to take shape even in prehistorical times, is the awareness of justice and of the equal right of conscious living entities to exist. Is this not the period of "pre-social" or "early social" development of the principle of justice which we once called "primitive communism?"

Having barely appeared in the human community, the idea of justice became, understandably, subject to doubt and tests. The instinct for self-preservation and self-assertion, perceived by man from the natural world, was older and stronger. Egotism, the aspiration to power, etc., became its "human" modification. The most active and predatory individuals easily slipped into aggression toward those similar to themselves. Fighting, violence, theft, and war are echoes of the animal struggle for existence.

Over the 2 millennia of "Christian civilization," the good principles in man were in fact subjected to profanation and distortion. They were reinterpreted in one's own fashion and used for mercenary interests. Nonetheless, this has not affected the heart of the morals of justice as a principle and a standard recognized by people. It has stayed protected and lives under the thick layer of hypocrisy and outright distortion, like a stream under the ice. One can also say further: it is precisely the morals of justice that sometimes made up the latent basis of most religious and political movements, national revolts, etc. One of the basic ideas of social revolution, leading to the people's movement toward a segment of human history well-known to us—the idea of material equality—only reflects the more general moral idea contained in man's nature.

The philosophy of the Manicheans preached that good and evil are two equal elements which give the world balance. However, this is not so. The position of good is initial. If you want to be treated kindly, be kind and tolerant yourself. If you want all human rights to be recognized for you, then recognize these rights for others as well.

2.

Socialism is not only criticized for its real historical flaws. The most vehement criticisms question utopism in general, i.e., the right to dream about the future and hope for the conscious creation of the perfect human world.

However, humanity would degenerate and suffocate without dreams, without hope for the best world, without attempts to build life, no matter what disillusionment may await us on this path.

That is why, in principle, moral and social "utopism" do not seem fruitless to me. It is easy to criticize it. In one's head, everything is built easily, eloquently and quickly, as is right. Practice shows the whole heavy labor and

crookedness of embodying any, even the slightest ideal. Who among us has not decided a thousand times to wake up on Monday and start a new, reasonable, pure life? However, if self-improvement is so hard for one person, what is it like for humanity?

If one acknowledges the legitimacy of optimistic dreaming, the complete triumph of justice would be universal equality, "eternal peace," and prosperity on Earth, which would complete the initial evolution separating man from the animal kingdom and would mark the beginning of his true history, when each will be able to freely develop his best possibilities and capabilities, put in him by nature. In itself, of course, there would be neither governments, classes, nor parties in this promising future world. Man would step into a kingdom of freedom and would feel entirely human for the first time. The great dream of communism speaks of this as a society, such that the "free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." These words of Marx and Engels almost literally repeat Kant. In fact, there cannot be a society free in principle, free for everyone, if the freedom of each is not implemented in practice. The infringement of personal freedom is evidence of an unfree society.

3.

The new morals of the revolutionary 20th century should have been born hastily in the wreckage of the old morals. In a certain sense, it turned out that this wreckage was unsuitable even as building material: just some dust and crushed stone. The only new and firmly concluded fact for many became: that which is useful and advantageous for one's class at a given moment should become the daily standard for one's own behavior. Thus, it is as if morals ceased to exist, having been diluted in politics, in the pragmatic requirements of the minute, and in the peripetia of leadership by practical revolutionary action. Man was freed of personal moral responsibility, transferring its burden to the shoulders of a faceless leviathan: the class, party, state, or person in whom they were embodied at a certain period of time, Stalin for example.

However, private relations among people, for instance, on the streets or in a communal apartment, nonetheless should have had a certain regulator. Even a simple line for food items would be impossible without arranging this. The old moral maxims came back into use, modestly described with the words "simple standards of morality." It soon became quite clear that, while laughing at the falseness and hypocrisy of former bourgeois and church morals, we should not hasten to extirpate it by the roots. For, if it is question of human culture and the spiritual values that had existed in the forms of antagonistic class relations, it is foolish to count on creating something new, having destroyed everything. Down to the foundations, and then... Then nothing will turn out any more: Lenin struck a blow against the cavalier attack on the old culture, even in his last article, "Better Less, But Better."

Morals, besides everything else, are the culture and clot of mental experience accumulated by people in the course of the millennia, the traditions of living behavior, preserved in the long chain of generations. "Do not kill," "do not steal," "honor your mother and father," "do not swear," "do not commit adultery"—of course, there is an element of general human truth in these precepts, which seemed so boring in our youth. After all, morals are the culture of healthy attitudes toward other people, toward society, and toward oneself.

How is it possible, like the existentialists, to believe that people do not and cannot have general goals and that life is devoid of meaning, since everything is already structured such that all ends the same—personal death? Is it worth finding delight in hedonism and "Don Juanism," mixed with skeptical stoicism, and drinking this heady cocktail, if there is still a hope of greater work for man? Why not help "humanize" people and, incidentally, thus keep oneself at the level of humanity as well? This alone is still capable of giving society dynamism, and man justification for his existence on Earth. Incidentally, here one does not have to sacrifice oneself to cheerless "duty." One does not have to sacrifice a single one of the basic human joys: the joys of one's favorite work, contemplating nature, interacting with people, love for a woman, enjoyment of art, etc. However, the creation of a broad, generally significant purpose and meaning, possibly, deprives these enjoyments of a distorted refinement and convulsive hedonism, which celebrates as though it were at the parting moment over the abyss.

4.

Morals and morality, understandably, do not always coincide.

Orthodox Marxism sees morals as something applied: the rules of society. Nobody, however, has labored to explain somewhat satisfactorily just what the "simple standards of morality and justice" are.

It turns out that everything that we considered private, applied and formerly subject to the sphere of politics and class nature, in reality precisely reveals, above all, a kinship with the basic features of the human future.

While seeking means for acquiring happiness and establishing justice by way of the class struggle of the proletariat, we gradually lost the concept of what "happiness" and "justice" are and even began interpreting them as by-products of the historical process, which followed their immutable track. Dangerous shifts occurred as a consequence of this, expressed in the absolute subordination of morals to politics and in the practical acceptance of the slogan that "the end justifies the means."

The institution of hostages, practiced in 1919 in response to the White Terror, was founded on the complete subordination of morals to politics. L.D. Trotskiy wrote openly that morals are subordinate to the interests of the revolution, that the end (democracy and socialism) justifies, under certain conditions, means such

as violence, lying, and murder, if they "truly lead to the emancipation of humanity."

They repeat over and over that the requirements of "eternal" morals are abstract. However, in conversion to class morals things remain even less definite: what is possible, what is forbidden? Do not murder? Why not, if necessary! However, **who** decides what is necessary? Where is the guarantee that he will decide correctly, that his personal (or "class") consciousness is infallible? Meanwhile, everything in history opposes this. Both ridicule of the "eternal" morals and the analogy of "class" morals have led to crime and confusion.

5.

Kant's categorical imperative and Hegel's "universality" required the subordination of man to an "absolute idea" or to the category of the "proper." According to Hegel, the state is the reality of a moral idea, i.e., a citizen includes the person within himself. The same strict standard is also found in Kant's ethic.

According to Kant, the moral law within us is eternal, unchangeable like the stars over our heads, and supposedly innate to mankind. It is not taken historically or viewed as a specific movement in its origin or as the accumulation of the qualities of humanity. It has the nature of an imperative affixed to people: this way only, and that is all! He abstracted humanity's tendency as a race, a purpose which realizes itself in history, as an absolute principle instilled in us from within. Kant's weakness lies in the fact that his morality is a kind of belief or revelation. Our irreligious materialistic era questions such imperatives. For one, it is an "imperative," and for another—"everything is permitted..." Hell, why not try to act contrary to the "imperative," as if to test the measure of its compulsion and the strength of one's "desire?"

Feuerbach, with his aspirations toward the "individual" person, the natural person, tried to eliminate this "must" (like an "ideal" attached from within) and simply turned to stimuli, to the interests and motives of the real person. Thus arose his version of the theory of **happiness** (eudae-monism), which takes natural, personal satisfaction as the source. There is no yoke of the "must" whatsoever, it would seem. However, what was done with the social requirements that check "personal satisfaction?" Feuerbach himself, like his Russian student Chernyshevskiy, removed this contradiction with the theory of "reasonable egotism" (self-denial is also an egotistical satisfaction), which essentially is a paradox, brilliant in terms of ingenuity.

Karl Marx, having utilized Hegel's historical principle and Feuerbach's materialistic pathos, quite convincingly showed that morals, like everything else in the "superstructure," relate to the nature of production and, consequently, are historical.

However, in the latter interpretation of Marxism, an important circumstance which has now become fundamental in terms of significance, was given second priority. Let the base be primary in the customary meaning. However, is it possible to say that it is primary in significance on the scale of all human history? Not in order for man to provide himself with the basic conditions of existence (food, clothing, housing, etc.), but also comfort, such that precisely in the "superstructure" he comes to light in his human, spiritual content?

Morals are not innate and God did not instill a "categorical imperative" in us. However, nonetheless there is a kind of objectivity in morals, relying on man's nature and his history, on man as a thinking entity and a social individual. In the course of humanity's evolution, spiritual values inevitably appear which possess, besides the historical umbilical cord that fastens them to their own time, value in themselves as well: they are the result of the historical movement of the human spirit along the path toward absolute truth (incidentally, toward an unknowable and unattainable end).

Good and evil, justice, conscience, and happiness exist as the most general and abstract things, but reflect an objectivity which carries, so to speak, the idealistic and objective content of the category of consciousness. One can debate one or another embodiment of these concepts (some people call one thing good, others—something else; the same is true of evil, justice, and conscience), but in general it is absurd to reject their objective basis.

These concepts are the essence of the clot, the extract of the concepts of normal (ideal) human life and human relations, the extract of man's natural properties and history as a social entity.

The unilateral nature of "economic materialism" as a universal way to understand the world and man is obvious. Of course, if we consider people en masse, direct material interests define, as a rule, both personal behavior as well as personal morals for them. For some, these private material interests form a class interest which in turn, by means of class government, class politics, and class rights, can influence the consciousness of the majority of people. Often there are psychological phantoms here, to which Marx directed attention. The honest philistine wants to think that he is defending one or another policy not out of a mercenary private interest, but out of certain "higher," "idealistic" considerations, whereas these considerations only reflect the class-material stimuli, embellished by the superstructure, which was given a good-looking form.

However, there are—and classical Marxism little took this into account—impulses of personal morality which decisively oppose class consciousness. That is why man is man, a reasoning, thinking entity, such that he can raise himself above the direct greed of personal interest. If he does this instinctively, it is a question of conscience, if consciously—of a new moral understanding. Foma Gordeyev and others of Gorkiy's heroes who "broke out"

of their environment arrived at an instinctive rejection of their own class gain. The Decembrists, Gertsen, Kropotkin, Engels, Leo Tolstoy, and Lenin are another matter—people of a new moral consciousness, who raised themselves above the interests of the strata, to which they belonged by birth and upbringing, because of thought, not just a feeling.

The "philosophy of practice" little considers the fact that simultaneously with the replacement of economic formations, the process of developing the entire human consciousness takes place, including moral consciousness as well. In the course of history, evidently, the element of consciousness and moral attitude should increasingly press direct material interest, correct it and, finally, strive to control it.

It is impossible any longer to slight morals as something secondary and questionable along with the unquestionable material interest. If we have already matured enough to realize that science and knowledge are productive forces, then perhaps morality is also a productive force?

6.

If a moral idea really exists in history, then, pardon me, but just what is it? Maybe you would like to say that morality is sovereign, good and evil absolute? In this case, what is the supreme principle of morals? Toward what does human morality strive, what does it want and what can it achieve in its own development?

The philosophers say different things. For some, this is the category of love and happiness (Feuerbach). For others—goodness (J. Moore). For a third group—conscience (Ya. Milner-Irinin). I agree with those who give first priority to the category of justice as mankind's leading moral idea.

As I see it, the idea of justice takes more into consideration man's existence not only as a natural entity, but also as a social person who, having received consciousness of rights and responsibilities, is not oppressed by this, since he is aware of the value of spiritual acquisitions and of their exchange among people—beyond direct gains, material satisfaction, or biological happiness.

The principle of justice, freely accepted by man as an ancestral essence that has entered into his flesh and blood, is the impossibility of wishing on another that which one does not oneself desire and, conversely, the desire to share one's happiness. Attention to other people, mutual assistance, fraternal support and even self-denial, when necessary, should be the basis for an individual's social existence.

Here, for the first time, the requirements of happiness for each, and for me personally, and of justice for all members of society, the great human family, can be combined in aspiration toward the ideal.

However, are complete happiness and complete justice possible? Even if they are not, advancement toward these goals comprises an incentive for the movement of mankind.

Of course, self-development cannot be complete. Otherwise, knowledge of the world and the world itself would turn out to be exhausted.

Dostoyevskiy touched on this subject in "Notes From the Underground." "Is it not because, perhaps, he (man—V.L.) so loves destruction and chaos... that he himself instinctively struggles to achieve goals and complete the building being created?... Who knows... perhaps the whole purpose on earth, toward which mankind strives, only concludes in this same continuity of the process of achievement, in other words—in life itself, and not strictly in a goal, which, of course, should be nothing other than plain as a pikestaff, i.e., a formula, but after all, plain as a pikestaff is already no longer life, gentlemen, but the beginning of death."

7.

Art knows best of all about "tomorrow," about the higher goal of "humanizing" man, because it inevitably expresses the feeling or the alleged intuitive sense of justice. "Poetry is above morality—or at least quite another matter," remarked Pushkin, discussing morals and art. However, art, even apparently amoral, bears the idea of good and the secret inspiration of the ideal in harmony itself, and becomes moral as soon as it contacts the audience, even if, in the artist's conviction, it was created in a purely aesthetic sphere.

Like morals, people love to adapt art to the expression of class interests and specific political tasks. It should be noted, art willingly shines and serves the rising classes of society. However, even while agreeing to serve it (entirely sincerely or under compulsion), in one way or another it more or less always reflects the human ideal, which belongs to the future, devoid of any requirement of class nature whatsoever; above all it serves the liberation of that general human content to which the entire history of the "two-legged featherless animals" on Earth has been devoted.

8.

Justice in morals is analogous to truth in knowledge. There is no single and eternal justice, just as there is no single and eternal truth. However, just as truth in its entire demonstrability and fullness nonetheless objectively exists in reality, so justice also objectively exists. Just as there is a striving of consciousness toward a more complete and exhaustive truth, there is also that which we call "spirit," an striving toward complete and unquestionable justice. In other words, both truth and justice are hypostases of an ideal. However, in historical practice an ideal consists of partial, relative truths, of separate, weak, incomplete elements of justice.

Moreover, just as complete truth would signify the end of knowledge and an exhaustive picture of the world, the equivalent limit of its development, complete justice would also presume such a blindingly perfect person, that he would no longer need to live. It is difficult to even imagine this accomplished as the result of history that has finally taken shape. However, as an ideal and aspiration, this is a powerful motive for life.

9.

"We must dream!" Lenin repeated Pisarev's appeal. It is inherent in human consciousness in one form or another to design the future, to look into tomorrow. As everyone knows, the socialist utopists, each according to his own reasoning and concepts of the ideal, have depicted the future order of a happy island or "Sun state" in all its details. Scientific socialism has rejected these illusory pictures in favor of specific ways and means for the struggle of the working class and its liberation. "...Scientific socialism has never depicted any strictly future prospects whatsoever..." the young Lenin wrote (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 1, pp 186-187), perhaps, to some detriment to the philosophy of purpose.

However, a dream in its contemporary social aspect is the worst kind of utopism. It is a jump straight through the study of facts, skipping over the analysis of ways and methods of interpreting them, directly to a conclusion, depicted in an abstract and ideal form simply for the reason of its alienation from reality. With "good" intentions, dreaming often fills in for the absence of education and culture: culture not only as the sum total of knowledge, of shaped historical experience, but the culture of a flexible, living mind, capable of realizing the dialectics of movement, diversity of conditions, interweaving of contradictions, and possibilities of good developing into evil.

In addition, philosophers and sociologists have done little work on the question of purpose itself. There is a kind of tradition here, which originates in the struggle of "scientific socialism" against "utopism." Utopian designs for a "Sun state," a world of the future regulated in all its details, the "crystal palaces" and prophetic dreams of Chernyshevskiy's heroine—all of these were naive attempts to abstract a definite idea of earthly paradise, of the universal happiness of people in specific forms accessible to speculation. They usually see the merit of Marxism in the fact that it specifically raises the question of the ways and means of the struggle, instead of lamentations about the future and the illusory prophesies of utopian systems.

However, after all, the question of purpose, a purpose neither private nor incidental, but universal and fundamental, did not disappear. Paradoxical though it may be, Marxism dealt with the question of purpose least of all, apparently assuming that in a general form purpose was long ago understood and known as something that goes

without saying and, due to its remote nature, not requiring too many specifics.

However, do many people consciously relate to what this future society is, for the sake of which so many sacrifices are being made? Is it not necessary to know more precisely what it is a question of? Are we all floating in one boat, amicably plying the oars, when suddenly it turns out that one of us thought we were going to Rybinsk, and another to Astrakhan? It was simply not agreed on beforehand.

Whereas the classics of Marxism did little to develop the problem of final purpose, contemporary theoreticians were entirely carefree on this account. The word "communism" is well known to us, but the content and volume of this concept—far less so. It suffices to recall the claim of some people to the effect that as we approach communism, the role of the state and the party increases further. Nobody, understandably, has objected to them. Somehow it was simply forgotten, erased from the consciousness, that communism, even in the most orthodox sources, was primarily considered a community of free people where, it goes without saying, there would be neither classes, parties, nor states.

The word "communism" incorporates a social reflex of purpose. It calls one to action and serves practice well. The ambiguity itself, the incomplete regulation of purpose, makes it attractive, because it makes it possible to individualize the ideal, to introduce an element of one's own concept of happiness in it. Nonetheless, social purpose ought to be outlined more solidly, in order to include a guarantee against distortion along the way to achieving it.

The question of social purpose as a super-purpose, the purpose of all purposes (J. Dietzgen), was not only related to economics and the social order. Its core and heart is the philosophy of man. Just what is the "flourishing of the human personality" under communism? How do we achieve it? What elements in history contribute to this? What does "bourgeois freedom of the personality" signify with regard to this? What is this morality and art in the prospects for the future? Can it be a question of moral self-improvement as the purpose of the communist individual, etc?

Perhaps all of these questions cannot be answered right now. However, in order to find an answer, one must have asked the question, so that it appears in a clear form which does not inspire doubt and so that it is objectified in expectation of a fitting echo.

10.

A purpose should not be alienated from the process of achieving it, for otherwise that which Kant cautioned against in his paradox on freedom will occur. He believed that it is impossible to reconcile oneself with an opinion which sometimes even very intelligent people adhere to. This opinion is reduced to the fact that there is a certain people, striving toward legitimate freedom at

this moment, that this people is not yet mature enough for freedom, that the serfs belonging to the landowners are not yet mature enough for freedom, and that all people in general are not yet mature enough for religious freedom. However, the fact is that freedom never enters into such an assumption, for it is impossible to mature enough for freedom without being free beforehand. It is necessary to be already free, in order to possess the capability of applying one's efforts toward freedom. The first attempts are distinguished, of course, by a certain crudity and are linked to a more or less onerous and dangerous condition, compared to that in which the command and supervision of some over others exists. However, there is no other way for reason to mature than through strictly personal attempts, and these attempts are possible only under a condition of personal freedom. That is, the purpose is the freedom of each person.

Fascinated by the economic aspect of the matter, many Marxists identified only the limited class content in morals, true, making provisos for the "simple laws of morality and justice, by which private individuals should be guided in their interrelations," and ideally—people among themselves as well (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 16, p 11).

The clarification of the principles of a future society, not only socioeconomic, but also moral, apparently, is in no way an idle task. Essentially, only this can reveal the purpose that gives meaning to the struggle.

If one always lives according to class morality alone, which is equivalent to class interest, then how, from what kind of elements, can the morals of a classless society be shaped? Or must we wait until it is announced that the material and technical base of communism is ready, and is it possible only then to allow ourselves the luxury of working to construct new relations, a new ethic?

However, this does not happen in history. The more so, in that part of history which relates to culture, i.e., to the slow, organic assimilation of a new level of human relations—just and free.

In the practice of the revolutionary struggle, people who have headed a political movement, class, or party, often release themselves from any sort of common moral considerations whatsoever. In "*Katekhizis Revolyutsionera*" [Catechism of a Revolutionary], Nechayev said: "Everything that contributes to the triumph of the revolution is moral for him (the revolutionary—V.L.). Everything that hinders it is immoral and criminal." As a leader, Nechayev left for himself the decision of what exactly is needed for a revolution, scoffed the "eternal moral rules," was convinced that he was acting morally in murdering the student Ivanov in a park grotto, and was dauntlessly prepared "for the benefit of the revolution" to murder another hundred thousand such Ivanovs.

Or when Stalin, having shaped the tasks of the class struggle for the party for decades, unleashed the mass

terror, there was no kind of moral regulator whatsoever, no moral restraint whatsoever, either for him, or for his stooges.

It is understandable that Marx, exasperated with bourgeois philanthropy and the "high-minded phraseology" of true socialists or of Proudhon, was unable to presume the conclusions that his successors would draw from the polemic rejection of speculative morals. Indeed, essentially, Marx and Engels do not in practice deny the significance of moral assessment. Moreover, when analyzing the historical movement of society, they often speak not only of the advantage or disadvantage for a class, but also of nobility, baseness, and similar such "abstract" moral categories. Apparently, man is generally unable to think beyond the categories of traditional (albeit also approximate) moral assessments.

The polemics between Marx and Engels and Proudhon and his followers, strictly speaking, was based on a objection to considering moral dogma to be the causal impetus of mankind's movement. For Marxism, it is clear that history to a far greater extent moves the socioeconomic aspect, material interest and the struggle of the classes. In this sense, Proudhon's law of "eternal justice" ought to seem like idyllic rose water.

However, the situation is different with respect to the "philosophy of purpose." The fact that certain moral rules are kept in the course of history, albeit roughly shaped and constantly distorted by class biases, has tremendous significance for the development of human ideals.

Many properties of the common human ideal were first formulated during the Age of Enlightenment. While Rousseau was writing in France about equality as man's original happy state, Kant in Germany defined his own moral imperative. His basis was the rule, not outdated even now, that man under any circumstances cannot be the means, but only the end.

11.

Is it possible to live in society, but be free of society? Of course, it is impossible to be absolutely free: dependency in one way or another inevitably has an effect. However, it is not only possible to lift oneself above one's society, social environment, surroundings, and material interests, but this also comprises the basis of all spiritual human progress. Otherwise, if we imagine that each depends on all, yet all consists of "each," we obtain a kind of push-and-pull with a false imitation of movement. As though from the cradle, mortal necessity enslaves people, makes them incapable of original thoughts and actions, and deprives them of hope for change.

True, people en masse are not free of society and the influence of its class and environment. However, everything valuable in philosophy, morals, politics, and art does not depend blindly on the surrounding circumstances and is turned toward the future. People of

science, art, and philosophy are just trying to go beyond the framework of the narrow class understanding, attached to them by their society and environment. To the extent to which they succeed in this, they are significant and can themselves advance human history farther, not just passively and involuntarily swimming in its current. Such were Tolstoy and Shakespeare, Aristotle and Kant, Marx and Lenin.

12.

The latest studies violate the soothing concepts of mankind's forward movement, of progress and optimistic evolution, inculcated in us by the 19th century. They point to the centers of civilization and developed culture that have perished without leaving a traces for mankind's further evolution; there were and are societies with humanistic inclinations, and the most savage satrapy and tyranny, and this is all developing not uniformly and forward, not according to the ways of evolution, but often catastrophically for man and uniquely each time. Sometimes there is no progress and development does not conform to the Marxist "spiral," but to the cycle or cycles of civilization noted by Arnold Toynbee.

However, what if we are faced with the still-hidden law of a more precise connection, of a more complex evolution, and not simply with the abolition of an optimistic forecast for history and a denial of the law of progress?

Of course, the theories of progress and evolutionism of the 19th century, Spencer, and Mikhaylovskiy now seem too good to be true. Everything in history, apparently, is accomplished more tragically, diversely, terribly and profoundly than the most penetrating thinkers had imagined.

However, I like to think that the present-day skepticism with regard to progress is not everlasting. It is a transition state to a new, more complex and comprehensive knowledge of mankind's movement. Perhaps 10 or 15 years will pass and a new influential philosophy will arise, a new explanation of life, on whose threshold we are standing right now. Possibly, this philosophy will unify and correct everything fruitful in our socialism, in the natural sciences, and in the different forms of humanitarian consciousness.

Rousseau asked: is there moral progress in human history? The illusion is that progress does not exist. Civilization's successes do not bring spiritual flourishing. Leading socialist systems are discovering their own despotism within themselves.

The memorials of our generation are World War II, Auschwitz, the Gulag system, Magadan and Hiroshima. Mankind lives under conditions of monstrous disproportion—improving life, raising the material level, and unprecedented progress of science and technology, versus constantly smoldering wars, hunger in the remaining parts of the world, and the relatively slow progress of moral concepts.

Yet, perhaps progress does not exist at all in the realm of spiritual culture? Can it be that mankind is crawling backward? However, let us recall the era of savagery, barbarism and slavery, let us remember the medieval Inquisition, the bonfires and galleys with slaves, let us remember the Crusades, the refined tortures, quartering, guillotines, witch-burning, the cholera and salt riots, etc.

Where does moral progress apparent here?

I do not want to idealize the present either. The count of tragedies in our own recent past is also high.

However, the attitude toward socialism on the part of some of our "protestants" is the attitude of the rejected and the "frustrated lover." He who has been deceived a woman once does not believe in love, and tends to think that it does not exist in all the world. He does not even want to hear the word.

Indeed, social progress is marching slowly, with disillusionment, setbacks, and backpedalling.

As far as the progress of moral consciousness is concerned, if it is being accomplished, and I am assuming that it is nonetheless being accomplished, the movement is occurring, like all profound processes of living nature, so slowly that we can hardly notice it.

Having become accustomed to dealing with clocks that show the time of day, a person clearly sees only the running of the second hand. However, let us imagine ourselves in front of a colossal clock face measuring the time in centuries. No matter how much we stare at the end of the gigantic steel hand, frozen somewhere between the figures 20 and 21, we would be unable to discern even the slightest motion. Does this mean that the clock has stopped or is running backwards?

The technical revolution that occurred in the 20th century, the unprecedented acceleration in the rates of development, the compression of the scale of the globe and its gradual unification, with the help of global information and transportation, into one enormous family, albeit still at odds with itself for the time being—is this not a prelude to the age of man's new spiritual development?

13.

According to the inertia of thought, I initially accepted for myself many concepts of Marxist orthodoxy, prepared by official teachers, only gradually noting how little they conformed to all of my specific experience, observations and moral consciousness.

Those who believed and preached that morals are class-oriented, but that philosophy, history and literature are party-oriented, quite understandably found many confirmations of these opinions. Right now I too am prepared to agree that here is part of the truth, only one part, and not the whole truth. It is only one of the "applications" of the general position, and not even always the main one.

The Leninist example of dialectics, born in polemics with Bukharin, is well known: a glass is an "instrument for drinking," along with the fact that it is a glass cylinder, yet if it is thrown at someone's head, it is a means of "polemics," etc.

Lenin was right; there are many properties, and they are not equivalent. The main purpose of a glass is nonetheless a vessel for drinking. All the rest are either its partial properties or use not according to its purpose.

Morals, art, and philosophy are class-related. This is one of the properties, but not the main property which systematizes them and is not the purpose either of morals or of art. However, who would dispute that they can be used not according to their purpose and, for instance, that literature can be made into a "projectile for throwing" at someone's head. Unquestionably, a stone, bullet, or shot would be more appropriate for the purpose.

Morality, reason and art should be measured on general human scales—this is the main thing about them. Of course, in each era they express the spirit of their time, meaning that of the party, classes, etc. However, they must not be measured only by an immediate historical yardstick. Their basic measurement lies in the progress of the entire human race, the measurement of the future free man, living in a classless society. In this sense, reason, morality and art are more communis in their elements, than some other manifestations of man in society (state, law, politics, etc.).

14.

Along with man's two powerful internal motives—egotism and altruism—we must bring up a third: the need for self-justification. This is unquestionably a child of egotism, but an individual and independent child. Man must justify himself, convince himself and others that his home is the very best, his wife and children are the most beautiful, and his nation, language, and country, the most wonderful in the world. This requires self-persuasion. People are weak, and weakness hates truth. Weakness must repeat over and over: "Everything that is mine is the very best." Otherwise it cannot live and finds no justification for itself. The American Tennessee Williams wrote the play "A Streetcar Named Desire" on the subject of an imaginary life for the sake of self-approval. In it, a woman fabricates herself, her past and her fate, in order to justify herself. One can live in a dirty, dusty corner, eat stale crusts, and repeat: "Everything is fine, I am warm and dry, there is enough food."

The desire to look good in one's own eyes and not lose self-respect guides many people in the moral sphere as well. Any mental weakness—treachery, apostasy, or cowardice—immediately seeks and finds internal justifications for itself. If I were cunning, acted dishonestly and my conscience was nagging me, I would most often pacify it by blaming others. Man is capable of setting the whole world "upright," in order to soothe and persuade himself: "I am right, the others are wrong." In the

absence of intellectual courage, there is the entire insidiousness of human consciousness.

Of course, the concept of class and group morality as something which automatically and without exception subordinates people to itself (in its sphere of influence) is absurd. According to the old theory of "environment," people consoled themselves: "the environment was oppressive."

"We could all become Nazis under certain circumstances." Is this true, taking into account that humanism has acknowledged its own helplessness in the face of the cruelest pressures of the century? This is the truth, but not the whole truth. Its other part lies in the fact that the psychosis of "collectivism," of the authority of the leader, and so on, have acted differently on different people. It is possible, it seems, to optimistically estimate: fifty-fifty. Half were willingly subordinated, and half were secretly or openly opposed. However, even if the majority, the "silent majority," the gigantic middle, submits blindly, there is always the protesting, thinking, unsubmitting minority, the "salt of the salt of the Earth."

15.

The noise made from time to time in the press about "abstract humanism" may seem at first glance to be the fruit of misunderstanding, a mistake in theory, simply an incorrect use of words. In reality, they usually call "abstract humanism," exactly the specific humanism, the feeling of kindness, compassion, and conscience which has no clear lining of class interest but is unquestionably aimed at the personality, the individual person.

"Forgive me, I pity old women. Yet this is my only shortcoming," the poet Mikhail Svetlov asked to be forgiven, and not for nothing. The poet's humanism is beyond class and, consequently, abstract. Having encountered a blind, feeble old woman by a crosswalk, leaning on a cane with difficulty, he helps her cross the street, not thinking of the fact that she is a Komsomol "rabfak" student of the 1920s or a former lady of the imperial court. The poet is on a dangerous path—pity for an old woman is a very specific feeling.

"Abstract humanism" is specific. It turns with compassion and support to the real, living person—to you, me, and him. Conversely, the so-called class humanism is abstract. It interprets the person only as a representative of a certain party, group, or class, and disregards his individuality, personality and peculiarity. In the light of class arithmetic, even thoughtless cruelty can be included (understandably, in a certain "higher" sense) in humanism.

Everyone knows, for example, that during the civil war it was deemed possible to shoot former White officers, since they were the enemy, regardless of the fact that they were already disarmed and helpless, harmless from the military point of view. Some may consider such "humanism" to be class humanism, but there is nothing specific about it. We are faced with an entirely abstract

class humanism. In "*Tikhiy Don*" [Silent Flows the Don], Sholokhov relates the fate of Grigory Melekhov. Readers of this novel sympathize with Grigoriy... Yet, how many such Grigoriys were shot during the bloody civil war? "*Tikhiy Don*" is the song of songs of abstract humanism.

Stalin developed a similar concept of class humanism further along in his campaigns to "dispossess the kulaks" in the countryside and the elimination of the "fifth column" in the army and the country, and several novelists even recently have obligingly explained the events of 1937. Where was there even a trace of specific nature? Abstract class nature struck people right and left, indiscriminately, peasant or army commander, engineer or writer.

The struggle against abstract humanism in the 1960s-1970s, if we sweep aside the verbal husks from the ornaments, allegedly had very little to do with class antagonism. The requirement of class nature here is most often conventional and sham—truly an abstract class nature. One thing was important for the singers of literary class nature: to reject for oneself the unconditional nature of categories like goodness, justice and conscience. Commonly acknowledged, these would have interfered with sleeping peacefully and eating caviar sandwiches.

Hence such hate toward abstract humanism and the desire to convince us that everything is relative: good and evil, justice and dishonesty. The relative nature of morals is convenient: it makes it possible to equalize honesty and baseness, courage and cowardice. "In my opinion, all fleas are bad: they are all black, they all jump," says Gorkiy's old man Luka. If everything is evaluated from the viewpoint of gain for a certain strata, class, or state, there is also no moral court and no personal moral responsibility. It is convenient to adapt this "abstract class nature" to personal advantages. Eat and drink, make a fortune on the sly, or crawl up the career ladder, and just do not forget to glorify a bit more loudly those on whom access to the trough depends.

Here, for verification, is the entire practical wisdom of the struggle against "abstract humanism."

16.

Morals are usually included in the sphere of ideology. This is a mistake. Morals are aimed at the person as a product of all history, of ideology—at the political existence of a person in contemporaneity.

Ideology is alive and green, fruitful and poisonous, while it grows evenly with life for the time being or outdistances it and makes it look younger. A vital and strong ideology is needed in general in order to assert a certain new political and social structure. It is also challenging to life in its requirements. However, when the structure is created and the skeleton has hardened, ideology is deprived of vital juices and hangs limply, like a dress on a drying rack. The organizational structure can still be

very strong, but the ideology that serves it is helpless with respect to further development and degenerates into a formal "moralism." This is no longer essentially ideology, but orthodoxy, i.e., applied propaganda formed long ago, fixed and really only persuading the propagandist himself. Life passed it by a long time ago.

17.

"They killed belief in God, but did not think of what to believe in," I heard, walking by a church on Pyatnitskaya.

In reality, the rejection of God has not presumed another belief within socialism. Knowledge of the world and moral self-awareness should have risen to take its place. Evidently, however, such deprivation of belief is not on the up for everyone. A fearless mind can understand that even without God there is morality, that life does have meaning and purpose. For this, it is necessary to realize and feel oneself a part of the human race and its history, not a tiny speck of sand tossed into the world, a lone individual, persistently thinking about the horror of personal death.

I have talked to newly converted young people, seized with religious fervor, and their impatience toward people, ideas and circumstances that do not somehow conform to their current belief was striking. Swift, it seems, spoke of people who were religious enough to hate, but not enough to love each other. They have been taught for a long time that "he who does not sing with us today is against us." Hence the latest "idealism" is sometimes just as intolerant as the former vulgar materialism. We eternally pretend that a categorical choice is inevitable: either this or that, spirit or matter.

Yet, a person inevitably has both spirit and body. There is a desire to live (and to live well) in the present, not in the future of some hazy century, and not just in the kingdom of God. People are suffering from social inequality, material inequality, hunger and cold, and unjust oppression, and this inevitably ought to provoke a social struggle and give rise to Marxism or something similar to it as the theoretical foundation for such struggle.

However, man's life is not flesh alone, not the happiness of life alone, not self-satisfaction alone. There is still a spiritual thirst.

I am saying a great deal in these odd pages about the moral idea, about justice, about moral purpose, so much that I risk becoming a bore with my moralism.

Let the fact that I did not start with a theoretical and scholastic structure serve as my justification. This came to me as a feeling, a sensation, an inner protest against those who deny the meaning of life and, having outlined the failures, proclaim the vanity of any human activity. Thus, I have acted on the recommendations of the existentialist philosophers—listen to your heart.

I am not trying to stun anyone with what I am saying. There is even a danger of seeming too insipid, simple

and old. "We have heard this a hundred times: once from Kant, again from Rousseau, and a third time from Marx." This does not dismay me. So much has been said in the world about the world that there is almost no hope of saying something entirely unprecedented. Indeed, must one? Sometimes it seems like all the words have been said and all the conjectures uttered somewhere, sometime, by someone, only we do not always remember this.

Well, so what? A new idea is new not because each time it invents new concepts or reflects laws previously unknown—it is almost impossible to distinguish such discoveries as applied to man's social and moral nature. What is important is that it puts well-known ideas and concepts into a different, vital connection and thus illuminates man's existence in a new way. Most important, in my opinion, is the consistency of speculative views with that which most people think or are preparing to think in our time.

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DEBATES AND DISCUSSION

Social Consciousness: Complex Interconnection With Practice

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[Article by Larisa Petrovna Kuksa, docent, Novosibirsk Higher Party School, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] Today the view that both the mechanism of obstruction and that of acceleration of perestroika are directly related to social consciousness has become quite clear. The concepts of "social awareness," "public opinion" and "social psychology" kept appearing in the scientific and mass press.

I believe that this interest is justified. Our society is in a stage of transition to a new qualitative status. The extent to which this transition will be difficult or less effective or else inconsistent largely depends on the success of perestroika in public awareness. For that reason we must look more closely into this phenomenon and into the processes which are occurring within it. Are they following a trend needed for the development of socialist society? What should be done to accelerate positive processes? Clearly, the answer to these questions requires a reference to the already basic truths contained in scientific conclusions on the structure of public awareness, the mechanism of its operational development and its actual condition, as it is found in our society.

The view that social awareness is a kind of supraindividual collective mind with a rather complex structure has been universally accepted in scientific publications. In terms of the extent to which it reflects surrounding

reality we distinguish between ordinary and scientific and technical awareness; in terms of the method of reflection, we distinguish between social psychology and ideology; and in terms of the object of reflection we make distinctions among the specific forms of social awareness.

The ordinary awareness is shaped, as a rule, on the basis of the practical experience of the people. Its judgmental element includes common sense, morality standards, customs and value concepts. Also included here are social illusions and fantasies. Common sense enabled the ordinary awareness to help over thousands of years the survival of mankind and the strengthening of positive practical experience. Scientific theory is a profound level of reflection of reality, which includes knowledge of the various aspects and facets of nature and society. Today we are witnessing the type of development of scientific awareness in which two of its main "trends"—natural science and social science—are beginning to come closer to each other. Possibly, it is thus that the process of merger between these areas of knowledge within a single science of man is taking place, as was predicted by Marx in his time (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 42, pp 126-127). The role of the intermediary units is played, to a certain extent, by the technical sciences and the initiated and tempestuously developing areas of general scientific knowledge: the general theory of systems, cybernetics, sociology and others. Sciences such as bionics appear at the intersection of the technical with the natural sciences. The development of education and, particularly, the enhancement of its quality are contributing to the dissemination of scientific awareness on a mass scale.

Ordinary and scientific awareness are both in a state of dialectical interconnection. Metaphorically speaking, scientific-theoretical awareness performs the role of the locomotive engine which pulls on the tracks of history the ordinary concepts of the people. In turn, the latter, having mastered one scientific idea or another, promote and develop practical experience and, consequently, test the veracity and accuracy and, naturally, the correctness of these ideas. In that sense as well practice is the criterion of truth while ordinary awareness, as the "representative of practical experience," provides material for the development of scientific awareness. In any case, this is unquestionably true in the social sciences which, as they study objective historical processes, cannot ignore their subjective duplication in human interests, aspirations and views.

Ordinary and scientific awareness never coincide. While the former masters the result of scientific thinking, the latter is already "pushing" ahead, penetrating ever more deeply into the essential aspects of reality, largely thanks to the study of public opinion. It is true that there also are frequent examples of an inverse influence exerted by ordinary on scientific awareness, in which the latter may retain for long periods of time even the most stupid dogmas and prejudices, as confirmed by numerous examples.

Such is the dialectics of awareness, inherent in any society. However, it is always of a specific historical nature. Thus, the ordinary awareness of the period of the October Revolution is not the same as the ordinary awareness of our time. The ordinary awareness of an illiterate person can be drastically different from the concepts of an educated person. The mass ordinary awareness of the period of the cult of Stalin's personality or the period of stagnation was different from the ordinary concepts of the present. Today there has been a sharp increase in providing a value judgment of this phenomenon, its activeness and critical trend; its foundations have become richer through social knowledge and ideas. At the same time, however, the scope has broadened for illusions and fantasies, related to a reassessment of all practical experience. In some cases such reassessment develops into a search for the possibility of turning movements back. The latter is perhaps one of the explanations for the "programmatic" declarations of anti-Soviet groups, such as the so-called "democratic alliance" or irrational slogans formulated by some independent organizations such as "Memory," and manifestations of extremism on the grounds of national relations. As a whole, elements of common sense continue to strengthen in the ordinary awareness; the authority of moral values is growing. This is manifested in the support of perestroika. It is precisely in this area that it is prepared to move on to the next round of development, i.e., to the practical mastery of the ideas of perestroika.

It is true that the following question arises: "Is social science today ready to play the role of a 'locomotive' which would pull mass consciousness forward?" We believe that it is not, not to the fullest extent, although since April 1985 there has been progress both in the development and scientific enrichment of the ideas of revolutionary perestroika and the economic and political reforms. However, we are as yet to implement the requirement of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on formulating an integral concept of social development, clarifying the dialectics of its processes and the contradictoriness with which they are reflected in the mass awareness, and to define the scientific prospects. The speed with which this gap between what is needed and what exists is closed will determine the fate of the society and, particularly, the success of the processes of democratization and the struggle against bureaucratism.

The extent of scientific support given to social management is particularly important, for the specific nature of the organization of human life is found precisely in the fact that social life is "governed" by ideas and by social awareness although, naturally, this takes place through the activities of the bearers of such ideas. The "management" provided by such ideas is of a dual nature: on an organized basis, through the political system of society and its institutions, or else spontaneously, through the so-called "ideologies" of daily life—traditions, standards and concepts which operate in the realm of daily contacts among people. Such ties between social awareness

and social management are present in our society as well and, on the surface, they may appear quite simply. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism "govern" through the institutions of the political system. This is the most important structural formation of scientific awareness. However, the absolutizing of this concept (as well as the unquestionable veracity of all available ideas and unquestionable accuracy of all actions taken by political institutions) is merely a system codified through the power of biases in past propaganda literature. Perestroika proved that a continuing investigation of practical experience is necessary both in the area of ideas and social management institutions.

In the area of the spontaneous contacts we find an infinite range of ideas, traditions and concepts based on the complexity of the development of the ordinary awareness and of social psychology. Under the influence of social groups on the awareness of the specific individual, this entire variety of ideas and forms of their manifestation leads to difficulties, contradictory features and, frequently, split thoughts and behavior. Examples of such a division is found, on the one hand, in the support of socialism and, on the other, in identifying the latter with the prevalence of equalization trends. This was particularly clearly manifested in the course of the last electoral campaign: in their programs, many candidates formulated as one of the main features a similar example of interpretation of the requirements of social justice, and "equalization" slogans enjoyed, judging by the results, a great deal of support among the voters. Or else, here is another example: the warm support for socialist democracy and, at the same time, support against this background of group, narrow-departmental and egotistical interests.

The lines of interaction between organized and spontaneous management and, therefore, between the scientific and ordinary factors in social awareness are quite flexible. Here the situation resembles communicating vessels: if the level of scientific and organized management drops, immediately everything is filled from the area of spontaneous management, including features which oppose a scientific approach, such as mediocrity, philistinism, incompetence, a petit-bourgeois attitude, etc. If the level of scientific support rises, its opposite surrenders its positions. This immediately begins to influence all aspects of social life. No other way is possible, for the political system—the organizational foundation of social management—tries to make society in its own image.

On this level, how to assess the existing situation in social management for the period since Vladimir Ilich Lenin's death? Clearly, we must acknowledge that the changes which we describe as deformations created conditions for weakening the attention paid to scientific principles and the summation of experience; ordinary concepts, emotions and nonprofessionalism, which parallel bureaucratism, became quite deeply ingrained. This situation is being surmounted today with a great deal of difficulty, particularly on the middle and lower levels of management, where the role of scientific knowledge in

management and the scientific training of cadres are weaker. In order to accelerate the process of perestroika we must (in addition to surmounting the bureaucratic ways of thinking and acting) accept the fact that a teacher, an engineer, i.e., a highly skilled specialist who has been trained for work in one area of production or another—material or spiritual—cannot successfully engage in management activities without mastering a special set of social skills.

Lack of professionalism in management must be eliminated from the viewpoint of its content and of organization: the necessary unity of science and practical experience in management must be organized on a legal basis. This is particularly important under the conditions of the broadening of democratic processes in society, when the replaceability of the people included in this social structure increases and when the practical experience of the activated masses becomes more complex and more varied.

It is natural for social awareness not to be limited to a single form of existence—knowledge. Collective views and moods of the people are concentrated in the social mentality which is closely related to ordinary awareness. Its structure is no less complex. We find here emotional conditions, psychological phenomena of a social and national nature, and a socioarbitrary factor. The social mentality expresses, if we could describe thus, the spirit of the people, the spirit of the times in a given social situation. Let us recall the Armenian tragedy. What great sympathy, what desire to help others in trouble that emerged in the social mood and became a manifestation of the internationalist spirit of the Soviet people, despite all efforts at reviving nationalism and chauvinism! Nonetheless, we believe that the spirit of the time and its main feature today are brimming with emotional manifestations and emotions which sometimes push into the background the primacy of reason and the greatly needed readiness to engage in willful actions for the sake of accelerating perestroika.

Emotions are manifested literally in all areas of social life: in material production, when the forms of labor organization change rapidly and not always for a reason, in various areas of spiritual activities, such as relations among writers or between writers and scientists, etc. In the last electoral campaign emotions prevailed. Nor were they absent in the course of the debates at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

This is natural, for emotions prevail when higher areas of awareness—theoretically substantiated political ideas and scientific thinking—are insufficiently included (or insufficiently organically included) in the life process, when the mechanisms which take to the various social groups and population strata clear and integral concepts which make the prospects for social development understood, both strategic as well as temporary, are not functioning at full capacity. This is prevented by the penetration of emotions into reason and the understanding which is becoming popular today of pluralism

as an ideological and political omnivorousness rather than a range for civilized debates and the search for truly fruitful and most efficient ways leading to reaching the targets set by the revolution and socialism.

In this connection, we should especially discuss the question of the place and role of ideology in social awareness. This is a system of ideas and views on the real process of human life, expressing the interests of a given class. Being related to the requirements and interests of classes and social groups, ideology seems to stand above social psychology, "growing" out of it even when this is not the target of the ideologues. Nonetheless, ideology is the product of scientific thinking and ideological and theoretical work. It is quite closely related to scientific awareness and, particularly, to the ideology of the working class—Marxism-Leninism.

Ideology plays a great social function. If scientific theory leads mankind to knowledge and realization of its nature as Homo Sapiens, ideology tries, along the same way, to combine the infinite variety of human interests, based on the level of development of production forces and production relations, within a single social target, to make meaningful the apparent variety of disparate actions and to unite society in engaging in a purposeful activity. This process also takes place under the conditions of pluralism of ideas, for one ideology always predominates, as consistent with the level of historical progress in the spiritual area, and natural for a specific era. Society, whatever it may be in terms of social status, cannot exist without having, to one extent or another, a unity of objectives and actions, although under the conditions of a spontaneous development, based on private ownership, such a general sociological law makes its way primarily in such a way that as a result a majority of seemingly unrelated and sometimes directly conflicting interests and actions lead to results which no one ever planned or contemplated. This means that there also develops the type of resultant force through which, in the final account, historical necessity is achieved. It is true that contemporary capitalism uses science to control an entire set of processes, by no means unsuccessfully.

In the controlled management of society, such a force must be discovered scientifically and become a subject of particular concern, for the accuracy of its definition determines the pace of social development. Communist ideology is the one called upon to serve as an instrument for the manifestation of such a force in the interests of the people under contemporary conditions, in order to ensure the ideological unity of the Soviet people and, consequently, unity of action in attaining the set objectives. We accept it as an ideology of a higher order compared to any previous or current global ideology, although its role must be constantly asserted through intensive intellectual work. Another question is the extent to which it is purposefully used today in society as an instrument for the unification of human thoughts and actions. There have been times in our history when communist ideology efficiently united the people and contributed to surmounting incredible difficulties,

directing their enthusiasm into the building of the new society. The value of these periods, as we now know, varied; ideology itself, which lost a great deal of its own value, was by no means always used for its proper purpose: it was skillfully used to conceal bad actions and events. However, this is not the topic of this article.

The ideological work of the bolsheviks, who were able to make accepted and understood by many people the image of communism and socialism, was a prerequisite for the spiritual upsurge of the builders of communism. Unfortunately, on a parallel basis, hiding behind the ideas of communism, another process was taking place, which was undermining the foundations of our ideological unity and contributing to the division among people and to undermining their trust in this lofty objective. Deformations, errors and disparities between words and actions led to the fact that in the ordinary awareness of a large number of people an illusory or even a clearly negative perception of anything which was said about the future developed.

The democratization of social awareness, which has matured and is taking place today, and the pluralism of opinions, which is necessary for the democratization of society, by no means simplify the process of intensifying the influence of communist ideology, which is so greatly necessary today, and which must be enriched and developed further and updated, in order for it to become the pivot of socialist pluralism in the spiritual life of our society. It is only the strong ideological unity (not unity of thought or uniformity!) and, therefore, the unity of action that can move perestroika forward. It is important for the pluralism which is being established to be truly socialist: socialist values must prevail in the social consciousness; despite the great difficulty of understanding the communist ideals on the different levels of awareness, their true humanistic content must be restored and the accretions of the past, which cast a shadow over them, must be eliminated as we remove barnacles from the hull of a ship. The ideal of a just and humane society must be revived in its full moral purity as an ideal carried by mankind through the millennia and which found its scientific substantiation in Marxism.

Social awareness reveals yet another one of its facet if we try to analyze one of its components, such as mass awareness. On the one hand, this means the collective mind and feelings of all consciously acting people living within a society, unlike, for example, the knowledge, experience and feelings of all past generations, which are concentrated in a phenomenon of the social awareness known as social memory (for greater details see V.A. Kolevator, "*Sotsialnaya Pamyat i Poznaniye*" [Social Memory and Cognition]. Mysl, Moscow, 1984, pp 64-75). On the other, it means a variety of formal and informal groups and accidental or shorter-lasting communities, such as people working in the same sector, television viewers, subscribers to a given newspaper, movie audiences, or crowds (see B.A. Grushin, "*Massovoye Soznaniye*" [Mass Awareness]. Politizdat, Moscow,

1987, pp 186-187). As a rule, mass awareness is the equivalent of ordinary awareness. Furthermore, it concentrates within itself all psychological formations and consists of a tangle of contradictions. The prevalence of one aspect of contradictions or another in the mass awareness such as, for example, judgmental or emotional psychological formations, convictions or beliefs, common sense or illusions, lets us speak of the quality of social awareness.

Today the fate of perestroika (as well as, actually, of any kind of progress or, conversely, any regressive social development) greatly depends on the quality of mass awareness and on the ideas which either dominate or influence it. We must once again turn to Karl Marx's familiar statement to the effect that ideas become a material force only when they conquer the masses, in connection with the fact that perestroika is entering its second stage of development. The essence of this stage, in terms of what interests us, is precisely that the ideas of societal restructuring must be converted from the theoretical-ideological level to the mass awareness and become accepted and understood by every person. They must become part of the people's motivations, plans and actions. The task is to change the priorities in the mass awareness from illusions (such as those of "equalization" or leftist deviation) to common sense and, subsequently, to substitute scientific concepts on the ways leading to change for emotional manifestation, and convictions for the feeling that there is truly no alternative to perestroika. The people are experiencing real practical difficulties and in each case they must be given truthful information about the reasons for such difficulties, so that they could jointly seek ways leading to practical improvements. Persistent efforts must be made for the ideology of renovation, which is closely related to life and the experience of the masses, to define increasingly the labor and sociopolitical activeness of the people in their daily activities. Under the conditions of democratization of social awareness, broad glasnost and pluralism of opinions, the individual frequently finds it difficult to choose between dry scientific explanations and much more accessible but sometimes primitive guesses. How to help him make the correct choice? Consequently, we need a more active restructuring of ideological work and its methods; we must find ways of organically including innovative party ideas within the conflicting context of contemporary mass awareness.

We see obvious difficulties in connection with the relatively widespread instability and vagueness shown in the views of a large number of people. Confusions, uncertainty and lack of discrimination are inherent in any transitional period, to one extent or another. This should not amaze us. Obviously, we must acknowledge that such elements account today for a rather substantial share of the mass awareness: illusions of returning to the good old times, meaningless emotional outbursts accompanied by individual passiveness, pessimism, demagoguery and extremist, including nationalistic manifestations, anarchic individualism, increased group interests and thirst

for "equalization," are all factors which hinder or directly oppose perestroyka.

While we note the adverse effect on the development of social affairs of replacing scientific analysis of problems which arise with approximate and hasty considerations, which are characteristic of the ordinary awareness, in making responsible decisions—management authorities which make responsible decisions using this approach quickly detect their lack of substance and groundlessness—we would nonetheless like to caution against underestimating this ordinary awareness which is inherent in broad human masses and different social and sociodemocratic population groups. The absolutizing of the dynamics of ideas in the social consciousness "downwards," and faith in the impeccability of the ideas formulated by social scientists and in the omnipotence of propaganda which disseminates such ideas in the mass awareness are nothing other than arrogance and scorn for that awareness and inability and unwillingness to organize a feedback involving social moods which become widespread and replace each other.

The Marxist-Leninist classics, who are familiar with the highest possible value of scientific theory and who, themselves, "acted as inordinately fruitful cogenerators of ideas," never suffered from such arrogance. They closely listened to the frame of mind developing within the popular masses. We are familiar, for example, with Engels' concept of the sensation of foolishness and inequity of existing concepts, such as the symptom of obsolescence of a social system, and with the even more categorical stipulation made by V.I. Lenin: "...We can rule only when we accurately express that which the people are aware of" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 112). The people perceive political and other social ideas through the lens of their practical experience and ordinary awareness and enter politics with this type of baggage. The successes of the Leninist Party, ever since it emerged on the historical arena, are explained precisely and to a decisive extent by the fact that its ideology and politics were based on the practical experience of the masses, for which reason they coincided with the needs and expectations of the people, and that the party's scientific ideas, to borrow a term from physics, were in a condition of resonance with the awareness and feelings of the multi-million strong toiling masses. The disturbances of this resonance are fraught with increased mistrust in the authorities or individuals responsible for this, who have been stricken by "communist boastfulness;" some of the results of the elections for people's deputies of the USSR indicate that in our time such events do not take place without having practical consequences.

We believe that it is possible to gain a better understanding of the trend of perestroyka in the social awareness by analyzing its particularly important areas today, for in a revolutionary period, by the logic of things, priorities are developed from a reflection in the public awareness of the aspects and conditions of human life

which are directly related to the social way of life, production forces and production and socioclass relations.

It would make sense to include economic and ecological awareness in the traditional listing of the forms of social awareness (political, legal, philosophical, moral, artistic, religious). The former is nothing other than the view which people have on their economic life, which is the fabric of social life. Today we cannot do either without ecological awareness, for one cannot imagine social life without a conquered nature, developed however, as we know, through a variety of methods, both rational and barbaric, which may be threatening its future.

Obviously, here as well it would be suitable to single out the various levels—ordinary, theoretical, psychological and ideological.

For example, economic awareness on the ordinary level means the experience gained through the working activities of our people, an experience in communicating in the process of economic activities and the existing standards of morality, customs, values, and so on, and the elements of common sense or illusions, which develop on this basis. Thus, common sense indicates the need for a mass support of a conversion to a new quality in the existing system of production relations and the need for their restructuring. Indeed, many people are aware of the fact that there is no alternative to this. However, receiving unearned wages has become such a customary thing that many people are still nurturing the illusory hope of continuing to live as in the past, relying on the customary "somehow." This immediately affects the people's willful actions. It is precisely the will to surmount such illusions that is today in short supply.

Economic awareness as well has its own theoretical level. Disputes on the state and prospects of development of the science of economics are frequent. Obviously, there indeed is something about which to argue and something to correct. Suffice it to mention the contradictions between the real production process, which involves the participation of real people with their needs, interests and real products of their labor, and their monetary manifestation which, sometimes, is a symbolic assessment of all of this, not clearly related to the quantity and quality of human labor or its results, or else to the consideration of the interests and needs inherent in man, the extent of the satisfaction of which is defined in its main and essential aspects by labor productivity. Possibly, that is why to this day economic management is dominated by the notorious "gross output," which is monetarily strong (and sometimes omnipotent), whereas in the development of areas related to production by the individual and the satisfaction of his vital needs for food, clothing and housing, the "residual" principle continues to function, as in the past.

Economic awareness has its own ideological aspect. It is shaped by political economy as the science of the type of organization of economic and production relations

which are the foundations, the base of the power of a given class. Specifically analyzing production relations in bourgeois society, Marx proved in "*Das Kapital*" the natural historical nature of the transition to a political rule by the proletariat and the conversion of capitalism into socialism. The following question arises: To what extent does the political economy of our time bring to light and refine the truly political and, therefore, the ideological aspect of the contemporary state of production relations? Socialist political economy in its contemporary condition, however, acts rather as a science of economic management; its ideological functions are not being purposefully developed; in arguments about priorities of efficiency or social justice in the development of economic relations, most frequently the main trends in the development of such relations are not considered.

The same type of triple study of other forms of social awareness would clearly reveal a situation similar to the one we find in economic awareness. The theoretical and ideological standards of political, legal and moral awareness have been developed—something which is not frequently acknowledged—quite poorly; their influence on the ordinary awareness is clearly inadequate.

Let us consider the problem of political awareness. Can we say that we have substantiated criteria for political activities on all levels—within all the units of the constantly changing and developing political system and among all supporters of perestroika, whose political awareness, as the practice of social discussions indicates, is quite heterogeneous. In the past we had numerous cases of lack of clarity of such criteria or even of their distortion, in which arbitrariness and subjectivism were just about the determining factors of political life, while political and other actions, for long many years, yielded sometimes fewer positive than negative results. The repressions which were carried out by Stalin and the people around him, "substantiated" by the absolutizing of the class approach in its obsolete forms (or even simply given a sectarian interpretation) struck at the faith and enthusiasm of many Soviet people. The very act of the exposure of his cult in the second half of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s was, because of its incomplete and inconsistent nature, another blow at the faith, the blind faith which millions of people had in socialism and which, in the awareness of many, if not the majority, was still identified at that time with Stalin. The shaken faith was not replaced by a profound ideological conviction of the incompatibility between that event and socialism, for instead of formulating a realistic concept of the development of the new society as a new ideological-theoretical foundation of social awareness, groundless systems of the "expanded building of communism," or the "building of developed socialism" were brought forth, which almost immediately clashed with practical experience. The gap between slogans and life was one of the reasons for the lowered social activeness of the people and the growth of negative phenomena.

The renovation process currently taking place is a great benefit to society. In order successfully to carry out the

various political, economic and other reforms, taking mandatorily into consideration the infinite variety of contradictions within the social awareness on its different levels and different conditions, objective criteria and processes are needed as well as results of organizing the political life of society; we need a comprehensive study of the conditions governing the shaping, development and influence of political awareness on practical actions, "from top to bottom."

A number of difficulties arise also in terms of the ideological standard of political awareness. In our view, we must take a particularly close look at its scientific foundations and, particularly, at the contemporary interpretation of scientific communism. We must refine its content, social function, role and place in the overall structure of Marxist-Leninist sociology. The ever increasing need of society for an overall systematic vision of reality around us—both natural and social—formulates new requirements in systematizing scientific knowledge, including the science of society in which it is reflected as a single complexly organized system.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of society includes, we believe, a historical, a fundamental and applied aspects. In providing a dialectical-materialistic interpretation of history, all social phenomena, regardless of the area of social life to which they pertain, and in formulating the theory of organization and development of social processes, within which are concentrated knowledge of organizational structures of society, the dialectics of social life and social awareness, the base and the superstructure, objective conditions and the subjective factor, Marxist-Leninist sociology also has an applied aspect. A special role is played on this level by scientific communism which, clearly, by summing up the historical experience of revolutionary change, is called upon to find models for the future condition of society and its strategic prospects and development stages, determined by the course of the natural-historical process and the dynamics of production forces and production relations.

In this connection, it may be worthwhile to consider the contemporary interpretation of scientific communism as the doctrine of the ideal of a society and the organizational foundations for attaining it. Unfortunately, the mechanical combination of these two disparate items is detrimental to the development of either but, particularly, to the overall vision of the new society and the role of man in building it. By this token scientific communism loses its practical trend and features of applied knowledge, for which reason, for the past 20 to 25 years, political science has been quietly separating itself from it as a science for the organization of the political system under specific historical situations.

The combination of the "global" objective and ideals with contemporary practical experience in the theory of scientific communism is possible. However, this can be achieved only through the accelerated development of an integral concept of socialism. At the same time, this will contribute to updating the content and to upgrading the

efficiency of propaganda and agitation and, consequently, to the growth of the political awareness and political standards of the people. The profound and expanded characterization of contemporary socialist changes in the light of our supreme objectives and the conclusive analysis of the contradictory nature of the natural historical process as well as the conscious activities of the people which lead, given the proper standard of mastery of objective laws, to the implementation of our ideals, will largely contribute to their restoration within the mass awareness and will influence the sociow-illful factor of mass actions.

This question has yet another aspect. The development of scientific communism, as the most important foundation for the ideology of our society, is a prerequisite for improving the professionalism of anyone involved in the management of social processes. It is only by bearing in mind the scientific prospect of socialist progress that we can properly take into consideration and assess the steadily increasing participation of the masses in all areas of social management, the "self-management factor" so to say, which introduces substantial corrections into even the most thoroughly formulated management decisions. In order to achieve this, one must be more precisely familiar with the condition of social awareness.

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National Groups in the USSR

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[Article by Mikhail Nikolayevich Guboglo, doctor of historical sciences, deputy director of the Ethnography Institute imeni N.N. Miklukho-Maklay of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Today national groups account for a quite significant portion of the population living outside of their national-governmental formations or lacking such formations at all. For example, according to the 1979 Census (respective data of the 1989 Census are being processed), there are 24 million Russians and another 15 million members of other ethnic groups which have their own republics but reside elsewhere, who live in 14 Union republics (excluding the RSFSR); 7 million people have no national-autonomous formations. The overall size of the country's population covered by the concept of "national group and national minority" totals 55 million.

The first Soviet Constitution of 1918 stipulated that "the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, which acknowledges the equal rights of citizens regardless of their racial and national affiliation, considers a violation of the basic laws of the republic the granting or tolerance of any whatsoever privileges or advantages on that basis or any whatsoever oppression of national minorities or

restrictions of their equal rights." However, all subsequent Soviet constitutions (1924, 1936, 1977) merely mentioned the rights and obligations of nations and ethnic groups, with no mention whatsoever being made of national minorities or groups.

It is entirely obvious that excluding part of the population from the effect of the fundamental law conflicted with the principles of humanism, socialist democracy and internationalism. The year 1988 was a turning point in relations of the society toward ethnic groups. This was manifested not only in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference but also in the extensive discussions which developed on national problems. The USSR Law "On Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution (Fundamental Law of the USSR)," was passed on 1 December 1988. It partially restored the rights of ethnic groups. In accordance with the stipulation of Article 116, "problems of guaranteeing national equality and the interests of nations, ethnic groups and national groups, combined with the overall interests and needs of the Soviet multinational state, must be considered above all by the Council of Nationalities; USSR legislation, which regulates relations among nationalities must be perfected."

This article—which is an act of humaneness and social justice—says a great deal. Above all, ethnic groups were taken out of their "legislative nonexistence" once and for all; their vital aspirations were put on an equal footing with the interests and needs of nations and nationalities. Also legitimized was the fact that the existence of national groups falls mandatorily under the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Now it becomes a case of formulating the new mechanisms for accounting, formulating and implementing the interests and needs of ethnic groups, not on the basis of a spontaneous and totally unregulated foundation, but on the firm basis of the law and legality. In other words, by classifying ethnic groups as nations and nationalities, the state assumes the legal and material concern for creating conditions for their development and delegates it to the supreme power authorities. This is entirely justified, for a democratic solution of the problem under the conditions of a numerical superiority of nations and nationalities over ethnic groups may lead to a "dictatorship of the majority." Clearly, a "protection" from this is possible only with the help of an authorized and competent all-Union institution which will function on a firm legal foundation.

The assimilation of small ethnic and national groups was one of the objectives of the national policy of Stalinism. This can be clearly seen from Stalin's report to the 8th All-Union Congress of Soviets, in which the overall number of nations, nationalities and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union was reduced to 60. The same policy was followed in subsequent years (with the exception of a short time interval between the end of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s, when some steps were taken to meet

the needs and requirements of the small ethnic groups in terms of the development of their national cultures and languages).

Thus, for example, until the start of perestroika, it was not accepted to even mention in the official republic press of the Moldavian SSR the fact that there were non-Moldavians in that republic. Gagauz and Bulgarian painters, writers and composers were referred to in the press as Moldavians. The 3 January 1961 order of the Moldavian SSR minister of public education "On Converting the First Grades Attended by Gagauz Children to Teaching in the Russian Language" was not only fulfilled but also significantly "overfulfilled" by zealous public education personnel. As a result, instruction in the native language and teaching the language of one's ethnic group as a separate subject were eliminated. The publication of newspapers, radio broadcasts, and training scientists and scientific cadres were ended; the study of the history, culture and language of the Gagauz was stopped; the history of the Gagauz and the Bulgarians was deleted from textbooks and academic works on the history of the Moldavian SSR. This "silent" routing during the period of stagnation of the cultures of national minorities undermined the foundations of their socioprofessional mobility. Today, in terms of the level of higher education, the Gagauz are almost the most backward ethnic group not only in Moldavia but in the entire country, although in 1897, for example, they were in one of the leading positions in terms of the level of literacy among Bessarabian ethnic groups.

Studies have shown that a similar situation could be noted also among nationalities and ethnic groups in other Union republics; Kurds and Azerbaijanis in Armenia, Poles in Lithuania and Latvia, Belorussians in Estonia, Uzbeks in Kazakhstan, and so on, are substantially behind the native nationalities in terms of that same indicator.

The social structure in the areas of the USSR inhabited by ethnic minorities is significantly weaker than in areas inhabited by the native nationality. Despite the substantial funds in bank accounts deposited by kolkhozes of ethnic minorities, the rayon managers cannot obtain from the republic's departments the necessary materials for laying roads, or building cultural premises. There is no purposeful assistance in training specialists in the various economic sectors, or an artistic intelligentsia. Repeated changes of administrative-territorial boundaries destabilized a nation-forming factor such as the feeling of "native land," and, in the final account, substantially hindered the normal development of consolidation processes among national minorities. Major distortions in republic cadre policy, including in shaping the social structure of rayons inhabited by minorities, reminding of a pyramid with a single ethnic group (essentially the native) on top, contributed to the enhanced feeling of social injustice among ethnic groups and small nations.

The past 4 years of perestroika have introduced a number of positive changes in solving long-festered sociocultural problems. However, for the time being no radical changes have taken place in the condition of ethnic minorities. We believe that a comprehensive program for national-cultural development is necessary, which would stipulate steps aimed at improving the social infrastructure of all the areas they inhabit, a system of public education, restoration of the periodical press, expanding radio and television programs, accelerating the progress of literature, intensifying publishing (including having their own printing facilities, which would mean training editors and printing-press workers), a purposefully trained scientific, technical, agricultural and pedagogical intelligentsia, and health care personnel, as well as cultural-educational institutions, theaters, professional musicians, party workers and social personalities.

The native nationalities in Union republics, concerned with the complex problems of their own lives in terms of culture, national language, democracy, conversion to cost accounting, and so on, would be unable to solve without the help of the center the pressing problems of the minorities. It would appear expedient to provide centralized help to republics by organizing on their territories national-territorial or ethnic-cultural autonomous formations. The existence of autonomous formations would make it possible more efficiently to solve problems of democratization and perestroika and to restore historical justice where it was violated.

As to the linguistic situation of the ethnic groups in Union republics, it is complicated by the fact that, at best, in the realm of public education they must choose as a second language either Russian or the language of the native nationality. As a result, a certain segment of the ethnic groups takes up the Russian language as the language of communication among nationalities, while the another chooses the language of the native nationality of the Union republic. Therefore, along with developing national-Russian or national-national bilingualism, they also develop trilingualism. In that case, if there is no choice, the national minorities are forced to abandon the language of their own national group and to study only the language of the native nationality of the Union republic.

Such a developing multilingualism does not have exclusively positive sides. For example, entering school and knowing, as a rule, the language of his own national group, the child begins to learn in the language of the native nationality of the Union republic and, at the same time, to study the Russian language; as of the 5th grade, a foreign language is added to this. Such a load worsens the chances of the children of ethnic groups to achieve good grades in many basic subjects of the curriculum. In the senior classes this lag worsens, as a result of which the children taking competitive examinations for secondary specialized or higher educational institutions are not well prepared. Dropping out on the threshold of higher

schools disrupts the natural development of socioprofessional structures, hinders the overall broadening of the outlook, leads to stagnation phenomena in sociocultural progress, broadens the area of social injustice and hinders relations among nationalities.

Incidentally, as it worsens sociocultural development, this linguistic "diaspora" has a weakening influence on ethnicity. The marginal situation which develops could be beneficial had the members of ethnic groups been able to "digest," along with their own ethnic, the additional double or triple dose of extranational information.

However, not everyone can do this. Practical experience indicates that becoming quadrilingual is not easy. It is even more difficult to become quadriethnic. The awareness of marginality is aggravated when society does not pay serious attention to meeting the needs for language and national culture of its ethnic group. Therefore, one of the suggested models for optimizing the sociocultural appearance and status of ethnic groups is the formulation of a set of steps to stabilize both their language and their ethnicity. This, we believe, will be a strong prerequisite for successfully eliminating the difficulties of the existence within a nonethnic environment. To this day the right and opportunities of ethnic groups in a large city are still violated; within them the shoots of discontent continue to grow. The sale of books in the native language, the organization of radio and television programs and clubs, circles, associations of native sons, oriented toward satisfying specific ethnic requirements, would help to eliminate the discomfort of living in a nonethnic environment.

Article 24 of the new Law on Language of the Estonian SSR ensures "priority in the development of Estonian linguistic culture," "protecting" the Estonian language on the governmental level and creating conditions for the development of Estonian-Russian and Russian-Estonian bilingualism; in my view, it leaves without attention, governmental concern and the right to choose their own linguistic fate ethnic groups in the republic, actually dooming them not to bi- but to trilingualism.

We believe that in perfecting national relations in the USSR we must maximally take into consideration the current situation in the rest of the world, which is characterized by a sharp increase in the movements of national minorities for their rights and the enhancement of the activities of a number of international organizations in developing forms of legislative codification of national and linguistic rights of minorities, including groups of immigrants. Against this background of major shifts in the attitude of the global public toward the situation of ethnic minorities, including said groups of immigrants, our country must not loose but instead assume leading positions.

In order to consider the entire set of problems related to relations among nationalities, I believe it expedient to set up as part of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, and within the supreme soviets of Union

and autonomous republics permanent commissions on national minorities, with corresponding rights. This would include granting them the opportunity to determine and analyze, through special studies, the needs of the ethnic groups in a variety of areas; extensively to participate in the formulation and implementation of national policy; supervise the observance of legal, national and linguistic rights, ensure the representation of ethnic groups in legislative and executive agencies and the exercise of their right in the development of their national culture, the teaching of the national language in schools and the use of the language by the mass communication media. The need to create specialized, problem-target and regional-territorial commissions in particular (including commissions in charge of ethnic group affairs) is confirmed by the fact that the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities failed for decades to fulfill its direct functions in supervising the exercise of national policy.

Based on the Leninist requirement of "extensive self-management and autonomy of oblasts which, among others, should be demarcated on the ethnic principle as well" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 23, p 209), the commissions on ethnic groups could, for example, formulate specific suggestions on changing the status of national groups and creating for them their own national-territorial formations. The possibility of a variety of forms of national-governmental and national-territorial formations was included in the Leninist concept of solving the national problem in a multinational country with nationalities which had reached different levels in their sociopolitical development. Lenin related the path to true democratic centralism and socialism to the mandatory consideration of ethnic features.

It would be expedient to assign to said commissions obligations in managing various national-cultural formations, such as associations, societies, clubs, centers, native-son organizations, foundations, and so on, based on the principles of cost accounting and self-support and, if necessary, state subsidies.

Our period will be recorded in the country's history as a time of intensive maturing of the social self-awareness of the Soviet people, the release of their spiritual energy, and the enhancement of their sociopolitical activities, and as a stage of real progress on the path of democratization and renovation. Within a very short period popular movements in support of perestroika have appeared and gathered strength and already covered a great distance in a number of Union republics (from the initial congresses of creative associations to the formulation and publication in the press of programmatic documents, appeals, laws, declarations and resolutions).

The historical prerequisites for such movements are more or less clear. Wherever there is social inequity and wherever people of an ethnic group consider themselves insulted and injured, a struggle for the triumph of justice appears. A major aspect of such movements is the struggle against narrowly interpreted and egotistical

interests of central departments, which frequently ignore the limited nature of natural resources, do not coordinate their actions with the local management authorities and neglect public opinion.

Our republics, however, are multinational. Each national movement has both external and internal tasks. Actually, how can people remain members of ethnic groups when the meaning of the struggle occasionally is reduced to creating priority conditions for the nation which accounts for the majority of the population in a given republic? Such a movement, which is just in terms of its extrovert trend, becomes unfair on the introvert level, i.e., concerning ethnic groups which, in one republic or another, account for a small percentage of the population and cannot, without state aid, harness adequate facilities to meet their needs.

The programs of many movements guarantee such groups equality. For the time being, however, we do not see the Baltic republics, for example, which have acquired substantial experience and traditions in establishing legal rules governing relations among nationalities, as formulating efficient mechanisms guaranteeing the true equality of all (such as proportional representation of ethnic groups on the highest possible power echelons). In providing the language of its nationality priority conditions for development, the nation which has given its name to the republic does, in my view, wittingly or unwittingly harm the interests of ethnic groups even despite the most ideal legal guarantees. Yet Montesquieu pointed out that "inequity allowed toward a single individual is a threat to all."

Inertia concerning the legal status of ethnic groups and minorities was manifested to a certain extent also in the work of the 1st USSR Congress of People's Deputies. By no means were all of its representatives able to take the floor from which to make their problems public. On the initiative of a number of deputies, however, the congress' draft resolution "On Basic Trends of the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR" included the following addition: "The congress instructs the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, together with the supreme soviets of the respective republics, to consider the question of steps to normalize the situation in the NKAO, and a suggestion on restoring the rights of the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars, and the Meskhet Turks, and problems of developing the small ethnic groups, as formulated at the congress."

Unfortunately, the list of priorities once again does not include the problem of the autonomy of the Gagauz, although it was mentioned in the speeches of the deputies and in a respective deputy query and a telegram which was distributed among the deputies, addressed to the congress by the "Gagauz Khalky" People's Movement, which was started by the end of May 1989. Why should we wait for the "temperature" of relations among nationalities in the southern part of Moldavia, densely inhabited by Gagauz, mandatorily to reach a critical

mark? Would it not be simpler to solve this problem on time by issuing an assignment to the respective authorities?

After setting up commissions on national policy and relations among nationalities and problems of the social and economic development of Union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs and problems of the development of culture, language, national and international traditions and preservation of the historical legacy, the deputies voted in favor of ending the stagnation in the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the implementation of national policy. However, by no means has everything been taken into consideration, including the suggestions of experts and social scientists on creating as part of the Supreme Soviet a special commission on ethnic groups and minorities.

Should we ignore the fact that the cutting edge of the aggravation of relations among nationalities is shifting from the area of relations among native nations and central departments to the area of intrarepublic relations, relations among nations and ethnic minorities? It is precisely in this area, in order to block further explosive situations, that we must abandon inconsistent and halfway decisions and boldly face the trends of self-expression of both large and small ethnic groups.

As we act in the name of justice and develop the foundations of the rule of law state, we must thoroughly consider and anticipate such a policy which would exclude any possibility of the outbreak of new social injustice in the realm of national life.

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MAN - IDEALS, INTERESTS, VALUES

Rising to the Level of Specifics

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[Article by Aleksandr Konstantinovich Frolov, member of the USSR Philosophical Society]

[Text] Memorial plaques stand on the gray wooden pavement of the passage of the Artistic Theater, under the huge lighted thermometer, familiar to all Muscovites. It was here that Nikolay Aseyev, Mikhail Svetlov, Lidiya Seyfullina and others lived and worked. Let us hope that some day there will appear yet another memorial sign: "In this home lived the philosopher Evald Vasilyevich Ilyenkov (1924-1979)."

This, however, will happen not before our society has realized that philosophy is not an ivory tower in which the indifferent or the weak hide from life and that all philosophy, to use the words of the young Marx, is the spiritual quintessence of its time and that philosophers are not grown like mushrooms from the ground. They

are the product of their people, the most refined, valuable and invisible juices of which are concentrated in philosophical ideas. This will take place only after we are able fully to realize the place which Ilyenkov held in the spiritual life of the postwar age and the contribution which he made to the philosophical interpretation of its painful problems and contradictions, in the theoretical and, which is even more important, the practical search of ways for coming out of the impasses of Stalinism and stagnation.

In order to understand a philosopher we must try to learn about his time. To this effect, let us go to the "House Under the Thermometer," the housing cooperative in which Soviet writers lived in the 1930s. In its own way it is no less famous than the familiar "House on the Embankment." The house and the lives of its residents are similar in some ways. Built at the same time, in an emphatically strict constructivistic style, settled at the same time, in 1931, they rose above the old Moscow as the prototypes of the future collectivistic way of life, as though embodying the real visions and naïve illusions of their time. On one occasion Thomas Mann referred to his native city as a "form of spiritual life." This writers' home was a particular spiritual formation as well.

Some details are more eloquent about life than hundreds of pages of sociological statistics. Where, for example, did this foreign name Evald come from? Why was it that among his coevals so many people were named Albert, Richard or Regin? At that time there could not even be a mention of "subservience to foreigners." The entire matter was that such names are not found among orthodox saints and what they implied was that the child had not been baptized and that its parents were uncompromising revolutionaries, communists-bolsheviks, who had firmly broken with all the attributes of the old world. What kind of chimeras could come out of this "most abstract aspiration toward the new" is to be discussed further. For the time being, let us try to understand the nature of this generation of the 1930s, which rose within these walls, and whose philosophical mirror Evald Ilyenkov was destined to become.

According to Roy Medvedev, no other decade had such a good, totally healthy revolutionary enthusiasm in a young generation as the one raised in the 1930s. Naturally, it had many illusions, and there was a great deal it did not know. However, in the overwhelming majority these were honest people. Most of them fell on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War, some of them returned and a great deal of what they retained is today the capital (more important than any economic potential whatsoever) used in perestroika.

One of those who did not return from the war was Yuriy Malyshkin, son of the famous writer A. Malyshkin, Evald's friend, who lived in the house of the MKHAT Passageway. Issue No 3 of the journal YUNOST for 1977 carried excerpts from Yuriy's diary and the remembrances of his friends.

From E. Ilyenkov's recollections: "In our home many famous and noted people—writers and military commanders—lived.... I remember that, as youngsters, we roamed around the entire house in groups of six or seven and would go into any apartment (the doors to the apartments were not locked). We went to Yuriy Olesha, Eduard Bagritskiy, Nikolay Aseyev... they always welcomed us warmly and gave us tea and sweets...."

Alas, soon many doors were not only locked but also sealed. The wave of repressions did not bypass this house. In 1937 it was almost half vacant. Evald was not affected. His father, the writer Vasilii Pavlovich Ilyenkov, a quite well-known writer in his time, lived in Moscow until the end of the 1960s. Let us not try to guess the feelings of the children of those who were repressed or those who escaped the repressions, they can now speak for themselves. What is clear, however, is that the foundations of the life of the generation of the 1930s included a huge and perhaps not entirely realized contradiction at that time, which was to define its future destiny.

Were these young people merely tricked? No, their attraction to the ideals of socialism and revolutionary enthusiasm could not have been instilled fraudulently. Here we detect an entirely different, an opposite force in terms of its nature and trend: the objective historical trend, the "wind of history." However, the more twisty is the real path followed by this trend, as it makes its way, the greater become the inner conflicts which accompany the life of the individual, having visited "the entire world in its fatal times." It is from such contradictions that all great material and ideal achievements of mankind are born. In order to learn how to withstand the stress of the social drama and correctly solve contradictions, a variety of ways exist: first-hand revolutionary experience and involvement with the labor ethics of the people. Not least here is the training of the mind and feelings, provided by world artistic culture.

From the diary of Yuriy Malyshkin: "31 August 1941. The conservatory. Yakov Fliyer. The program: Chopin, List. Evald and I are attending the concert."

From the recollections of E. Ilyenkov: "Whenever we had any money we would spend it on tickets to the conservatory or the Bolshoy Theater.... We discovered in music a tremendous world of feelings, human daring, suffering, ascension to the truth and to goodness. Music awakened in us the aspiration to somehow show what we can do, to reveal our possibilities. I was attracted by the world of human thoughts, by awareness...."

Philosophy and music, science and art, thinking in concepts and thinking in images, and their dialectical interaction in the process of the spiritual and practical mastery of the world, became one of the key topics in Ilyenkov's legacy. He studied particularly closely the works of his favorite composer Richard Wagner. Wagner, Ilyenkov claimed, was congenial with Marx. The four volumes of "*Das Kapital*" and the four operas of the

"Ring of the Nibelungen" depict through different means the same process: the metamorphosis of gold, experienced in the course of the history of civilization and bourgeois society, paralleling the drama of mankind. Wagner the artist proved the same thing that Marx the theoretician did: the pattern of the breakdown of a civilization based on the power of gold, the logic of its internal corruption.

In this case, it seems to me, the dynamics of Ilyenkov's thoughts, moving from the artistic character to the scientific concept, is dictated not by the empty wish to "trust the algebra of harmony," but the aspiration to penetrate more profoundly into the essence of reality as depicted in characters and concepts. Clearly, it was this that predetermined his encounter with philosophy and the originality of his philosophical works.

From the diary of Yuriy Malyshev: "4 September 1941. Evald is happy: he has enrolled in the IFLI and is enthusiastically 'absorbing' Plato and Aristotle.... Samarkand, 3 April 1942. Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! ...I received a letter from Evald from Ashkhabad. He is there with the institute. He arrived on 1 November, i.e. only 6 days after me. Like me, he felt hunger and more hunger. Now his stomach has shrunk and is learning...."

He did not stay long as a student of the IFLI. He took an accelerated course in an artillery school and was sent to the front....

Little is known of the combat career of gun commander Ilyenkov, the recipient of several orders and medals. Personally, he did not like to talk about it and his service record is similar to the records of thousands and thousands of young lieutenants who found themselves thrown into the war directly from the school bench or the university classroom. What did those who were lucky enough to survive bring with them from the war?

The Great Patriotic War intensified the contradictions in the people's life and triggered a new quality of people's self-awareness, which was significantly deeper than the enthusiasm of the 1930s. "Hidden" military prose (particularly V. Grossman's *"Zhizn i Sudba"* [Life and Fate]) informed us that in addition to the intensified resistance by the Soviet people to the Hitlerite invasion there also developed something which undermined the regime of Stalinism **morally**. The possibility of independently guiding one's destiny and a comradely unification without instructions from superiors, and free discipline without retreat-barring detachments, threatening to any repressive regime, appeared among the terrible millstones of the war. This intensified even further the conflict between the free activities of the people, as the real foundation of social life, and the limited and frequently distorted framework within which such activities were performed. Stalin answered this contradiction with the only method at his disposal: more repressions. The liberators of Europe, who had seen the world and

discovered the source of human dignity within themselves rather than the miraculous emanation from the "father of the peoples" had to be "put in their place."

It was under such most difficult circumstances of the new historical experience acquired by the Soviet people that the new attitude had to acquire its ideological-theoretical and philosophical expression. Why philosophical precisely? Philosophy, as the most combined reflection of the most profound social processes emerges the first during periods when society has **already** developed new forces which cannot **as yet** obtain their direct-practical expression. It was not for nothing that Albert Sweitzer compared philosophers with general staff officers who formulate plans for future operations. Although to the majority most of them remain unfamiliar, a great deal depends on their professional skill.

Senior Lieutenant Ilyenkov ended the war in Berlin. Back home, for a while he worked in the editorial premises of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, after which he pursued his education in the philosophy department of Moscow University, where he completed his postgraduate studies. Ilyenkov defended his candidate dissertation in 1953. The country was rising from the ruins where philosophy lived.

Later Ilyenkov was to say that dialectics had been crucified by the "four devils" of paragraph 2 of chapter 4 of the *"Short Course."* The author of this paragraph, the "coryphaeus of all sciences," is still being praised by some for the clarity and simplicity of his presentation. However, this was precisely a case when simplicity was worse than thievery. In hashed words, in a mixed style of catechism and a drill manual, the reader was notified that all problems have already been solved and that all that was left was the absolute implementation of resolutions. Therefore, those who would have the courage to oppose this barracks "philosophy" had to pit against it an essentially different way of life and thinking.

Here is a most typical feature: our social thinking has always felt itself extremely uncomfortable within official framework. It was born and is born, it lived and lives in the direct "family" contacts among like-minded friends, in endless midnight discussions around the kitchen table. This is our tribal feature ever since the circles of Stankevich and Herten: "The Russian person has shifted his feelings from official reality to inordinary daring theoretical elaborations at home" (Lenin). This is the origin of the entire dignity and shortcomings of such elaborations: humanism, a spirit of human closeness and warmth and helplessness in the face of reality; daring radicalism and reliance on the good uncle; openness to all world culture and "terribly distant from the people." ...Nonetheless, it was precisely these circles that preserved for domestic science that without which science is bound to perish: a moral-humanistic orientation of theory, independence of research and selfless aspiration to the truth.

One such circle developed in the 1950s around Ilyenkov. Later, when the scientist was buried, it was said that "all postwar Soviet philosophy came out of Evald Ilyenkov's apartment at the passageway of the MKHAT." There may be some exaggeration in this but it hardly matters. Life dispersed the members of the circle, placing them on different sides of ideological, professional and even governmental barriers. Possibly, they themselves will describe one day their true alma mater, the jointly experienced upheavals triggered by the 20th Congress and many other events. As a member of an entirely different generation, I do not claim to be able to highlight such questions and I try to understand only that which attracted the people to Ilyenkov as a scientist.

Briefly, the answer could be the following: in the 1950s Ilyenkov restored the true Marxist philosophical set of problems in its actual reality rather than as a declarative link with life. The first thing he undertook was an effort to restore dialectical materialism as the logic and theory of knowledge through the theoretical interpretation of the logic of "*Das Kapital*," and Marx's method for ascending from the abstract to the concrete. This was the topic of his dissertation and first publication: the article "On the Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Scientific-Theoretical Knowledge" (VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 1, 1955). The article had the effect of an exploding bomb.

It is said that when a delegation of the Italian Communist Party came to Moscow, to attend the 20th CPSU Congress, at the airport, asked about his program for the visit, Palmiro Togliatti answered that he would like to meet with the author of that article. This may be no more than a legend. In any case, it was roughly at that time that Ilyenkov's extensive manuscript "*The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Scientific and Theoretical Knowledge*" found its way to Italy. It was translated into Italian and prepared for publication. To Ilyenkov's opponents from the camp of dogmatic pseudorthodoxy this was a true gift. The author was subjected to the then traditional "indoctrination." Nonetheless, he did not lose his party card. Fortunately, there were people who were able to speak out in favor of the book and in 1960 it was published, in an abridged version, entitled "*Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's 'Das Kapital'*," under the personal responsibility of M.M. Rozental. In its unabridged version, the book came out in Italian, published by Feltrinelli, on the following year. This was followed by the French, Mexican, Japanese, Yugoslav and other editions. In 1965 Ilyenkov was awarded the USSR Academy of Sciences N.G. Chernyshevskiy Prize for research in the area of dialectical logic.

What was the reason for which this seemingly quite abstract matter triggered a great public interest at home and abroad? What fresh wind blew from its development in Ilyenkov's works and what sensitive area of the contemporary world was felt here?

In accordance with Marx, Ilyenkov characterized the "abstract" and the "concrete" not simply as categories

which are part of our thinking but also as entirely objective definitions of actual reality, outside and independent of our way of thinking. The "abstract" is simple, undeveloped, one-sided and partial. Conversely, the "concrete" is the "unity within variety," the real link among phenomena, connected and interacting in all their aspects and features of the object, an internally split totality of a variety of forms of its existence, the unique combination of which is typical only to that specific object. Dialectical logic considers the laws of ascension from the abstract, i.e., from partial and one-sided knowledge to the specific study of the object in its entire complexity. However, it characterizes this process not as an exclusively "specific law" of thinking but as a reflection, as an ideal reproduction of the real, the objective process of dynamics of the object itself and, above all, of human society.

What do we obtain from the development of such logical categories in terms of understanding topical contemporary problems? Let us try to apply them to the development of socialism.

Expressed through the category of the "abstract and the concrete," the development of socialism appears as the ascension from the formal socialization of production to its actual socialization, from a civil war with its irreconcilable antagonisms to a civil peace as a combination and interconnection among a variety of social interests, from science (revolutionary outlook) as a "dead letter or fashionable phrase" to a science which becomes "flesh and blood," which turns into a "structural element of life fully and truly" (Lenin) from power "in the name of and for the people" to the power of the people itself, from the state form of regulating social and economic life to self-management forms, from the abstract division of the world into irreconcilable social systems to a conflicting but a largely integral world....

What restrained, stopped and, in many aspects, even turned back the ascension of Soviet society to the concrete fullness of its socialist development? This is a question which, in its obvious and unobvious aspects has been repeatedly raised in the history of our social thinking and which is the central point of today's fierce debates. The importance of Ilyenkov's initial publications was found precisely in the fact that they restored the Marxist methodological approach to the solution of this problem.

To begin with, as Ilyenkov emphasized, the conversion from the abstract to the concrete is not a conversion from thought to reality. It is, however, a motion within reality itself, from one of its objective definitions to another objective definition. The identification of the abstract with the mental, which is characteristic of traditional formal logic, replaces the question which interests us with a question which is entirely different, making it essentially insoluble. This substitution occurred, in my view, in contemporary debates which turn essentially around the question of whether in the 1930s the country took the path indicated by Marx or

failed to do so, whether Marx's doctrine was applicable to Russian conditions or not, and whether or not Lenin's idea was implemented. All of this, naturally, is important. However, the truly essential problem of socialist development is reflected in it in a converted, a distorted manner. In order to direct the discussion into a more productive channel we must determine the following: the nature of the contradiction between idea and implementation and doctrine and its achievement, and ideal and reality, being the contradiction within reality itself, which cannot be eliminated by simply amending the doctrine and restructuring our thinking. The real pere-stroyka of the mind begins precisely with understanding this circumstance. Not so long ago, finally, this was pointed out in philosophical publications (see VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 4, 1989, p 29). The objective content of the development of socialism is the movement from the abstract, undeveloped and embryonic form of the new social system toward its specific and developed form, which is a unity within variety. It is only the theory which reflects this entire path and the contradictions which arise along it, the clashes, and the used or unused opportunities that is fruitful. The orientation toward a predetermined ideal, alienated from life, the implementation of which, by hindsight, requires the finding of suitable means is characteristic precisely of a utopian awareness. Willy-nilly, it turns ideals into idols, depriving them of any real content. When the idol crumbles, it is particularly important to restore the true ideals and to understand their objective nature. This was what Ilyenkov wrote about in his book "*Ob Idolakh i Idealakh*" [On Idols and Ideals] (Moscow, 1968). In my view, this book should be reprinted.

The second thing to be emphasized is the following: the ascension from the abstract to the concrete, which takes place within objective reality, cannot be reduced to the simple quantitative growth of already given features. It implies a further complication, a branching out, a radical restructuring of the entire system of internal and external relations and intermediary facts and the solution (the elimination) of its contradictions. Furthermore, specifically as an ideal and an inner form of development, we cannot imagine a condition of conflict-free balance and elimination of contradictions. "Concreteness is, in general, the triumph of opposites," Ilyenkov emphasized.

Contradictions and opposites cannot be eliminated, avoided or circumvented in any given area of activities. However, one can and must try consciously to combine opposites in such a way that contradictions can indeed be revealed as a source of development and play a constructive rather than stagnant or destructive role. It was precisely this problem that Lenin considered most important in the post-October period.

Lenin's political and socioeconomic strategy and tactics, as the leader in the building of socialism, clearly reflected the fact that historical development is unfamiliar with the abstract struggle between the old and the new, which held such a place of honor in the "*Short Course*," but is an arena of the struggle among the **different forms of**

combinations of the old with the new, and between their "symphony" and "cacophony." Strictly speaking, the entire Leninist concept of the new economic policy was governed, from the philosophical-logical viewpoint, by the aspiration toward the concrete as the fruitful unity of opposites.

On the eve of the NEP, Lenin reread Hegel and an entire series of conceptual Leninist evaluations of the transitional period were clearly influenced by this reading. In characterizing the condition of the society in its primary and abstract phase of development, Hegel noted in his preface to the "*Science of Logic*," that initially any new creativity shows a fantastic hostility toward the systematizing of the old material. It fears to loose in the particulars but, nonetheless, feeling the need for the formulation and development of the new principle, initially holds on to meaningless formalism.

Meaningless formalism, mixed with a fanatical hostility toward the old principle was what Lenin justifiably described as exaggerated revolutionism and as a "most abstract aspiration to the new which should be new to such an extent that no single facet of the old would be found in it." Meanwhile, this aspiration easily learns to coexist with even the stuffiest routine in the area of respect for rank and in observing the forms and ceremonies of paper shuffling (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, pp 401, 400). Thus, from the abstract pitting of the new against the old there develops an equally abstract "cacophonic" combination, the combination of socialist ideas and principles, reduced to meaningless formalism, with official-bureaucratic methods of their "application," and the aspiration to improve the well-being of mankind by force, and to shove mankind into paradise with a stick.

The extraordinary threat presented by this phenomenon was perfectly clear to Lenin. All that he said and wrote after October concerning the necessary prerequisites for the successful building of socialism, such as the mastery by the revolutionaries of all the achievements of the old culture, the alliance with noncommunists in a great variety of theoretical and practical activities, the variety of ways of accepting communism by members of different social and professional groups, the requirement "to learn to trade" and the difficult system of compromises, and concessions to the daily and economic ways and customs of the mass strata of the old society, the middle peasantry above all, all of this was aimed at the "symphonic," the productive combination of the opposite principles between the old and the new.

Nonetheless, it was a "cacophony" that prevailed, although not everywhere and in everything. As we already saw, the positive trend could not be totally suppressed in popular life. This was manifested on the theoretical level as well. The range of the problems we described was developed in the 1930s but already according to a different and more abstract "trend" in literature, art and the history of philosophy (as it was then described) by philosophers and critics rallied

around the journal LITERATURNYY KRITIK, which was closed down in 1940. The activities of this "trend," involved above all Gyorgy Lukacs (1885-1971), M.A. Lifshits (1905-1983), and V.R. Grib (1908-1940), which cannot be described in detail in this article. It is important to note that it was precisely this line of ideological connections that reached Ilyenkov and his circle.

Ilyenkov approached the problem in its universal and logical aspect, raising the question of the formulation of a system of theoretical concepts and categories which could encompass the establishment of a most complex social reality, such as the communist socioeconomic system. By pointing out that we are still poorly familiar with the society in which we live, we naturally imply not that we are unfamiliar with the facts of the past and the present but the fact that the logical apparatus which enables us accurately to understand such facts in their internal interconnection and to consider them in their universal-historical context, is extremely underdeveloped. In terms of the capitalist production method, such an apparatus was created and applied by Marx in *"Das Kapital."* However, already the theoreticians of the Second International, even major ones such as Kautskiy and Plekhanov, could find virtually no way to apply Marx's dialectical method. We must acknowledge that in our social sciences as well, to this day, no use has been made of the lessons contained in *"Das Kapital."* In their overwhelming majority, the studies of socialism are reduced to an empirical description and an elaboration of a sum of abstract-general concepts which describe and classify the existing situation but are unable to engage in forecasting and in the theoretical anticipation of developments. It is easy to **reduce** the phenomena of social life to their material economic foundation, Marx pointed out. However, it is much more difficult to operate in reverse: to **derive**, to develop them on the same basis. The latter requires essentially different logical methods and the formulation of **specific-general** concepts.

In explaining the difference between the abstract-general and the concrete-general in scientific and theoretical knowledge, Ilyenkov wrote in his first book: "It is easy to have a football, the planet Mars and a ball bearing fit the concept of "round" in the abstract-general. However, neither the form of the ball nor the shape of the planet Mars or that of the ball bearing can be derived from the concept of "round in general" regardless of all efforts to think logically, for not one of these forms **stems** from the reality which is reflected in the concept of "round in general," i.e., from the real similarity and shared features of all round-shaped bodies.

"Out of the concept of 'cost' (in its Marxian understanding) the economic form of money can be derived most specifically. It is derived precisely because in objective economic reality, reflected by the category of 'cost in general,' we find enclosed the real objective need for the appearance of money."

"This need is nothing but the inner contradiction of cost...."

Briefly speaking, the specific scientific concept of a certain object is a strictly defined procedure for the theoretical or practical reproduction of a given object in the course of its development and in the formulation and resolution of its contradiction. In order to formulate such "functional" concepts we need the logical apparatus of dialectical materialism, a system of categories such as the abstract and the concrete, historical and logical, formal and meaningful, isolated or particular and general, material and ideal, contradiction, essence, substance, etc. Ilyenkov's contribution to the formulation of this system and its individual elements was quite substantial.

Nothing could be farther from understanding the nature of this matter than the unfortunately widespread view in the development of such categories that they are a relic of "Hegelianism." As Ilyenkov proved, they sum up the scientific experience acquired in the course of centuries, which is the best possible, for which reason the real facts they express immediately find their place in a general historical and general theoretical context, acquiring the type of facets and aspects which would otherwise remain unknown. The philosophical approach enables us to encompass and single out above all the universal, the essentially important outlines of reality and thus, under the proper angle of vision, to look at specifics and details which prevent the philosophically untrained eye from seeing the true picture.

Therefore, philosophical categories are not self-seeking. According to Ilyenkov, the final product of all work in the field of philosophical dialectics is to solve specific problems of specific sciences. By itself philosophy cannot achieve this. This requires the alliance, the practical cooperation between philosophy and the natural sciences or philosophy and the sociohistorical sciences. "However, in order to be a first-rate contributor to specific scientific knowledge," Ilyenkov wrote, "dialectics 'must' develop in advance a system of its specific philosophical concepts, from the viewpoint of which it could display the power of making a critical distinction in terms of the actually specific mental process and the consciously applied methods." A system of dialectical materialism must be structured, as a logic and theory of knowledge.

Today many people cite as an excuse the fact that this task is scholastic, alienated from the real practices of contemporary science. Indeed, until the decision to write fundamental works on dialectics was made in the mid-1970s, many voluminous works on this topic were published but, for the time being, not one among them could boast of major achievements. Ilyenkov did not participate in the creation of such multiple-volume works but predicted possible failures and identified their reasons.

One of them should be especially mentioned. It is rooted in the very basic concept of the subject of philosophy as a separate science. Ilyenkov insisted on understanding dialectical materialism as Logic, with a capital letter, as defined by Lenin as "a theory not of the external forms

of thinking but of the laws of development of 'all material, natural and spiritual objects,' i.e., the development of the entire specific content of the world and the knowledge of the world, i.e., the result, the sum of the history of knowledge of the world" (V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 29, p 84). Philosophy can attain such a level of knowledge not only by summing up the latest results of individual sciences by themselves or "positive data" as such, but by interpreting the development of scientific knowledge and achieving an increasingly deeper and comprehensive knowledge of the dialectical processes in the material world.

The concept of philosophy as a discipline which reduces to a single picture specific data obtained by the other sciences turns it into a heavy train which drags itself at the tail end of science and only hinders its progress, for while the philosopher "sums up" the latest data of the individual sciences, during that time these sciences have been able to advance. The thus understood and cultivated philosophy invariably offers to natural and social scientists as "methodological recommendations" their own achievements of yesterday. Whether that enhances the prestige of philosophy in the eyes of scientists and motivates them to ally themselves with it does not need a lengthy explanation. Philosophy is kindly allowed to eat the scraps off someone else's table, and just that.

The main trouble, however, is also that such an essentially positivistic version of the development of philosophy "transplants" to philosophical thinking all vices, prejudices and illusions of the spontaneous growth forms of specific scientific knowledge—scientism and technocriticism—which Ilyenkov described in his brilliant pamphlet "*The Secret of the Black Box*:" focusing on individual features, reductionism, eclectic mixing of laws of different quality or levels, lack of attention to the individual and failure to understand him as an organic entity. As a reaction to such phenomena and attempts to defend the fact that man cannot be reduced to the purely natural scientific description, the opposite is an abstract concept of an existentialist variety which opposes rationalism in general. The result is the growth and intensification of the split between scientific outlook into two internally unrelated "halves:" Abstract rationalism and an equally abstract humanism. Naturally, they "supplement" each other but their specific unity does not arise from such "supplementing." "When science is fetishized along with scientific thinking," Ilyenkov wrote, "the result is an immoral conclusion and the justification of violence and cruelty which horrify the very supporter of such thinking; the scientist starts crying and seeking salvation in abstract-meaningless but "humane" ideals, moved by his romantic but, alas, totally sterile nobility."

Ilyenkov was convinced that the only way out of this situation was to follow the path of Marxism. Humanism, he proved, is inherent in Marxism not as a kind of separate section but organically, as an initial postulate in the foundations of Marx's political and economic doctrine: the labor theory of value. "The basic moral spirit of "*Das Kapital*" is manifested quite accurately with the thesis of

real humanism: man, living man, and not money, not machines, not products and no other forms of 'material wealth', is the highest value, the creator-subject of all the forms 'alienated' from him. If we remove this 'moral' principle from "*Das Kapital*" by proclaiming it unscientific, the entire logic of this brilliant work collapses. Actually, is it possible to substantiate purely 'logically' the thesis that the labor of man creates value, while the work of a donkey, although he may be doing the absolutely same type of work, does not create any new value?"

Marx's understanding of the role of man in production is not an extraneous evaluation or a subjective preference for one of allegedly equal "factors" of social life but the strict determination of the objective place of man in the natural historical process. This positioning, however, is still a rather abstract phase of development in the course of which man is reduced to "manpower" and his labor to "abstract labor," which is extreme and an abstract opposite of strict specialization which reaches the point of "professional cretinism." The elimination of such an objective abstraction and achieving the full comprehensive and harmonious development of the individual is what, according to Ilyenkov, was the true content and meaning of the socialist and the communist reorganization of society. Socialism, he proved in his last posthumously published book "*Leninskaya Dialektika i Metafizika Pozitivizma*" [Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism] (Moscow, 1980) remains an abstraction although actually existing, as long as public ownership and the planned organization of the production process are not advancing toward the stipulated objective.

It was precisely the formulation of the logical structure of "*Das Kapital*"—this tremendous picture which depicts the development and resolution of the initial contradiction between concrete and abstract labor, i.e., between the ever growing variety of human activities and the narrow alienated form in which such activities earn their social evaluation and recognition—that determined the reason for which Ilyenkov turned to the problems of the development of the individual, and to psychology and pedagogy.

In this area he acted not only as a philosopher-logician but also as an outstanding educator and not only as a theoretician but also a practitioner of education.

Today the experience resulting from the long cooperation between Ilyenkov and A.I. Meshcheryakov in the areas of education and the intellectual and moral-esthetic development of the personality of deaf and blind children at the Zagorsk Boarding School is quite well known. Numerous articles have been written about it and a motion picture was made. However, so far the fact that this experience does not have any specific-applied yet universal significance in terms of the theory and practice of education has been studied to a much lesser extent.

Ilyenkov was convinced that being blind and deaf does not create even the slightest microscopical problem which could not be considered a universal problem. It merely aggravates, brings to light and emphasizes the actual laws

of the birth and shaping of the human personality which "normally" are developed largely spontaneously and subconsciously, for which reason, in the majority of cases, partially and one-sidedly. The real pedagogical experience in raising deaf and blind children indicated that the secret of the personality and its capabilities, needs and creative thinking, i.e., precisely all that which makes man what he is, is found not in any natural or divine "predetermination" but in the ways of introducing or ensuring the independent entrance of the human being into the world of overall sociohistorical practice and into material and spiritual culture. If you want a person to become a personality create along with his activities conditions in which he will not simply obtain prepared answers but will penetrate into the core of the questions, in the theoretical and moral-practical problems, solving them as the objective contradictions of life the solution of which involve him personally.

Problems which someone else has solved for us are not solved at all. It was truly said at one point that the personality is a person through whose heart and mind have passed all the contradictions and failures of his age. That is what Ilyenkov was. He reacted to social difficulties and the difficulties of his science as to personal misfortunes which brought him literally physical pain.

Ilyenkov died 10 years ago. Within the system of categories, to the development of which he dedicated his life, there is also a place and a concept of stagnation which can be defined as the contradiction between the activities of the person and the alienated-distorted form within the framework of which the person is forced to exist, a contradiction which is not productive but is precisely "cacophonic," leading to a restriction of true creativity and excessive growth of its mock forms, its pseudoactivities. This contradiction has existed for several decades and several generations of Soviet people have experienced and are experiencing its effect in a variety of ways. The reasons for its appearance have still not been entirely clarified and it has not been uprooted. This is as yet to be accomplished, for which reason the experience of people such as Ilyenkov is simply necessary.

A bronze statue of Ilyenkov stands, in a pose of profound thought, in Moscow's Novodevichye Cemetery. In the final years of his life, Evald Vasilyevich was amazingly like Goudon's Voltaire, and the artist has been able to depict this similarity to a certain extent. This monument was planned by the friends and students of the philosopher. It was cast in bronze by a young provincial sculptor, in a simple casting shop of a plant. The few visitors of this cemetery occasionally stop to look at this thin stooped figure, but the name at the pedestal of the statue says nothing to most visitors. Society is still poorly familiar with its intellectual and moral heroes. We are only at the very beginning of this long and difficult ascension to the concrete.

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PUBLIC OPINION

Surveys, Letters to the Editors

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[Text] Survey prepared by the Sociological Service of the Congress consisting of the following: heads: N. Betaneli and V. Lapayeva; staff: V. Alferov, V. Gubernatorov, A. Postnikov, V. Pyzin, V. Syrykh, S. Tikhonina, M. Chesnokova and G. Yakunin.

The Congress as Assessed by Its Participants

During the proceedings of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, its sociological service held three instant surveys (27 May, 2 June, 9 June). Each one of them included the participation of between 1,000 and 1,350 deputies (45-60 percent of the entire corps of deputies).

What did the surveys indicate?

In a number of problems there were clashes of views and arguments. Although the correlation of opinions does not have any given or stable nature, one could conventionally single out among the people's deputies a "group with more radical expectations and lesser degree of satisfaction" (25-30 percent); a "group of balanced positions" (40-55 percent) and a "group with relatively more moderate expectations and more cautious approaches, who displayed a greater level of satisfaction" (15-20 percent).

Nonetheless, the data of the surveys confirm that in a number of problems the deputies were predisposed to reaching an agreement, occasionally reaching the 92 percent level.

One of the first studies dealt with an overall assessment of the situation in the country. The deputies were asked to note two items in the list of problems they considered of the greatest importance today. The result was the following (here and subsequently in percentiles):

—Achieving Higher Living Standards for All	74
—Maintaining Law and Order	56
—Greater Participation of the People in the Making of Important Political Decisions and Further Development of Self-Management	30
—Glasnost, Openness, Freedom of Speech, and Increased Standard of Criticism and Self-Criticism	25

Although the task of this survey was not to analyze the results or to comment on them, nonetheless it is worth noting that in this table priority was not given to problems of democratization and glasnost which, one may have thought, would have been the main concern of the deputies.

Here is another question asked the deputies: "Do you link your hopes for improving the state of affairs in the country

to the activities of the following political institutions, party and state leaders, or social organizations in the country?"

The breakdown of the answers was the following:

—CPSU Central Committee General Secretary	81 (81.0)
—USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman	81 (80.7)
—USSR Congress of People's Deputies	78
—CPSU as a Whole	72
—Soviets of People's Deputies from Top to Bottom	66
—USSR Supreme Soviet	66
—CPSU Congress	61
—Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers	58
—USSR Council of Ministers	46
—CPSU Central Committee	44
—CPSU Central Committee Politburo	43
—CPSU Central Committee Plenum	38
—Law Enforcement Authorities (Courts, Militia, Prosecutor's Office)	34
—Informal Citizens' Associations	29
—The Country's Trade Unions	23
—The Komsomol	19
—Central Agencies of State Management (Ministries, State Committees, Departments)	15

In terms of the problem of demarcating between the functions of party and state authorities, discussed at the congress, the views of the deputies were the following:

—Necessary Improvements in the Practice of Interaction Between Party and State Authorities Without Legislative Changes	14
—Demarcation Between the Functions of Party and State Authorities on a New Legislative Basis	79
—Other	1
—Unable to Answer	6

How did the deputies rate the course of proceedings of the congress itself? Judging by the initial impressions (27 May Survey) what its participants liked more than anything else was the democratic nature of the congress, pluralism of views, debatability (37 percent); daring, and initiative shown by the deputies, their aspiration to defend their views and openness (13 percent); glasnost in covering the work of the congress by the mass information media (6 percent). They did not like the following: the behavior of many deputies (27 percent); organizational shortcomings in holding the congress (26 percent); the insufficient political standards of many deputies (16 percent); sterile debates (9 percent).

After several days the deputies were asked to answer the question of what changes had taken place in the work of the congress. Noting the positive changes which had taken place in the psychological atmosphere, the contacts between the presidium and the deputies, and the democratic nature of the discussion of problems and the

formulation of resolutions, the majority of those surveyed saw no improvements in the political standards of the discussions and the extent of agreement among the views held by the different deputy groups.

The overall attitude of the participants in the congress to its work was characterized as a whole by sufficient stability of positive evaluations (55 percent on 27 May, 50 percent on 2 June and 53 percent on 9 June) although the level of full satisfaction dropped from 20 to 10 percent. Similar data are found in the table in which answers to the question of "Were Your Hopes and Expectations From the Work of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies Justified?"

	27 May	2 June	9 June
—Yes	20	14	10
—More Yes Than No	35	36	43
—More No Than Yes	26	26	27
—No	14	17	15
—Unable to Answer	5	7	5

The surveys also determined the views of the deputies concerning their own contribution to the work of the congress. Answers to the question of whether they were satisfied with their personal participation can be broken down as follows:

—Yes	14
—More Yes than No	29
—More No than Yes	31
—No	21
—Unable to Answer	5

We can single out among the factors which contributed to shaping the feeling of dissatisfaction among 52 percent of those surveyed a characteristic "lack of speaking out" and disagreement with one decision or another. The deputies noted the following reasons:

—Put His Name Down to Speak but Was Not Given the Floor	39
—Did Not Dare to Speak	16
—Spoke Not as Successfully as He Would Have Liked	2
—My Suggestions Were Not Understood by the Majority	3
—My Suggestions Were Not Supported by the Majority	2
—I Disagree with Some Congress Resolutions	31
—I Disagree with Most Resolutions of the Congress	9
—Other	2

Relevant in terms of the subsequent work of the supreme state authority was the question of improving the mechanism for decision making on the basis of bringing views

closer to each other and taking all interests into consideration. The deputies showed the greatest unity on matters related to solving foreign policy problems (76

percent as a whole). Nonetheless, between 44 and 69 percent of those surveyed noted that there were substantial differences on an entire array of problems.

	Unity Increased	Unity Existed and Continues	No Unity Existed Nor Does Exist	Unity Weakened	Unable to Answer
—Socioeconomic Problems	29	17	36	8	10
—Democratization of Governmental and Social Life	22	17	35	12	14
—The National Problem	11	6	44	25	14
—International Problems	25	51	3	2	19
—Activities of the New Supreme State Authorities	16	13	34	10	27

The support and trust expressed by the congress to the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman and the USSR chairman of the Council of Ministers (following their election and ratification) were combined with independent views expressed by the deputies on ways of solving pressing problems. Statistically insignificant differences in the assessments contained in the speeches confirm that the pluralism of opinion and variety of approaches are characteristic also in the collective thinking of the deputies.

Were the Expectations From the Speeches Justified	From Gorbachev's Report (2 June Survey)	N.I. Ryzhkov's Report (9 June Survey)
—Yes	21	19
—More Yes Than No	34	40
—More No Than Yes	27	25
—No	15	15
—Unable to Answer	3	1

Some of the deputies have still not developed their attitude toward the activities of the newly elected USSR Supreme Soviet. However, nearly in one-half of them the initial impressions were encouraging. Were they overall satisfied with its work?

—Yes	17
—More Yes Than No	32
—More No Than Yes	25

—No	14
—Unable to Answer	12

On the last day of the congress, on 9 June, the deputies were asked questions concerning its influence on the development of society and the further work of the people's representatives. The majority were in favor of extensive political interaction with their voters (80 percent), the local soviets of people's deputies (67 percent), the mass information media (66 percent), the councils of labor collectives (60 percent) and the local party committees (53 percent). Between 25 and 31 percent of the respondents were not confident of the help they would receive from the local soviets of people's deputies and the economic and law enforcement authorities. Between 16 and 21 percent did not rely at all on cooperation with informal citizens' associations and social organizations. Thirty-three percent of the respondents were relying on the help of the local party committees; 20 percent would have liked to rely on it but were not confident of the possibility of doing so; 11 percent did not rely on their help and yet another 8 percent feared a counteraction on the part of such committees. A certain percentage of deputies (in terms of some views as much as 40 percent) failed to provide any answers and, clearly, have still not identified their political partners.

The surveys made it possible to compare the views of the deputies on the extent to which the congress and its resolutions would be reflected in the next 2 to 3 years on the situation in the various areas of social life in our country.

	Significant Improve- ments	Insignificant Improve- ments	No Improve- ments	Unable to Answer
—State of the Economy, Living Standard, Material Situation of the People:				
27 May	5	55	27	13
9 June	6	55	28	11
—Legal Foundations of the State, Law and Order, Socialist Legality, Observing the Principle of Social Justice:				
27 May	17	56	15	12

	Significant Improvements	Insignificant Improvements	No Improvements	Unable to Answer
9 June	20	50	11	19
—Influence of the Citizens On State Policy and the State of Affairs in Society, Development of Self-Management:				
27 May	32	50	7	11
9 June	29	44	9	18
—Glasnost, Openness, Freedom of Speech, Possibility of Expressing Oneself Honestly and Fearlessly On Any Problem:				
27 May	60	29	4	7
9 June	48	29	7	16
—Life in the Country As a Whole:				
27 May	6	56	23	15
9 June	4	51	27	18

Yet another table sums up the answers of the deputies to the question "To What Extent Did the Concepts Expressed in Your Electoral Program Coincide with the Resolutions Passed by the Congress?:"

—Coincided Fully	7
—Coincided On Essential Features	32
—Coincided On Some Views	41
—Coincided Very Insignificantly	15
—My Program Was Totally Different From the Resolutions Passed by the Congress	2
—I Did Not Formulate My Own Electoral Program	1
—Unable to Answer	2

Such are the basic results of the fast survey which, naturally, still need interpretation and analysis. Let us note in conclusion that for the first time the sociologists had been offered such extensive opportunities for gathering and processing information relative to the work of the supreme power authority. The studies were conducted not only among the deputies but also among rank-and-file citizens who, thanks to live television broadcasts, had open access to the work process of the congress and to the formulation of its resolutions. Population surveys were conducted by specialists from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology and the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion of the AUCCTU and the USSR State Committee for Labor. Surveys of people's deputies at the congress itself were conducted by the sociological service set up on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Soviet State Building and Legislation.

The Reader Reflects, Disputes, Proposes

On the Dignity of the Individual

Letter from V. Filippov, candidate of technical sciences, Kuybyshev:

Today, when we are restoring socialism and cleansing ourselves, when we think of its origins, all of us should

try to find in the theory of Marxism that which was clearly not realized in its time and which was unable to prevent the distortion of theory in its practical application.

It is perhaps with this in mind that we should thoroughly analyze the problem of human dignity in the works of the classics. In my view, this is a basic "structural" element of Marxism and, at the same time, a "key," sufficiently simple and understood by everyone, in interpreting the very complex (as many seem to believe) theory.

What distinguishes Marx's "*Das Kapital*" from the other classical works of political economy? In my view, it is a sharpened feeling of compassion and respect for those who are humiliated, abused and mercilessly exploited. It is respect for human dignity, that same "litmus paper," which Marxism reliably shows in our practical—social, economic and political—activities.

Such a claim may be interpreted as an attempt to vulgarize theory. However, if it can serve the people who have never read "*Das Kapital*," in my view it could accurately and capably protect us from many errors in our practical work. I believe that wherever the dignity of man is valued more and wherever the invisible moral boundaries of this delicate area are observed more carefully, there also is more socialism. Socialism ends when the dignity of man is violated. Let us recall the coercive collectivization and repressions of the 1930s, the losses of which remain incalculable and sharply felt to this day. And if today we were to gather the bits of everything which promotes the assertion of human dignity in our society, we would see how much remains to be done to implement the Marxist ideal.

We must most persistently erect moral, theoretical and any other barriers, making them insurmountable, to block those who wittingly or unwittingly would like to encroach upon human dignity. This is important in economics as well. It is only a master of his work with a highly developed feeling of personal dignity who is capable of creative toil.

I am addressing myself to your journal for I believe that today this question requires close theoretical attention.

Again Irresponsibility

Letter from A. Moklyuk, chief specialist-electrician, YuzhNIIgiprogaz Institute, Donetsk:

I would like to go back to an article published last year in your journal, the one by Ye. Gaydar and V. Yaroshenko "Zero Cycle" (KOMMUNIST No 8, 1988) in which, among others, they mention a system of managing the Urengoy-Uzhgorod Gas Pipeline, equipped with morally obsolete devices. The authors are not specialists and could hardly have been in a position to realize that matters are actually much worse. The point is that it is impossible simultaneously to ensure the normal work of this ASU and to observe all requirements of electric power safety. In other words, the system can be functional but dangerous or else safe but inoperative.

Worried by the possibility of an accident, as early as 1987 the personnel of this institute suggested the organization of a task force on the level of the USSR Ministry of Gas Industry. The department remained silent and no steps were taken. Then, at the start of 1988, the imported equipment at control point No 30/41, in the sector of the Kharkovtransgaz Production Association, broke down. That time a commission was set up but, for some reason, they did not see fit to include in its staff a specialist-electrician, as a result of which it reached erroneous conclusions on the reasons for the breakdown. All efforts to prove that the recommendations of the commission could not be met remained unanswered. Fearing a recurrence of the breakdown, the institute demanded that talks be held with the supplier—the Thompson Company. However, obviously afraid of worrying their foreign partner, the personnel of the Ministry of Gas Industry did not hold such talks.

Finally, on 8 February last, the experts who had gathered in Moscow were forced to acknowledge the doubtful expediency of the use of the Urengoy-Uzhgorod Gas Pipeline Control System as scheduled. Once again the ministry pretended that this was not its business. Therefore, problems remain unanswered and, let us point out, many such problems have accumulated. To begin with, is it worth it to continue to waste the people's money for the complete installation of a control system if its functionality is not guaranteed? Second, what about the threat which such systems create in the case of explosive production facilities? Third, is it worth developing our domestic systems on the basis of imported equipment which has become compromised?

Finally, how dangerous are such systems in other gas industry projects? This applies above all to the Astrakhan Gas Complex, from which information is coming about "strange" breakdowns of imported electronic systems for controlling gas leaks. There is no time to lose, for the efforts of the ministry to install clearly unsuitable equipment could become the latest tragic monument to incompetence, irresponsibility and impunity.

Editorial note. Unfortunately, the tragedy in Bashkiriya offered yet another proof of the importance of the problem raised by this author. This is a problem not only of a technological but also of a moral nature. As we can see, it goes beyond the limits of a single sector or even a group of sectors. Incompetence and irresponsibility remind us, yet one more time, of the serious consequences which they could entail. It is a question not of accidental and unpredictable reasons but rather of systematic errors and blunders. Unless they are ended the list of accidents will grow. Strange though this might seem, after the catastrophe at Ufa one could clearly say that today departmental expansion is not only undermining the level of the well-being and health of man but is threatening his very life.

And That Is All!

Letter from L. Lopatnikov, candidate of economic sciences, Moscow:

Many years ago I read in a journal a consultation by a jurist from the USSR Goskomizdat on the procedure for paying the fees to book authors. It included the following: "According to the law" (i.e., the standard contract) the initial amount is paid following the approval of the manuscript. However, as a rule, according to the practices of publishing houses, this payment is made after the manuscript has been delivered for processing. Unquestionably, the contract is being violated as if so stipulated.... Naturally, this clearly that this was a way for the publishing houses to insure themselves. What if they were to approve a manuscript and then, all of a sudden, someone would determine that it was poor? Meanwhile, the money has already been paid out and who will be answerable for it? Therefore, let the author wait. What else can he do?

I marked that passage but then forgot it. A departmental jurist could write anything he wants (although, understandably, his consultation is not all that harmless for it essentially excuses the violation of the law). At that time this was an entirely ordinary and normal phenomenon. Today we are describing this period as the time of stagnation, but we could justifiably also describe it as the time of disrespect for the law, double moral standards, trial by telephone, and the power of the apparatus and departmental instructions over the law, jobs and people.

I remembered this rather insignificant fact from the discussion in the press which followed the publication of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the cooperative. We know that this resolution, which was promulgated, as it itself claimed, in accordance with the Law on the Cooperative, was given a variety of receptions: some welcomed it ("blaming the grubbers in the cooperatives!"); others condemned it ("they are hanging the cooperatives," was the biting expression used by a newspaper).

Who is right? Let us not consider a confused matter such as the spirit of the law but better turn to its letter. This is obviously more reliable and convincing. Thus, many

economists, members of cooperatives and journalists make the following comparison: the law speaks of equality between the state and cooperative sectors in the national economy. Yet the resolution does not even mention this term; the law speaks of the autonomy of the cooperatives whereas the resolution speaks of their being assigned to state enterprises (against which, conversely, according to the idea, they should compete), and so on.

The natural doubts appeared: was this the last word of the government? Could or should the USSR Supreme Soviet, as some demanded or others suggested, and its constitutional supervision authority, which is now being set up, take up this matter again? In particular, this author, in a press article wrote as follows: The resolution is not a legislative act, as was erroneously said at the press conference by a highly placed official, who addressed the entire country on television, but only a regulatory act of the executive power. Consequently, the final word has not been said as yet. In the newspapers PRAVITELSTVENNIY VESTNIK and IZVESTIYA and in the roundtable meeting which was telecast, the chief jurist of the country, the USSR Minister of Justice, categorically claimed that practical experience, as it had developed in recent decades, is such that the resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers and of the Councils of Ministers of Union republics have the power of law or—in some cases the minister was more cautious—are part of the legislative system (which, actually, is one and the same). This means that I, and not said highly placed official, was wrong by virtue of my juridical ignorance....

At that point I remembered that old event and I turned to the most authoritative source: the country's Fundamental Law. Everyone must obey this law, from the journalist to the minister. Articles 108 and 113 stipulate that laws are passed by the supreme authorities of the state: the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. That is all. Not several periods, not a comma, not an abbreviation such as "et cetera," or "and so on," after which one could imply some kind of extension or the enumeration of other legislative authorities not mentioned at that point. There was a period!

I do not emphasize this pedantically. The question is what is the law and what is the so-called legal act of the executive powers. This is an essential question. Incidentally, its accurate solution is needed also for the legal acts as well to be strictly observed by all and in everything. It is no accident that during the period of stagnation the illegality of a minor departmental jurist could, on a minor departmental subject, provide point by point the same type of interpretation which is now provided by the chief jurist of the country on the subject of an immeasurably greater and immeasurably more important governmental problem! The former annested the violation of a standard publishing house contract, approved by that same USSR Council of Ministers; the latter... should we go on?

Unquestionably, we are discussing neither words nor terminology. The subject of this argument is a major one for a rule of law state which we wish to build.

Excerpts From Letters

N. Sumenkov, Kemerovo: I noted that at the congress we frequently heard the word "give!" and virtually no one said "take!" All that we could hear was "give, give!" But where from? Until labor productivity increases there will be no possibility of giving anything from anywhere. Everything is based on labor productivity which is indeed the most important, the main thing for the victory of the new social system. However, virtually no one raised this question at the congress or discussed it (I am writing this on 4 June). Does this mean that the decline will continue?

V. Mazurin, Moscow: I am pleased that at its first session the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities so profoundly raised the question of ethics, upbringing and high level morality of our society (something which, unfortunately, it has lost).

Nikolay Ksenofontovich Obotnin, Murashinskiy Rayon, Kirov Oblast: I am a pensioner and war veteran from Verkhoramenye Village. My question is the following: Why raise the price of equipment? I am referring above all to the T-25 tractor. It used to cost 1,800 rubles and now it costs more than 5,000. Where can a pensioner-kolkhoz member find such money? He would like to work a little while longer on the land, he needs help and this means equipment. If such help was available to the individual, he would try to work harder, to raise a cow and feed himself and the state and deliver milk. All that is good. Those who do not wish to cultivate the land do not need any equipment even if it is given to them for free. We are already grandfathers but when it comes a question of work, we pay less attention to our age.

Without equipment we cannot cope through manual labor. The kolkhoz does not have horses. We have nothing to rely on. I wanted to write to the Congress of Deputies but I do not know how to do so, for which reason I address myself to your journal. If possible, pass on my request on buying small tractors at a low price. The price should be reduced by one-third, perhaps to help former front-line veterans.

V. Silchenko, CPSU member since 1951, Yeysk: In some of the speeches delivered at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies the appeal was heard of totally rehabilitating all repressed peasants. Many of us are not clear as to whether this is needed. We had a neighbor. He had eight children. I did not see any wealth in their family. All of them worked from dawn to dawn. They were classified as kulaks. The children were loaded up on a cart, covered with sacking and taken outside the settlement. They were shoeless and undressed, despite the bitter cold. Then they were taken to Siberia. During the war all these children fought on the front and only two of them returned home as war invalids. Every one of us is

ready to vote with both hands for the rehabilitation of these and other innocent people.

However, there were cases of a different nature as well. That is why I and my comrades totally agree with Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov to the effect that in matters of rehabilitation the Supreme Soviet should not allow any leniency toward those who were really guilty and who committed various crimes. I would like for this letter to be published.

G. Sayakin, Moscow: I would like to read in your journal a thorough and scientifically substantiated article on socialism and on the errors and blunders which were allowed in the course of its building and about whether the present economic and political decisions are promoting socialism. Many such questions, both theoretical and practical, have appeared.

In the course of the electoral campaign one could hear hundreds of different platforms. As a rule, they contained a great deal of promises which, in some cases, were clearly unattainable. There were plenty of cliches and statements. Yet not a word was said about socialism in the programs I read. Are there so few people in our country who could say what is the nature of socialism, what are its features and laws? Obviously, it would be difficult to find all of this within a single article and it would be much better if a series of such articles is published.

Pomadova, Kharkov: Look at the note which I am sending you. My only question is the following: When will there be an end to this passion which humiliates human dignity: that of reporting "wherever necessary" on all occasions, to dig into the heart of man, and to turn man's soul inside out? Although no one seems to need this and it has even become popular to explain in virtually all printed organs the unethical nature of such actions in a rule of law state, there still remain many "volunteers."...

Do not be amazed at my letter. In 1937, in 1 month my entire family on my father's side was wiped out. That is why a reflexive fear and apprehension concerning such people arises.

Responses to Journal Publications

V. Kapranov, professor, philosophy department, Leningrad Higher Engineering Naval Academy imeni Admiral S.O. Makarov:

"Velikopisarevo Passions" by S. Koshelev. KOMMUNIST No 5, 1988.

More than 1 year has passed since your journal printed a letter by a priest, complaining about the local authorities. The editorial comment acknowledged its accuracy and included the alarming idea that atheism needs protection. This is becoming ever more apparent with every passing day.

Even during the period of stagnation the propagandists of atheism had to defend it from the zealous activities of local officials who tried, through administrative methods, to "surmount religion" as soon as possible and to "alienate the working people from religion." I, for instance, have had to listen to accusations that "philosophers are hindering us from putting an end to religion, engaging in demagoguery instead of decisively mounting an offensive against the clergy." Understandably, the politicizing of the attitude toward religion, the believers and the church undermined the prestige of atheism and of the policy itself.

The restoration of the Leninist principles of the attitude toward religion, believers and the church should also contribute to the renovation of scientific socialism, filled with a humanistic and moral content. Actually, how did the view develop that the atheists divide people into believers and nonbelievers? Did V.I. Lenin the atheist not write that the unity of people in the struggle for creating heaven on earth is more important to us than their unity of views on paradise in the skies?

Let us point out that frequently people who are incompetent in that area of knowledge speak out in the name of atheism. Atheism has suffered from this in the past and does so today. That is why it has needed and needs protection.

A. Finititskiy and S. Shepitko, teachers, Moscow Institute of Railroad Transportation Engineers:

"Inevitability of the New Methodology: Mathematics and the Methodological Renovation of Science" by A. Samarskiy. KOMMUNIST No 1, 1989.

Academician A.A. Samarskiy justifiably notes that today the very process of the use of means of mathematical support frequently replaces the targets of research. The achievements of mathematics, which allow us to unravel already essentially understood but clumsily depicted systems remain virtually unused in our country.

Yet algorithms and programs contain a sum of abstractions developed in the course of the interpretation of modeled systems. Computers merely allow us to make use of what man has already understood in solving specific problems. It would be good if as a result of such an interpretation we develop the possibility of working with simple models. The simplicity of models is not in the least synonymous with their poverty (although this too may happen). In the United States, for example, a number of applied systems have been developed, the use of which makes us forget that we are dealing with linguistic facilities, etc., and work with some kind of artificial intelligence, oriented toward the solution of specific engineering problems. Naturally, this requires a profound professional and mathematical training. Computer literacy is reduced almost entirely to the ability to work with the keyboard and to use the software.

A.A. Samarskiy complains that science is making poor use of mathematics, which is the reason for many difficulties. In our view, the reason for which mathematics is not used is that in a number of sectors the situation relative to the overall, the mass scientific standard is bad. For all too long it was believed that "light is brought only by those sciences which contribute to the implementation of the instructions of superiors."

According to Academician Samarskiy, since it would be difficult to rely in the forthcoming years on the appearance in our country of a favorable situation involving computers, we should "compensate for the lag in technical facilities by drawing on intellectual reserves." We do not believe that such reserves should be used only in the case of material poverty. Intensive development is not simply "our specific way to computerization," but the only possible and accurate one.

Naturally, the creation of an infrastructure which ensures the efficient use of computers is also extremely necessary. However, it would be proper to recall the statement by M. Born: "An experiment is totally meaningless unless it is interpreted theoretically." In other words, information becomes information only in the awareness of the competent person.

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Development of Leasing

18020016i Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 10, Jul 89 (signed to press 23 Jun 89) pp 78-81

[Survey by V. Nefedov, chief of the statistical administration of the agroindustrial complex, RSFSR State Committee for Statistics, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] Leasing is being extensively debated. The views expressed are different and conflicting. Many researchers and propagandists consider essentially its progressive aspects without properly analyzing the range of the most complex problems involved in the development of the new production relations. Many theoreticians and practical workers have a restrained or, sometimes, even a negative attitude toward leasing: above all, this is related to the concept that it does not fit the actual model of socialism. Some employees who, under the conditions of impersonal behavior and equalization became accustomed, without any particular effort, to earning a good income, have an extremely negative reaction to leasing. The attitude toward leasing is negative on the part of many members of the apparat. They consider the lessees one of the economic and social forces which, in the final account, could undermine the administrative-command system. The individual person as well does not as yet always realize that he could become the master, the co-owner of property. The people have become unused to independence.

The journal's readers (judging by the letters which I was shown by the editors) also have different reactions to leasing and family contracting. Let me cite just some quite typical views.

"...With the present leasing option, production relations remain virtually unchanged. The activities of the performer are based on contractual relations. Without being the owner of the labor objects and tools, he is not interested in basic production efficiency and in spending his own funds to promote it. He does not work for the future. He works on the basis of the term of his contract. More accurately, he remains a paid hired worker. The hope that this way we shall convert to a qualitatively new technology in agricultural production and attain world standards in this work is futile" (from the letter by A. Sokolovskiy, Moscow).

"It is sometimes said that the peasants are unwilling to lease because they find it 'difficult to understand economic concepts.' But is this the case? No one is willing to strain himself excessively! It is not a question of days off or paid leave for the lessees, for the livestock does not allow this, requiring daily care. What we see is the excessive load assumed by the lessee and the lack of a stable organization of labor and production, which will come somewhat later. Today, however, we are getting stirred up on the subject of leasing. However, emotion is not science. We need clarity" (from the letter by V. Arf, Gomel).

"Any long-term program presumes that the people will be interested. The interest of millions of people in town and country, who would like to cultivate the land, has been confirmed by the high production indicators at the miniature private plots. What about leasing? It is worrisome that frequently the stipulations of the Ukase on Leasing are being implemented stereotypically, hastily, without the study of the situation in the individual villages, kolkhozes or sovkhozes...." (from the letter by V. Koskovenkov, Sverdlovsk Oblast).

"The high labor productivity of rural lessees is, naturally, greatly determined by the form of the lease itself: free activities and the possibility to earn well. Another major part of success is related, in my view, to strict specialization, for most people raise only one or two crops or breeds of cattle" (from the letter by G. Infantov, Kuybyshev).

"Yes, the people are leaving the countryside, to this day.... Why ruin their health (in our village 95 percent of the milkmaids are sick). What will leasing change? Who needs more rubles for manual labor and a 16-hour workday? Who would want to become a socialist kulak, for the countryside has its own mentality" (from the letter of A. Orlova, Potnyak Village, Kirov Oblast).

"The dream of any milkmaid is to work as in the city: 8 hours, with days off and paid leave. She will never wish for her children to share her fate. If she takes up leasing as is now 'fashionable,' it should be, let us say, in a large dairy complex. In my view, this would be profitable and

would make sense" (from the letter by V. Zyablov, Belogorka Settlement, Leningrad Oblast).

"Why are the people not all that willing to take up leasing? They fear that after they have developed a good farm at the cost of incredible efforts, arbitrarily this farm will be broken up and given to a broken down kolkhoz or sovkhoz. As long as the functions of the current management system have not been changed, agriculture will not come out of the crisis" (from the letter by D. Novikov, Sverdlovsk).

Understandably, under contemporary conditions it is important objectively, without going to extremes, to study the processes of development of leasing relations and the economic and social changes related to it. We must indicate the type of problems which arise and what must be done to prevent hasty measures, as has been the case in the past, and not to chop down a tree before it has yielded fruit. These are by no means meaningless questions.

I would like to express my view on this account, based on surveys we have conducted, studies and, naturally, statistics (taking into consideration the very nature of our work).

I share the view that leasing relations must not be considered only in relation to the models of cost accounting, which narrows the content itself of the leasing movement. Essentially, it is a process of conversion to an essentially new socioeconomic form of management which implies a restructuring of basic relations, of ownership itself. The development of leasing in the agrarian sector plays a special role (for nowhere else has the feeling of ownership been so strongly undermined!); it is related to the possibility of drastically upgrading labor productivity and the quality of output.

The study of public opinion and of statistical data indicates that the organization and development of leasing relations are by no means simple. Obviously, no other way is possible for the development of this process, which is most important to the outcome of perestroyka, of transferring to the people ownership and converting it from state- to people-owned. At the start of December 1988 1,600 kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the Russian Federation (6 percent) had converted entirely to leasing; 9,000 other farms (37 percent) used leasing in some of their subdivisions. A total of 69,000 brigades and links (22 percent) employing 800,000 people (9 percent of the average annual number of sovkhoz and kolkhoz workers) had converted to leasing.

More than one-half of the arable land and the cattle have been assigned to leasing subdivisions in Orel, Vologoda, Belgorod, Saratov and Ulyanov oblasts and the Kalmyk ASSR, compared to less than 4 percent in Ivanovo, Kalinin, Ryazan, Gorkiy, Amur and Magadan oblasts and the Karelian, Komi, Udmurt and Tuva autonomous republics.

Today leasing is essentially being applied in kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Contracts are being signed with individual citizens as well, with farmers. Favorable conditions for the development of such farms exist in areas characterized by scattered farmland, particularly in the Pskov area, where there is a large number of farms (in Pytalovskiy Rayon alone, at the start of this year, there were 66 livestock farms which had signed contracts), and other parts of the Russian Nonchernozem.

The reasons for taking up leasing are indicative: 73 percent of lessees surveyed in a number of RSFSR oblasts believe that the main reason is the aspiration to work independently (and, in their view, the work becomes more difficult but also more interesting); 27 percent quoted material incentives. Virtually all surveyed farm managers and specialists claim that leasing has been applied in their areas quite seriously and for quite some time. Studies have indicated that the lessees are the most active and best trained part of the rural workers. Characteristically, 12 percent of the 780 people working in 122 leased subdivisions of kolkhozes and sovkhozes in that same Pytalovskiy Rayon are specialists with higher or secondary training.

Leasing becomes particularly effective when the entire farm converts to the system. This is confirmed, in particular, by the work results at Palekhskiy Sovkhoz, Ivanovo Oblast, where since the beginning of last year crop growing, animal husbandry, the garage and repair workshops and the cafeteria were converted to leasing. As a result, the net profit here was higher by a 2.4 factor compared to 1987.

For the RSFSR as a whole, for the time being the contribution of lessees to agricultural output remains small. Accounting for about 25 percent of the arable land and one-quarter of grain crops, 16 to 25 percent of the cattle and 16 percent of areas in potatoes, last year the leased subdivisions accounted for approximately 15 percent of the gross output, 12 to 18 percent of the meat, 14 percent of the milk, 23 percent of the gross grain harvest and 14 percent of the potatoes.

What is the reason for such modest overall results against a background of individual outstanding examples? We know that with leasing what increases above all is labor productivity: in 1988 it was 20 percent higher in the least subdivisions of Russian kolkhozes and sovkhozes compared to the farms as a whole. In other words, fewer workers are taking care of larger numbers of cattle and cultivating bigger areas. The workday of the lessee is longer (V. Kosinov, for example, who is raising young cattle at the Buninskiy Sovkhoz, Orel Oblast, puts in 16-17 hours daily). The lessees are largely surmounting negative phenomena such as negligence, violations of technological discipline, etc. However, even under the conditions of leasing matters have not always reached the level of using the existing deep reserves for upgrading production efficiency, related to technological changes.

We believe that initially leasing will largely be an opportunity for extensive development: involving in agricultural production a great deal of neglected land, particularly in the Nonchernozem, an influx of new manpower moving into these virtually deserted areas, and the revival of so-called villages without a future.

However, it is characteristic that in the course of the surveys lessees, and farm managers and specialists noted an increased interest in progressive technologies, rationalization, accountability of outlays and a search for possibilities of economizing. Leasing offers tremendous opportunities for production intensification and a radical restructuring of technology. Clearly, such potential opportunities cannot be utilized with a predominant manual labor and the excessive load carried by the lessees. The leasing movement will not yield the expected returns or could even get bogged down unless we concentrate on the production of work tools for agriculture on a priority basis. The question of the scarcity of work machinery and the lack of respective machine systems has been repeatedly raised (including in KOMMUNIST—see No 1 for 1984 and No 17 for 1987). The situation is not improving. It is no accident that in the course of our surveys it was precisely this problem that was singled out among the factors which are holding back the development of leasing: as in the past, major disproportions remain in agriculture between available power equipment and the amount of machines directly replacing human labor.

Last year, in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses of the Russian Federation, the ratio was 100 rubles of power machinery in fixed capital to 162 rubles of work machinery (for many years this ratio has remained virtually unchanged); according to computations, on an average per each 100 rubles worth of tractors, in an optimal correlation, there should be machinery for crop growing worth 260 rubles and, including machinery for animal husbandry, more than 300 rubles. The problem of equipping agriculture with work machinery could be solved to a certain extent even by somewhat reducing the growth rates of power resources which, as it were, cannot be fully applied as a result of the lack of necessary sets of work tools.

For a number of years gigantomania flourished in our country, as a result of which no suitable attention was paid to the production of smaller tools. Yet such tools are needed by the lessees (and, naturally, not only by them). For the time being, minor mechanization facilities may be essentially seen only at exhibits. The production of truck gardening light-duty tractors and motor cultivators in the country totals 65,000 pieces per year. It accounts for 512,000 in the United States. Between 1979 and 1983 the overall value of small equipment in the United States accounted for between 21 and 39 percent of the overall value of the entire volume of produced agricultural equipment: many tractors and motors come with numerous attachments which make it possible to use such equipment in a great variety of farming operations.

This year we are not expecting any breakthrough in our country in this area. The urgent need arises to reorganize the production process by increasing the production of small tractors by drastically reducing the volume of huge tractors (using the same production capacities, without building new plants), and changing the structure in the production of agricultural equipment. We should not allow any delay in this matter.

It may be sensible to listen to some suggestions as reported in the press. In particular, taking a shortcut, the Society of Small and Middle Entrepreneurs of the FRG is ready to sell to us at advantageous prices (almost at the price of scrap metal) some types of equipment—full sets of machines, mechanisms and appliances for private farms, with closed production cycles. Are such suggestions being discussed? We believe that it is not in our interest to waste such an opportunity.

As surveys have indicated, some of the factors which hold back the development of leasing include the unsatisfactory organization of procurements of material and technical resources, as a result of which there are frequent violations of contractual obligations and a lack of organizational-economic and technological knowledge. The future of leasing greatly depends on farm specialists. Nearly one-third of the surveyed specialists consider that their place is directly in leasing collectives; 45 percent believe that they would be most useful as consultants to such collectives on a contractual basis; the others deem it expedient to continue to work in their previous jobs, emphasizing the use of intensive technologies and supervising their application.

Formalism is very wasteful. Our studies have indicated that numerous farms, giving fashion its due, announce the conversion of contracting collectives to leasing, although essentially nothing changes in their work. The contracts do not always stipulate specific measures of responsibility on the part of the signatories for the violation of their obligations. Interference in the daily work of the lessees is continuing (transferring equipment, reassigning them to other projects, setting deadlines, etc.). As a result, in the leasing subdivisions in 14 oblasts, krais and autonomous republics, in 1988 grain crop yields turned out 20 percent or more lower than those in the public sector; in 13 they were 25 percent or lower than crop yields and in some oblasts labor productivity of the lessees turned out to be lower than that of kolkhozes and sovkhoses as a whole.

It is understandable how important it is not to allow, under the destructive influence of formalism, for leasing to experience the fate of collective contracting, in which the intensive efforts to apply it (most of the land and cattle were "assigned" to contracting subunits) were not noticed by the purchasers: the store shelves did not become richer.

Judging by the surveys, last year the lessees were not confident of the future and the contracts they concluded were essentially for 1 year. Faith is undermined by the

nonmandatory nature and imperfect economic interrelationship both within the agricultural enterprise as well as with the other sectors in the agroindustrial complex. Following is an example: in the studied leasing collectives in Kurgan Oblast, there was abundant criticism on the subject of the forced excessive keeping of the cattle which entailed additional costs (the meat combine did not accept the cattle promptly). Here is another example of a different nature: the board of the Leninskiy Put Kolkhoz, Tikhoretskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray, paid the lessees, despite the contract, barely one-half of their earnings, resolving that even this was sufficient, while the balance was distributed as additional wages among the other subdivisions of the kolkhoz, even among those which had suffered losses. Naturally, the people will not accept such "leasing," which turns them off.

Nonetheless, what instills optimism is the fact that, asked about their future plans, more than one-half of the surveyed lessees answered that they intend to go on leasing, and do the same amount of work. Almost 20 percent of them expressed the wish to increase their output and only 6 percent said that they would not sign another contract. We believe that with the promulgation of the Ukase on Leasing, more favorable conditions will be created for solving many problems, including those related to the leasing period. A legal guarantee will appear; the lessee will be protected from illegal actions by the administration. The ukase stipulates that the lessee himself will determine the nature of his farming activities. He will handle his output and income as he wishes. However, all of this may remain merely a pious wish, particularly for those who work under the conditions of leasing within a farm. No peasant can be a true owner while being pressed by administrative regulations within which the kolkhozes and sovkhozes themselves still operate. If attempts to "squeeze" the new leasing forms of economic management within the old economic mechanism were to continue, one could hardly expect any breakthrough in increasing food production.

Under circumstances in which the lessees themselves distribute their cost accounting income, the problem of its "use" and the lack of interest in production accumulations will remain. This is related to the threat of a further gap between the mass of money and the volume of available goods and services, the aggravation of the deficit and inflationary processes. The solution of this problem lies in increasing the interest of the lessees in extending the period of the contracts, changing ownership relations and developing their group form (increasing assets by making purchases of items, using the cost accounting income of the lessees, which then become the property of the collectives). This will eliminate the old concept of the individual that production accumulations are something "external." The fear of having such accumulations will disappear and it is thus that the individual will begin to accept ownership.

Also important is the fact that contemporary agrarian policy is not only oriented toward mastering leasing relations but is also called upon to ensure a decisive

conversion to the development of agricultural production on the basis of a variety of forms of socialist ownership and types of farming—kolkhozes, sovkhozes, agroindustrial combines, agricultural companies and processing and other enterprises, leasing collectives and lessees, peasant farms and cooperatives and private auxiliary population farms.

In frequent cases the leasing movement continues to be developed not on the lower levels but by higher authorities. Virtually all the respondents answered that they had converted to leasing on the initiative of superior agencies. The poor attraction to leasing in many farms is related, as we pointed out, to the fact that leasing presumes the status of the direct producer as being the owner, whereas the entire management system is still structured on a command-administrative basis. The urgent need to eliminate such principles was voiced, among others, in the appeal of the group of agrarian deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Under the new economic management conditions the statistical system of the agroindustrial complex is being restructured as well. It is being simplified and shortened. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes which have fully converted to leasing are virtually no longer required to produce any daily accountability. All that is required is the submission of annual reports. The emphasis will be on obtaining the necessary information through selective studies and one-time audits. It is thus that the lessees will be largely relieved of administrative obligations and, at the same time, information will be provided, needed for the study of the processes occurring under leasing conditions.

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SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

The Elements and We

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[Article by Nikolay Vissarionovich Shebalin, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, chief, strong earthquakes laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Earth Physics]

[Text] The seismic catastrophe in Armenia is an exceptional event in terms of many indicators, both natural as well as socioeconomic. It mercilessly bared the question of the choice of strategy and of specific organization for the struggle against the destructive influence of the elements.

Usually, a natural calamity is considered to be a rapidly (most often suddenly) arising local ecological situation. In this connection, there is always an unfavorable combination of three factors: an extreme geophysical event (seat of the catastrophe); some sort of influence on the

earth's surface caused by it (strike factor); and the inability of the population and all of its social structures to adequately prevent this influence (vulnerability). The possibility of reducing the damage from a natural catastrophe to a minimum depends on the extent to which we are able to influence any of these three components. Contemporary science envisages such influence at the level of forecasting, protection, or prevention.

Forecasting

The most dramatic but also the least effective level is that of forecasting. Intensified public interest in it is understandable. In order to forecast, knowledge of the properties of the seat of the coming calamity is needed, but no special requirements whatsoever are necessary for studying the strike factor or vulnerability. Today, success in forecasting natural calamities depends on the possibility of identifying the preparation process for the not yet manifested seat and estimating the time of its awakening. For example, in the case of typhoons, the center does not arise suddenly on the sea shore: it forms in the ocean and its path and speed almost always lend themselves to preliminary estimation. Hence the good accuracy in predicting the approach of typhoons at one point or another on the shore. However, for earthquakes, eruptions and landslides, determining the moment of the seat's action is so complicated that it reduces the possibility of reliable prediction down to nothing. Moreover, the modern level of knowledge is such that mistakes are inevitable in predicting the force (energy) characteristics of a future seat. At times, this raises the temptation of retrospective speculations, for example, such as happened when an insignificant, ordinary, repeated tremor of the Spitak earthquake (24 January 1989) was passed off as the predicted strong earthquake with disarming shamelessness, publicly, right up into the central press.

Speaking of predicting natural calamities, somehow we forget about the extraordinarily high social responsibility of this work. A forecast cannot be fabricated and is not a set of one-time actions and measures, carried out somewhere and somehow. A forecast is a continuous process, covering a significant territory; once neglected in can no longer be stopped. In the case of earthquakes, that which is often passed off as forecasting by journalists and administrative quick-thinkers from science, is just an attempt to apply individual methods that are still poorly coordinated among themselves. That is why it is hard to admit aloud the obvious fact that the maturation of individual seismic seats can occur noticeably sooner, but other seats in geophysical fields well-familiar to us are not manifested distinctly. Accordingly, having the necessary system and a long series of preceding observations, sometimes we can predict the moment of an earthquake, while in other cases, we cannot. Therefore, successful predictions today are nothing more than precisely that—a success. The success, clamored across the world, of Chinese seismologists in predicting the Hai Chen earthquake on 4 February 1975, when at least 30,000 residents would inevitably have perished in the absence of the prediction, was also, of course, the result

of an exceptionally favorable combination of the "open" preparation of the depths for raising the earthquake and well-organized work by the specialists. However, such efforts alone for the time being, unfortunately, are not enough, and tragic failures attest to this, such as the unpredicted Tanshan earthquake of 28 July 1976, when according to official data 243,000 people died. Given the current state of science and degree of organization of forecasting systems, the first example was chance, while the second is the rule.

Besides everything else, we must not forget that the release by scientists of reports made from a series of figures indicating the place, force, and time of an upcoming earthquake, essentially solves nothing if it is unknown to whom it should be addressed and if it has not been previously determined what the addressee should do on receiving such a report. In the Hai Chen earthquake, the information (more precisely, a series of consecutive refining data) made it to the right place and the government agencies that received it organized both the evacuation of the population from buildings, as well as service for the population immediately before the underground strike and afterwards. Nothing of the sort existed in our country at the end of 1988, nor does it today. Who must, who has the right to release a prediction? A specialized agency (for example, the MSSSS—the USSR Academy of Sciences Interdepartmental Council on Seismology and Earthquake-Proof Construction), any scientific institution (for example, the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geochemistry), or any citizen of the USSR? Where is the limit of obligation and responsibility?

We should admit that we do not have a proven model for forecasting, nor a system for reacting to a forecast, nor are there consistent attempts to build either one, or the other.

This is all the more distressing since, judging by the existing but still incomplete and unsystematized data, in the case of the Spitak earthquake it was precisely a case of a very obvious, "open" maturation process of the seat. Moreover, long before the earthquake a number of phenomena were noted that attested to the increased seismic danger in nearby areas of the Caucasus. However, there was no system for gathering and interpreting these data, there was no estimate of their reliability, and mainly, there was nobody to listen, understand and take this information as a guide to action: neither our republic, nor the all-Union system is ready to receive the signals of an impending calamity. We can hope that the governmental committee on extreme situations will not limit itself only to economic management problems and will direct serious attention to the scientific side of the problem of natural disasters, in all of its aspects.

In summing up this section, I would like to emphasize that it is senseless, uneconomical and ineffective to count mainly on predicting earthquakes in solving the urgent problems of the struggle against their destructive consequences. This does not guarantee us the safety of

human lives everywhere, yet it does guarantee the preservation and even growth of the level of material losses and, in a number of cases, also ecological damage from the possible destruction or damage to chemical industries, AES [nuclear power stations], high dams, etc. The fact that the absence of precision, clarity and glasnost in predicting earthquakes gives rise to an avalanche of rumors, which are a considerable factor in destabilizing social life, is no less important. One need not look far for an example: just before May, all of Moscow was full of ridiculous talk about an impending strong earthquake in the capital.

Prevention and Protection

Modern technical and power industry possibilities permit us actively to influence only the small seats of local natural catastrophes, like impending avalanches or hail-threatening storm-clouds. In order to halt the process in an earthquake seat like Spitak, according to some estimates, it would be necessary to spend several billion kilowatt-hours of energy, applied to a depth of 10-40 kilometers. Today, mankind lacks the means, methods, or even serious scientific ideas for such a plan. Therefore, organizing protection from natural disasters acquires special significance.

Mankind turned to weather prediction very late, since the problems of reliable protection from rain and wind were solved long ago, both for caves, felt yurts, and huts, as well as prefabricated ferroconcrete buildings. Our situation is different in the case of earthquakes and, when talking about seismic forecasting, we always give second priority to the problem of the rational definition of dangerous territories and the design and construction of earthquake-proof buildings. The last 2-3 decades have been spent in attempts to organize joint research within the framework of the above-mentioned MSSSS. With time, however, an ever greater mutual isolation between seismologists and builders occurred, which concluded in the unworthy and sad confrontation in the ruins of Leninakan. I am entitled to write about this, if only because I myself made a certain contribution to the shameful chaos of reciprocal rebukes and accusations.

What is the problem? Why was high-rise Leninakan destroyed? Why is the seismic protection of our society in such a pitiful condition? What is the reason for this—the perfidy of nature, the uselessness of seismologists, or the errors of builders? To this day, the builders consider the seismologists the main culprits, while most seismologists blame the builders. The broad public, brought up with a truly general disrespect for the intelligentsia and knowing the scale of many builders' unscrupulousness, accuse both. Meanwhile, the problem is not all that simple, and assistance in looking into it is one of the main, if not the most important, purpose of this article.

The formal side of the problem is clear. Construction in seismically active regions must be done in strict accordance with the Construction Standards and Rules SNIIP-II-7-81, approved by USSR Gosstroy. Therefore, the

designers and builders are responsible for deviation from the SNIIP, and Gosstroy—for the quality of the standards themselves. Despite what is being written and said, scientists should not advise builders on specific problems of earthquake-proofing. They do not have the right to make any private recommendations whatsoever to builders: while the state standard SNIIP exists, the fulfillment of its requirements—and its requirements alone, not somebody's recommendations—is strictly mandatory. For any point in the territory of the USSR, said standard stipulates the calculated level of seismicity in points (according to the international 12-point scale accepted as the standard in the USSR and in several other countries), the frequency of repetition of earthquakes of a calculated force (once in 100, 1,000, or 10,000 years), formulas for calculating the loads on one or another structure, which take into account the number of other seismic vibration periods (this is very important), and other details needed by designers and builders. The role of the scientists in creating the regular version of SNIIP lies, above all, in submitting a map of the seismic regions of the USSR for the consideration and approval of USSR Gosstroy, or more precisely, a list of the basic settlements in our country, taken from this map, for each of which the SNIIP indicates the seismicity and frequency of repetition. The final version of this general seismic zoning map, OSR-78, is not a law for builders in itself: it became so after approval of the above-mentioned lists in the body of the SNIIP by USSR Gosstroy.

Naturally, there can be many ways and methods for constructing such a map and many variants of procedures for its approval by Gosstroy. Map OSR-78 was created as follows: in 1975, after heated debates the leaders of this work—the late Professor G.P. Gorshkov, Academician M.A. Sadovskiy, I.L. Nersesov, and V.I. Bune—decided to create the Union-wide zoning map by combining maps compiled independently in the republics and large territorial centers of Siberia and the Far East. Several members of the editorial collegium objected, considering a more unified approach to the entire seismically active territory of the USSR to be more accurate. However, we were unable to convince our leaders: they were backed by the collectives of the republic organizations and institutes, powerful in number and possessing the initial data, which wanted to make their own—and only their own!—maps... In 1978 the cheerless, routine work to combine the republic and territorial maps was completed, the MSSSS sent the composite map to the USSR Academy of Sciences and, after being signed by the vice-president, it was presented to Gosstroy, subjected to lengthy expert analysis there by a number of specialists, and repeatedly reworked and refined in this connection. A great deal of effort went into proving the economic effectiveness of the map. The matter ended with the fact that official stamps were received, the Gosstroy scientific and technical council accepted the map, and Gosstroy sent us a list of settlements, which had also been officially included in the new

SNiP with the addition of map fragments, for coordination. This is the history, which gives an idea of the formal and moral responsibility of the participants in this entire job for the map's merits and shortcomings.

Was map OSR-78 better than the previous one, the one approved in 1968? In order to understand, one should bear in mind that a map estimating the place and force of all future earthquakes essentially is a kind of prediction map. The prediction principle which forms the basis for Soviet seismic zoning maps indicates that not only the sites of historically known or recently registered earthquakes, but also zones geologically similar to these, are declared dangerous. Because of the uncoordinated nature of the work done in different regions, and also as a consequence of the different skills and sometimes diverging scientific interests of the authors' groups for the republic and territorial maps, the prediction principle was applied with a varying degree of consistency.

The forecasting nature of the maps means that they can be verified only by practice. The theory of forecasting knows two kinds of mistakes. Mistakes of the first kind ("missing the mark") signify that an unpredicted phenomenon is occurring, in our case—an earthquake with a point rating at the epicenter above the estimated rating. Such mistakes are immediately revealed on the maps. For example, the 1976 earthquake at Gazli, the 1971 Moneronkoye earthquake on Sakhalin and, of course, the Spitak earthquake missed the mark. Those who would like to groundlessly accuse the authors of maps OSR-68 and OSR-78 of incompetence on this basis should be reminded that far stronger earthquakes have happened over preceding decades within the limits of the corresponding point zones. In the Caucasus area, these included the Dagestan (1970) and Chernogorsk (1976) earthquakes, in Turkmenia—the Kum-Dag (1983) and Burunday (1984), in Central Asia—the Tashkent (1966), Sary-Kamysh (1970), Markansuyskoye (1974) and many, many others. Thus, the 1968 and 1978 maps have justified themselves on the whole, having saved us from many casualties and losses.

We must not, however, forget about mistakes of the second kind ("false alarm"), when the predicted event does not occur. Matters with estimating the share of false alarms are more complex, after all, an earthquake with a calculated point rating is expected anywhere once in 100-1,000 years, but it would be desirable to know what will happen tomorrow. Obviously, we are in no position to indicate the precise coordinates of false alarms and are forced to estimate only their average level. It is possible, for example, to count the area that was encompassed by tremors of a certain point rating over the last 10 years and multiply it by 10, 100 or 1,000 to convert to the estimate that we need, depending on the map's repeatability indicator. If the area obtained turns out to be less than the one predicted on the map, a share of false alarms is present and can easily be deducted. Such work has not yet been done for map OSR-78, but for the three preceding maps (1937, 1958 and 1968) an associate at our institute, N.G. Mokrushina, and I performed all the

calculations and established that from map to map the percentage of misses is decreasing, but to make up for it the percentage of false alarms is growing, especially in Siberia and the Far East. What, one may ask, does it matter? However, this is not quite so.

The cost of earthquake-proofing is dictated, essentially, by a single rule: no additional expense should exceed the losses it prevents. The additional expenses have been fairly well studied: it is known that raising a building's earthquake-proofing by 1 point makes it several percent more expensive (the exact figures change from year to year). The question of the amounts of loss prevented is far less clear. Properly speaking, we do not know the true cost of that which we possess. An elementary example is a residential building that has stood, for instance, for 50 years. Everyone knows what it cost to build. However, what is it worth right now? If one judges by the amortization deductions, then it is worth nothing, zero. If the building collapses, the residents will suffer damages, within the limits of official estimates, amounting only to the cost of their own property. Formally, the state will not suffer a loss. Yet, in fact?..

Let us now consider a recently constructed residential building. It is still worth something. If it collapses, the loss is obvious. However, something else is not at all obvious: who, what organization, suffers this loss? The local soviet? Nothing of the kind. The building might be... "in the books," but these are empty words. Not a single organization will become poorer because of the building's destruction! This is the main reason for the ubiquitous negligence in constructing buildings: not a single organization suffers from their destruction, and the residents, to put it crudely, are not taken into account.

Let us go further. We, the residents, can insure our property. But by whom and where was our building insured? Somehow, it is even uncomfortable to talk about this... Moreover, let us consider an example in which the owner of a structure is known. Why do our ministries so stubbornly push their AES, plants, and other construction projects into inconvenient, dangerous regions? Truly, because their possible material losses in this connection are not calculated and are not taken into consideration. If we had introduced mandatory insurance based on the level of natural risk, with sharply progressing insurance rates, the situation would have been different. One is impatient to start building an AES near a fault, on a growing volcanic dome—so go ahead! Only let the department pay Gosstrakh, i.e., the state, an appropriate sum! This immediately would sober many and, incidentally, in itself solves the problem of where to find funds for geological and seismic surveys: a small percentage of the sum of the insurance, officially deducted by Gosstrakh for Gosstroy, could provide for all the requisite needs. Moreover, if a project's destruction threatens neighboring states, it is no sin to worry about international insurance as well—and here is a source of hard currency for buying foreign equipment. In my opinion, the representatives of Gosstroy, Gosplan,

Gosstrakh, the Academy of Sciences, and other departments must think about this together now, instead of wasting time and nerves on reciprocal accusations.

Of course, general efforts are needed here. Strict instructions are needed for Goskomstat and Gosstrakh to set the amounts of losses and payments, separately for each type of natural catastrophe; for economists—to develop criteria for evaluating these losses for all forms and types of the national economy; for geophysicists, along with economists—to assess the amount of possible losses. Let me dwell on the latter in greater detail.

Today, natural phenomena have not yet been studied enough to organize regular prediction services everywhere, but there are now many well-known laws for estimating the average repeatability of dangerous geological and geophysical cataclysms and distribution throughout specific regions depending on their forces. There are also possibilities for evaluating the consequences of such cataclysms for society, its economy, culture, and other valuables. Consequently, today we can raise the question of estimating the probable losses due to natural catastrophes, and consider them a negative factor constantly in effect in the country's system of productive forces. Such an approach would facilitate the creation of real reserves and funds in places where this is of prime necessity, and also the taking of proper economic and organizational measures to guard our property from the unfavorable influence of the elements.

The Reality of Spitak and Leninakan

From general problems, let us return to the tragedy of 7 December 1988. After all, everything said above does not free us of the need to clearly and impartially evaluate the causes of the calamity. Thus, the existing general seismic zoning map. It does not work too badly for the territory of the USSR "on the whole," but it must be openly admitted that it does not reflect the real seismic danger of the Caucasus area (indeed, the Caucasus on the whole) in the best possible way. It was also incorrect for Armenia. Its first shortcoming is that it had become "lighter," in terms of the level of suggested seismic danger, compared to the 1968 map. The seismologists of Armenia spent a great deal of effort to prove that the earthquakes which, at the turn of the millennia, annihilated the two ancient capitals of Armenia—Dvin (893) and Anu (1046), were local events; their force did not reach 9 points at the epicenter, and the intensity of the seat (magnitude) did not exceed 5.5 on the Richter scale. These figures were published in a most exhaustive report, in the "New Catalog of Strong Earthquakes on the Territory of the USSR" (published in the USSR in 1977, and in the U.S., in 1982), and one of the editors of the "Caucasus" section, who was also the editor of the historical part of the catalog on the whole and the author of this article, is fully responsible for the reduced figures that were given. Indeed, I have not managed to convince my colleagues in this work of the fact that the historical evidence of the number of victims and degree of destruction of the cities, contained in many remarkable literary

and historic memorials of Armenia, deserve greater trust. At that time, in the late 1960s-early 1970s, our methods for estimating the point rating and magnitude of historical earthquakes had not yet found international recognition. A.A. Nikonov had not yet done his research, which subsequently revealed a great deal of additional information about the force and, mainly, the large area of distribution of the destructive vibrations in several of the strongest earthquakes in the Caucasus area and Central Asia. A universal algorithm had not yet been developed for translating the brief and very general evidence in chronicles into the most probable quantitative estimates of the earthquakes' parameters. As a result, the magnitude of several key historical catastrophes in Armenia was estimated with an error of reduction by 0.5-0.7, and a point rating of 1, or less frequently, of 1.5. Right now, the most painstaking work, requiring lengthy efforts and thought, comparisons and estimates, aimed at a more realistic assessment of the parameters of historical earthquakes, is continuing and the end is not in sight. However, serious corrections in the "New Catalog" will, obviously, be made in the course of the next 1.5-2 years. The one thing that we are not allowed to do is be hasty and raise the estimate of the force of ancient earthquakes in order to please "fashion," just as we permitted their reduction in the past.

The second reason is harder to explain, but I will try. The essence lies in the fact that the seat of a strong earthquake can only be caused by a sufficiently powerful geological structure. The strongest earthquake on the rim of the Pacific Ocean or in the most active parts of the Alps-Himalayan belt, where the magnitude reaches 8.5-8.7 on the Richter scale (this is the limit for Earth) and the force at the epicenter can be 11-12 points, are caused by planetary geological structures with a length of up to 2-2.5 thousand kilometers and a depth below the planet's surface of up to 80-150 kilometers and, in the Pacific Ocean, even up to 700 km. The seats themselves are enormous—a length of up to 600-800 kilometers, and depth of up to 60-80 kilometers. They simply cannot be located on a small geological fault. In order to determine whether a similar or somewhat smaller-scale seismic catastrophe can occur at one site or another, it is necessary to study the geological situation in a radius of no less than 300-500 kilometers, and sometimes even wider. Meanwhile, since the charting of map OSR-78 the inflexible certainty has been reinforced and is very steadfastly maintained in the minds of most specialists, particularly in the Union republics, that work on overall seismic zoning should begin and be done in the basic stage precisely in the republics, and in an extreme case—in groups of neighboring republics (seismically active regions). As mentioned, the existing map was compiled on the basis of precisely this principle. A narrow republic view of tectonics made it impossible to "notice" the connection of the geological structures of northern Armenia with a powerful, extensive and very active seismic generating structure going far beyond the borders of the republic—and the corresponding danger zone did not appear on the map. I am certain that a new

map should be compiled according to a single methodology, in a single document, by a single collective, which would include representatives with equal rights from both republic and territorial, as well as central geological and geophysical scientific institutes. Any other path will lead us to new mistakes—basically mistakes of the “missing the mark” type.

Furthermore, general civilian construction calls for refining the seismic danger in a settlement by way of so-called seismic microzoning. Somewhat simplistically, one could say that the point of this work is to indicate sectors with bad, average, and good ground. For average ground, the intensity of a possible earthquake corresponding to the OSR map is accepted as the calculated intensity, for bad ground it is rated a point higher, and for good—a point lower. It should be said that the methodology which we have developed for seismic microzoning is not bad on the whole. It was used to study the possibilities of building many cities, including Leninakan. However, unfortunately, builders have not always listened to the opinion of seismologists. In particular, several structures in Leninakan, including residential buildings, were erected in places not recommended for construction according to the seismic microzoning scheme. The consequences, it goes without saying, were sad. However, failure to observe these recommendations only to a small degree explains the scale of the destruction of modern buildings in Leninakan. We must dig more deeply for reasons.

In doing work on microzoning, an essential question arose long ago, around which the debates have not subsided for years: to what extent does the estimate of the level of seismic danger, taken from a small-scale OSR map (“initial seismicity”), correspond to the real conditions of this settlement? Attempts to answer this led several years ago to the formation of a new trend in estimating seismic danger—detailed seismic zoning. It entails the study of territories adjacent to the seat where the threat of the destruction of buildings is greater. In this respect, special features of the bedding of seats, the nature of their seismic radiation, as well as the weakening of tremors along the path from the seats to the site, are explained. Consequently, the expected seismic influences (type of vibrations, their spectra, duration, and other parameters) are becoming known beforehand.

Recently, detailed seismic zoning became mandatory only in assessing the seismic danger of sites for AES and GES, and at that, in shortened form and artificially compressed time periods. For other important structures (for example, large chemical combines and new cities) neither the departments, the republics, nor the state on the whole have found the resources. It should be noted that essentially uncalled-for research work has begun to die out and that improvements of methods for detailed zoning have come to an end.

Here is how the Spitak earthquake took place. Several settlements were inside the 10-point epicenter zone.

Spitak was in the 9-point zone, and Stepanavan, Kirovakan, and Leninakan were in the 8-point zone. The fact that the force of the earthquake in the vicinity of Leninakan did not exceed 8 points is unquestionable. Moreover, it was about 7 points only 10 kilometers south of the city. Stepanavan and Kirovakan, incidentally, are located closer to the epicenter than Leninakan and suffered noticeably less, but the warped quarters of Leninakan looked like a monstrous absurdity, an awe-inspiring deviation from the permitted level, a frightening phantasmagoria against the background of its near vicinity. Why? The answer to this question proved to be rather difficult. First, the investigation of the destruction in Leninakan was done hastily, in parallel not only with rescue work, but also with work to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake. This work, in proportion to its development, strongly distorted the initial picture of the destruction. For precisely this reason, the data obtained in the very first days is most significant for evaluating the intensity. These are the data of the Uzbek specialist A. Dzhurayev, the macroseismic group from MSSSS led by G.L. Golinskiy, and partly of the author of this article. What was especially characteristic of these data? Above all, it is obvious that the old, short buildings in the city held up approximately the same as in nearby villages. Old and short... The modern, multi-story buildings revealed a frightening picture. Modern, multi-story... At various meetings in Yerevan, the thought was repeatedly expressed that some of the destroyed buildings, specially selected, ought to be kept for detailed scientific investigation. Our arguments went unheeded—in many cases the investigation of buildings had to be done literally under the nose of a bulldozer.

The second complicating circumstance was the fact that in Leninakan, where the specialized Institute of Geophysics and Engineering Seismology is located, we did not receive a single time-scanned recording of the Spitak earthquake, although, after all, a network of so-called engineering seismometric stations had been installed there. Each of these consisted of several instruments for recording accelerations in strong vibrations, set up in basements and on several floors of tall buildings. In terms of the number of such stations, Leninakan was probably one of the most well-equipped cities in the seismically active southern USSR. Was this network functioning before the earthquake? How many instruments were turned on at the moment of the tremor and recorded the earthquake? We will never, apparently, find out, because today we do not have even a single recording in our hands. Really, not even one? Really, not even two or three cassettes were successfully removed from the ruins? Were they charged? If they were charged, did they light up? There is no answer.

Our only hope was for an analysis of the damage to the buildings. They can collapse for three reasons: if a strong tremor slashes or stretches the supports of a building, its connection to the foundation; if strong deformations of the ground and distortions of the foundation occur beneath it; and if the building sways in time to the

vibrations of the ground and the amplitude of its vibrations are greater than permitted by the strength of the structure. Such analysis was not completely done in Leninakan, primarily due to rescue work. Everyone knows that there is not enough heavy equipment or basic organization for the first days after an earthquake. Most frequently the dismantled parts of the buildings and the fragments of construction parts were not taken away, but piled in a heap along with the ruins. The basements and foundations were not uncovered even to the end—the uninvestigated remnants of buildings were often leveled to the ground with explosives and bulldozers. Under these conditions, the reasons for the collapse of specific buildings remained unclear in many cases.

However, valuable information in being collected in the course of the scrupulous and serious work that the building engineers from scientific research and design institutes in Alma-Ata and Moscow, Tbilisi and Yerevan, and other cities in our country have been conducting in Leninakan for many months already. It was noted that the majority of destroyed buildings in the city collapsed without leaning strongly to the side. This means that the basic vibrations in Leninakan, far from the epicenter, were vertically oriented. An opinion is widely held to the effect that buildings with basements under other equivalent conditions have withstood seismic effects far better than those without basements. Consequently, we must study how the foundations behave and what the role of the residual deformations of the ground below them was. Actually, something else is happening. Under the hypnosis of the proclaimed 2-year time period for restoring the city, not only worthless, but even fairly well-preserved buildings are being hastily demolished, sectors are being developed, and projects are being approved—as a rule, not much different from the previous, hasty construction.

This haste makes a painful impression. I was shaken by the fact which Colonel-General K.M. Vertelov, deputy chairman of a state committee, recalled in an interview: during the expert analysis of a building under construction in Dilizhan, where work after the earthquake had already commenced, the same scandalous violations relating to the quality of construction—unwelded panel joints, intolerably low mortar quality, and so forth—were discovered. Really, has the main cause of the mass destruction of buildings in Leninakan—the quality of work—already been forgotten?! What if this had been discovered only after an earthquake! It can be boldly asserted that the builders themselves, and the leaders of the republic (and also the Union) Gosstroy, as well as the former leaders of the republic, knew full well that Armenia was threatened by a severe earthquake. After all, only 3 and a half months after the catastrophe a literally heart-rending article by F. Nakhshkaryan, "Crack," appeared in the republic press, in which the author with pain and, furthermore, with excellent knowledge of the matter, related how intolerably badly housing construction is being done in Armenia. It is obvious to anyone who read this article and was at the ruins of

Leninakan that those who stole cement and did not weld the armature joints are guilty of the destruction of the city and its residents. This is the unavoidable truth. However, is it the whole truth? No, it turns out. Right now, scientists must attentively discuss two additional assumptions. First, it is necessary to make sure that the practice of earthquake-proof design provides a sufficient reserve of strength for the building and thereby protects it from destruction during a small excess of the calculated point rating. Second, it should be verified whether or not some sort of unconsidered natural factor existed in Leninakan.

Seismologists have suspected for a long time that on small areas of the Earth's surface a local intensifications of vibrations can arise. It is thought, however, that this is a typical effect of the epicenter zone and that it appears in places where the seat comes close to the surface or is even on it. This was precisely the case in the 1983 Kum-Dag earthquake in Turkmenia. There, the seat emerged on the surface in the form of a crack which crossed the territory of the town of Kum-Dag. The force of the tremors in the town was 7 points, and only in a narrow strip several tens of meters wide did the intensity of the vibrations reach 8 points, and in the crack zone itself—9 points.

The picture was different in Leninakan. The seat of the earthquake did not come close to the city, and secondary seats did not arise near Leninakan—the independent results of Soviet-French and American observations attest to this quite definitively. The established picture of 8-point damage to short old buildings and the sharply contrasting damage to tall buildings, for which the official assessment of the intensity exceeds 10 points, characterizes the territory of the city on the whole. Considering that for a short building the resonance period (period of the building's own vibrations) is 0.2-0.3 seconds, but approaches 1 second for tall buildings, a seismologist should, taking the above into account, have concluded that on the territory of a site of about 5 by 10 kilometers during the earthquake, very strong vertical vibrations arose with a period of 1-1.5 seconds. Nothing of the sort was noted in the central part of Mexico City in the 19 September 1985 earthquake. In our country's territory, this effect is being observed (or at least recognized) for the first time. Can it be explained from the positions of modern seismology?

Studies done in March-April of this year by V.I. Khalaturin and V.V. Shteynberg, associates at our institute, showed that a thick 400-meter lens of dense clays, bedded beneath Leninakan, actually possess the property of concentrating within themselves and sharply increasing vibrations with periods on the order of 1-2 seconds. Unfortunately, this means that the present-day territory of Leninakan is just about the worst from the viewpoint of seismic conditions, compared to many other areas located in the vicinity.

It comes out that the decision to rebuild the destroyed city in 2 years was hasty and ill-considered. Like many

others, it was made without a thorough discussion with specialists and, mainly, before completing even the first stage of the scientific studies. Meanwhile, the most prominent Soviet specialists in seismology and earthquake-proof construction have been working in Leninakan since December. No one in the leadership, even on the republic level, has absorbed a basic idea into his head yet: let the scientists work and argue, and then gather them and listen to their advice and considerations directly, without translation through academic and other authorities. As a result, Leninakan is being built almost on the old, dangerous site and ever more valuable hectares of arable land are being used to construct buildings. However, it would be far more economical to invest additional (admittedly, large) funds to develop the "inconvenient" sectors on basalt outcroppings. The investments would nonetheless be returned: first (and rapidly), by saving on earthquake-proof construction costs (after all, one can build on basalt on the basis of 8 or even 7 points), and second, by restoring the resulting territory near and partially on the site of the former Leninakan for agricultural use. Meanwhile the traditional (alas!) disdain for science, the neglected possibility of practically discussing the optimal ways from the viewpoint of science for restoring the cities and villages of Armenia, will lead and has already led to the repetition of mistakes in planning, design and construction.

What are the results? No, it is too soon to summarize results. Serious scientific work to study the Spitak seat and its manifestations on the surface is only beginning. Today we do not know what will threaten the lives and property of our country's residents in the near future. We only know that, unfortunately, there are no guarantees against natural disasters. The purpose of this article is to help the great army of party and administrative leaders in local areas realize the need to choose between a passive expectation of trouble and a guided, a directed system of action long before a catastrophe suddenly strikes. We must think about and create a structure of public readiness for extreme situations, develop local scenarios for possible natural calamities, conduct training, primarily in schools, PTUs, tekhnikums, and VUZs, and create monetary and other material aid funds. We should no longer tolerate the ineffective pile-up of various decisions—calm or hysterical, considered beforehand or chosen at random, necessary or harmful. The mistakes and crimes of Spitak and Leninakan are scandalous. Let us learn from mistakes, so as not to make new ones.

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PAGES OF HISTORY

Reminiscences by Participants in the October Revolution

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[Materials prepared by S. Petrov, senior scientific associate, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and V. Startsev, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] We may think that we know everything about the October Revolution. It was precisely in the study of the October Revolution that the Soviet historians took a major step forward after the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses. The best scientific publications of the end of the 1960s provide the truest possible picture of the political struggle waged by the parties, and the clashes of opinion within the Bolshevik Party itself on the question of power and the uprising. The falsehood of the theory of the "two leaders" of the October Revolution was exposed and J.V. Stalin was assigned a modest but realistic place in the leadership of the October armed uprising in Petrograd, consistent with the facts. V.I. Lenin was described as being the only inspirer and leader of the October Revolution. Nonetheless, at that time the entire truth could not be written. Only Sverdlov and Dzerzhinskiy, among the party leadership, could be mentioned alongside Lenin. Errors had to be found to have been committed by all other participants in the struggle for seizing power by the bolsheviks, which had predetermined their membership in the opposition of the 1920s and the anti-Soviet "conspiracies" of the 1930s. Today an end has been put to this.

Following are the recollections of those who, together with Lenin, headed the offensives in Petrograd and Moscow and participated in the first victorious proletarian uprising. Taking into consideration the restraints of a journal article, only three reminiscences have been chosen. The first is that of S.S. Pestkovskiy on the seizure of the Central Telegraph facility in Petrograd and the first days of the revolution. "My goodness, so what!" a reader may say. "Memoirs by Pestkovskiy may be found in virtually any collection of memoirs about the October Revolution!" This may be true but is not all. It is precisely a comparison between the first publication in the journal *PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA* for 1922 (which we reprint here) and subsequent publications that would indicate how mercilessly the editorial pencils deleted, in the 1930s, the 50s, the 60s and even the 80s (!) entire segments and topics if they made mention of Bukharin, Trotsky or Stalin. Yet these memoirs are unique. The occupation of the telegraph building was the first "offensive" operation of the Petrograd Military-Revolutionary Committee. Let me point out that historians are arguing as to when the uprising began. Did it begin on the morning of 24 October, when the RSDWP(b) Central Committee and the VRK decided to disobey the order of the Provisional Government on closing down the central organ of the bolsheviks, the newspaper *RABOCHIY PUT* and to reopen the printing press, or else in the evening, when actually the occupation of government and public buildings by the armed forces of the VRK began. Pestkovskiy's memoirs confuse both. They confuse the "morning people" because the actual occupation of the telegraph building occurred only after 5:00 p.m.; they confuse the "evening people" because by 2:00 p.m. Pestkovskiy had already received the order to do so. However, life has never followed charts.

The story of the way Pestkovskiy found himself a job with Trotsky at the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs or with Menzhinskiy at the People's Commissariat of Finance, or else decided to join the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and to set up a commissariat for Stalin, consisting of one desk and one associate, is typical and filled with gentle humor. It was those live details that were being deleted, above all.

The second of the documents reproduced here is of a somewhat different genre. It is a record of the speech, of the oral recollections of N.I. Bukharin. Probably Nikolay Ivanovich himself looked over the text before submitting it to the journal PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, correcting, deleting or else adding something. This may be. Nonetheless, the printed pages bring to us Bukharin's live voice. In reading these lines, it is as though one can see him on the rostrum, imagining his personal and character features. One of the compilers of the publication which follows has long been familiar with this source. He quoted it in 1967 to prove the existence of the 15 September 1917 (here and subsequently the dates given are in the Julian Calendar) RSDWP(b) Central Committee Resolution on preserving only one copy of Lenin's letters, containing the appeal to start preparations for an armed uprising. For until the start of the 1960s, even scientific publications claimed that the Central Committee had decided immediately to disseminate Lenin's letters among the party organizations and that it was only Kamenev who had asked for their destruction.

There could not even be a question of publishing in full Bukharin's recollections, even during the "thaw" which followed the 20th Party Congress. Today the reader can assess for himself the sincerity and frankness of Bukharin's story of disagreements between the majority of the Central Committee and Lenin in September 1917 and we find here the important testimony of Nikolay Ivanovich of the events in the July and October days of 1917 in Moscow. Today Bukharin or Trotsky are frequently assessed on the basis of such matters. Would it not be best, however, to begin by reading their works?

In this connection we submit to the reader a third document. In 1927 Istpart distributed among many active participants in the October events a "Survey of the Participants in the October Coup d'etat." The survey was received by L.D. Trotsky as well. Long gone were those October days when, as Bukharin said, all bolsheviks felt the happiness, joy and unparalleled upsurge of the time of their seizure of power. Ten years previously Trotsky had been member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, chairman of the Bolshevik Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and, as voted at the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets, people's commissar for foreign affairs in the first Soviet government. Now, in 1927, he was defeated. He was part of the minority of renegades who had abandoned the party's general line followed by the majority of the Politburo headed by Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy and others. For the past 4 years Trotsky had struggled

against Stalin and his circle, each time surrendering one position after another, losing friends, supporters and temporary fellow travelers. He had just lost L.B. Kamenev and G.Ye. Zinovyev.

Under those circumstances, already deprived of the opportunity to speak out publicly, Trotsky decided to make use of this unexpected opportunity and to answer the Istpart survey. He wrote an entire pamphlet in which he once again analyzed his differences with Stalin's faction. After completing the work, Trotsky sent it with a special accompanying note to D.B. Ryazanov, director of the Marx and Engels Institute. He did not expect it to be published but asked Ryazanov to preserve it as an important document on party history. Trotsky published it in 1932 in a book entitled "*The Stalinist School of Falsifications*," which came out in Berlin. We include here only part of the answers to the survey, directly related to the 1917 events. They could be considered as some kind of memoirs. Trotsky forgot a few things or had some inaccuracies (which we mention in the notes). Essentially, however, the content of the document corresponds to the truth.

S. Pestkovskiy. On the October Days in Petersburg

On the night of the 23rd the Provisional Government ordered the closing down of PUT PRAVDY. We decided to disobey and, at 6:00 a.m., on the 24th, our military organization sent a patrol from the Volynskiy Regiment to protect the editorial premises against "all encroachments."

At 2:00 p.m., on the same day, during the busiest time when the newly arrived delegates to the congress were registering, Comrade Dzerzhinskiy ran up to me with a paper in his hand:

"You and Comrade Leshchinskiy are ordered to occupy the main telegraph building. Here is the mandate of the Military-Revolutionary Committee, which appoints you telegraph commissar. Go now."

"How are we to take the telegraph?" I asked.

"The guards come from the Keksgolm Regiment, which is on our side," Dzerzhinskiy answered.

I asked no more questions. At first the assignment did not seem to me all that difficult, for I was the head of our postal and telegraph cell in Peter and I knew almost all of our bolsheviks. I located Comrade Leshchinskiy and the two of us took off. Neither of us had a revolver. In the car, there developed in both of us a strange painful tension: there it was, this decisive offensive by the proletariat, which we had awaited for decades. How would it end? Would there be yet another defeat?

The bitter experience of the July events did not make us fully confident of victory.

We decided to act as follows: the telegraph commandant (from the Provisional Government) was personally

known to Leshchinskiy, who was then a menshevik-internationalist and now a communist, Staff Captain Longva. We were to enter into negotiations with him and gain his support. Then we would make an agreement with our cell and immediately undertake "the seizure."

Matters developed somewhat differently. Comrade Longva, "without having a directive from his own organization," refused us his cooperation but promised only "not to interfere." At the conference with the cell we determined that among the entire personnel of the telegraph, 3,000 employees, there was not a single bolshevik and there was only one left-wing S.R., Khaurov. All of our comrades were employed not at the telegraph but the post office. We summoned the left-wing S.R. Khaurov: He told us that most of the officials were very hostile to the bolsheviks.

The situation was quite difficult. However, Comrade Lyubovich came from Smolnyy to our help. He was a telegraph operator by training and was familiar with telegraph procedures. The three of us together felt stronger and went to discuss the matter with the guards.

The guards, headed by one ensign, having seen the mandate of the Military-Revolutionary Committee, promised us their assistance. It was then, on 24 October, at about 5:00 p.m. that the three of us, accompanied by the chief of the guards, entered the main hall of the telegraph, approached the chairman of the union of postal and telegraph officials Mr. King (a right-wing S.R.) and informed him that we were occupying the telegraph. King told us that he would throw us out. At that point Comrade Lyubovich summoned two Keksgolm soldiers and positioned them near the switchboard.

The women telegraph employees began to scream and a commotion developed. The representatives of the "committee" held a consultation and decided on a compromise: they agreed "for a commissar to be in the hall," providing that we would remove the soldiers from the hall.

We agreed. I "settled" by the telegraph while Lyubovich went to "reinforce" the guard and Leshchinskiy occupied the little room of the faction, in the neighboring home, "in reserve."

By 8:00 p.m. the Keksgolm soldiers were relieved by a guard sent by the special commander of the Petrograd District, consisting of military school cadets. The Keksgolm guards, "indoctrinated" by Lyubovich, said that they wanted to continue to occupy the telegraph building.

The cadets left....

During the night the building neighboring the Petersburg Telegraph Agency was occupied by Comrade Stark with 12 seamen, commanded by my old friend from exile in London—the seaman Ivan Savin.²

It was quite reassuring to have the seamen for our neighbors, for the Keksgolm soldiers were not all that

trustworthy. During the night the cadets showed up once again. The seamen ordered them "front left, march!" and once again they left.

On the next day, until the evening, nothing particular happened. I did not leave the telegraph agency. I did not even wish to sleep all that much. Lyubovich, who was in touch with Smolnyy, informed me that during that day we had occupied the main government establishments and had laid siege on the Winter Palace.

That night Comrade Zof came to see me from Smolnyy, bearing the famous manifesto of the Council of People's Commissars, signed by Comrade Lenin, which reported that the Kerenskiy Government had been overthrown and that the Sovnarkom had been formed. It was ordered that the manifesto be telegraphed to the "local areas." This was a very difficult task. The manifesto had to be printed in no less than 100 copies and the telegraph officials refused to execute my orders.

Comrade Solovyev, minister of posts and telegraphs, came to my assistance. He showed me where the rotaprint was located and I forced a youngster to print the appeal. I then had to write by hand on each leaflet the name of the city to which the manifesto was to be sent. Solovyev gave it to the telegraph operators.

By morning the manifesto had been transmitted to all guberniya and industrial centers and the seats of the various Army headquarters.

The cadet uprising broke out on the 28th.³ On the other hand, Kerenskiy with Krasnov were advancing on Peter. The telegraph personnel, feeling the rising "force," themselves increased their sabotage.

The cadets seized the telephone station on Morskaya, not far from our telegraph. We prepared ourselves for defense. We could rely only on the seamen, for the Keksgolm soldiers appeared afraid.

From time to time a cadet armored vehicle fired at our Pochtamtskiy Alley. The seamen organized an ambush, hiding behind piles of wood on Isaakiyevskaya Square. Eventually, they were able to damage the tires of the armored car. It stopped. The seamen attacked. Two of them fell but the armored car was seized. Two of the four cadets in it were killed and the other two were captured.

Lyubovich and I decided to raise a Keksgolm regiment to retake the telephone station and went to the barracks. After long discussions the regiment agreed to act "if an armored car would come from Smolnyy." We sent to Smolnyy a "courier" for an armored car. Before it arrived the seamen and the Red Guards recaptured the telephone station.

On the night of that same day (28 October)⁴ I decided to ask Moscow what was the situation there. I sent the following note: "Moscow, Sovdep. Here in Peter we have dealt with the cadets' uprising. What is your situation? Telegraph Commissar Pestkovskiy."

Several hours later I received the answer: "Things are not too good. They have the cadets and artillery; we are considering a compromise. Smirnov."

Considering the importance of this note, I decided to take it personally to Smolnyy. I demanded a postal car. The driver refused to drive: it was still dark and there was occasional shooting. I borrowed a pistol from someone and ordered the driver to drive. At the entrance to Smolnyy I encountered Krylenko. He told me that reinforcements were being sent to Moscow: seamen, armored cars....

I went up. In one of the rooms I saw Ya.M. Sverdlov, sleeping on a bench. I woke him up and showed him the note. He too calmed me down, confirming Krylenko's words. Out of curiosity, I went also to "headquarters" where comrades Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Podvoyskiy and Mekhonoshin were. Trotsky, it seemed, was engaged precisely in drafting the famous order to the Petrograd Proletariat.

Ilich astounded me with his calm. Having come to headquarters, I also decided to see Smolnyy, which I had not seen since I had been sent to the telegraph. I came across a suspicious-looking room on the lower floor. Some kind of "private conference" was taking place there in the presence of Kamenev, Zinovyev, Ryazanov and a couple of other people whom I do not remember. They were discussing the need "to reach an agreement with the others."

Kamenev left and a few minutes later came dragging behind him the sweating Kamkov. I immediately realized what was the matter and hastily withdrew and returned to the telegraph building.⁵

Several days later I was released from the telegraph by Dzerzhinskiy.

I decided to look for something to do. I was initially offered a membership in the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Posts. However, I no longer left any liking to do something I did not understand.

I decided to see Trotsky and to apply for a job at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. I thought as follows: "I am an old party man and I know foreign languages, this should suffice." I found Trotsky and presented him with my request. Trotsky entirely agreed with the "substantive nature" of my application but also said: "It would be a pity to put you to such work. I already have Polivanov and Zalkind. It is not worth gathering here more of the old comrades. I personally have taken this job only to have more time for party work. My job is small: to publish the secret treaties and to close down the store." Although I was amazed at such a simplistic view of the tasks of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs I did not argue.

I then went to see Ilich to offer my services. Ilich heard me attentively, smiled when I told him of Trotsky's views on the tasks of his commissariat, and said:

"Unquestionably, we shall have a job for you. We are awaiting Rykov from Moscow, who will be the people's commissar of internal affairs. Wait for his arrival and we will definitively find you a job." I decided to "wait." I first sat down in the hall, on a bench, not far from Ilich's office. The place was quite convenient for purposes of observation. Various people, both from Peter or from the outside, went to see Ilich in his office. Soon afterwards, however, this method of waiting began to bore me and I opened the door to the room which was opposite Ilich's office and went in.

The room was quite big. In one corner, behind a small desk, Comrade N.P. Gorbunov, Sovnarkom secretary, was at work. At another desk comrades Zalkind and Polivanov were interrogating a recently detained high official of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Elsewhere, half lying on a sofa, looking tired, was Comrade Menzhinskiy. The inscription above the sofa read: "People's Commissariat of Finance."

I approached Menzhinskiy and engaged him in conversation. In a most innocent way Comrade Menzhinskiy asked me about my past and wanted to know what I had studied.

I answered that, among others, I had attended London University where, in addition to other sciences, I had read finances.

All of a sudden Menzhinskiy rose, bore through me with his eyes and categorically said:

"In that case we shall make you manager of the state bank."

I became frightened and answered him that I had absolutely no desire whatsoever to hold that position, for this was totally "out of my bailiwick." Saying nothing, Menzhinskiy asked me simply to wait and left the room. After a while he came back with a piece of paper which read, under Lenin's signature, that I was indeed the manager of the state bank.

I became even more frightened and asked Menzhinskiy to annul this resolution. He remained inflexible. He then explained the situation to me. The point was that we desperately needed money, even if only a few million. The state bank and the treasury were on strike and there was no "legal" way of obtaining money. Finances, however, are a delicate thing, for which reason formalities must be observed. The only way was to replace the "head" of the bank and then take the money.

Having heard what my main task was, I calmed down somewhat. Soon afterwards, Menzhinskiy and I began to put together an expedition to the bank. We prepared ourselves thoroughly. In order to strengthen "my position" in the bank, Comrade Sokolnikov was appointed member of the bank's council. Furthermore, we were accompanied by Comrade Podvoyskiy, who had ordered in advance that one battalion of seamen be "moved up"

to the bank building to relieve the guards protecting it, who were from the Semenov Regiment.

On arrival at the bank, we saw a situation which reminded me of my stay at the telegraph building. Officials were pressing down the halls: from that crowd various "little words" were hurled at us. We went straight to the manager's office. We found there the bank council, complete with the exception of the manager, Mr. Shipov. The council was a handful of "honorable elders," in front of whom I felt like a student taking a test. With a firm voice Menzhinskiy read the "Declaration of the People's Commissariat of Finance," which stipulated that the employees would stay on their jobs; those who refused would be fired and sent to do their military service at the front. Our declaration was met with hostile shouts. After that, when Menzhinskiy said that Shipov was being removed and that I was appointed in his place, the din increased: the council declared that it was resigning. After arguing for another couple of minutes, all of us retreated.

The only element in the state bank who showed some support and sympathy for us were the couriers and the low-ranking officials.

We left the bank and returned to Smolnyy having achieved nothing. This initial start discouraged me to such an extent that once again I began to pressure Menzhinskiy to relieve me from such an unbearable burden. Two days later Menzhinskiy yielded: Comrade V.V. Osinskiy was appointed bank manager in my stead.

Having ended my "financial" career, once again I started thinking about where to go. Having severely considered my situation, I reached the conclusion that other than foreign affairs, the only department suitable for me would be the Commissariat of Nationalities. "I myself am a foreigner," I thought, "and consequently I will not have that kind of great Russian nationalism which is harmful for work in that commissariat. Furthermore, I have some notions about the national problem." Having decided to follow this new line, I went to see Stalin.

"Comrade Stalin," I said, "are you the People's Commissar of Nationalities Affairs?"

"I am."

"Do you have a commissariat?"

"No."

"Well, I shall 'make you' a commissariat."

"Very well! What do you need for that?"

"For the time being, only a mandate 'to render assistance'."

"Fine!"

At that point Stalin, who did not like any unnecessary speeches, walked to the Sovnarkom's Administration of Affairs and several minutes later with returned with a

mandate. Armed with the mandate, I started looking in Smolnyy for a place for the People's Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs.

The task was difficult, for everything was crowded. Finally, I came to a big room where, around one little desk, the following were in session: the "commission" on material supplies of the Red Guards; around another desk permits were being issued for the right to bear arms. Here I suddenly came across my hard-labor comrade who, subsequently, died on the Western front, Comrade Feliks Senyuta.

"What are you doing here?" I asked.

"I am working on ordnance for the Red Guards."

"Transfer yourself to us, to the People's Commissariat of Nationalities."

"Very well."

"Can we 'settle' in this room?"

"Naturally."

It was here that I and the now deceased Senyuta found a free desk and placed it against the wall. Then Senyuta took a big sheet of paper on which he drew the words "People's Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs," and affixed it on the wall above the desk. We found two chairs.

"The commissariat is ready!" I exclaimed.

We immediately rushed back to Ilich's office where, lacking his own office, was Stalin.

"Comrade Stalin," I said. "Go take a look at your commissariat." The imperturbable Stalin did not show any amazement at such a fast "organization" and followed me down the hall to the "commissariat."

It was there that I recommended Comrade Senyuta to him, describing him as "chief of office" of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs.

Stalin agreed, looked around the "commissariat" and made a kind of vague sound, something between approval and displeasure, and retraced his steps back to Ilich's office. I went to the city to order forms and a seal. I paid for the forms and the seal using all my money and Comrade Senyuta's funds. I decided to see Stalin.

"Comrade Stalin," I said, "we do not even have a penny."

I knew that the "withdrawal" from the bank had still not taken place.

"How much do you need?" Stalin asked.

"To begin with, a thousand rubles."

"Come in an hour."

When I showed up, 1 hour later, Stalin ordered me "to borrow" from Trotsky 3,000 rubles.

"He has money, he found it in the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

I went to see Trotsky, gave him a proper receipt for 3,000 rubles and received the money.

To the best of my knowledge, to this day the People's Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs has not repaid Trotsky this loan.

At one point, this was on 5 or 6 November, Stalin met me in the hall. He was holding some paper in his hand.⁶

"Do we have a typist at the commissariat?" he asked.

"No!" I answered. "Furthermore, so far we have not needed one. We have been using an acquaintance of mine, a typist from the Council of Factory-Plant Committees."

"In that case find a reliable typist and have her type his paper. I need 12 copies. This is strictly confidential."

I took the paper. It was the famous address by the Central Committee majority to the "minority." It read: "Either obey the majority or leave!" The appeal was signed by 15 members of the Central Committee.

I started thinking. The typist from the factory-plant committees, whom I had used so far, sympathized with the mensheviks. She should not be given such a paper to transcribe. I started looking around Smolnyy and came across Mekhonoshin.

Comrade Mekhonoshin! Do you happen to have a reliable typist?"

"I do not have a reliable female typist but I have a male typist."

"Let me have him!"

Mekhonoshin took me to a kind of bearded individual in military uniform, sitting behind a typewriter.

I dictated the paper to him. Having printed 12 copies, I took all of them to Comrade Stalin.

This paper drew my attention to "our differences." Since I did not hope to find out anything from the silent Stalin, I decided to ask the first member of the Central Committee who came my way.

The next day, in the morning, I came across Muranov at the entrance to Smolnyy.

"How are our differences?" I asked him.

Muranov waved his hand.

"Our trouble," he said, "is not that we have many Marxists. What is bad is that we have too many Marx's."

That is all that I could find out about the "split."

New and pressing problems came up every day, in such numbers that I soon stopped being interested in the split. With every passing day the power of the Soviets was strengthening.

PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA No 10, 1922, pp 94-104.

From Comrade Bukharin's Speech at the Evening of Reminiscences in 1921

I would like to share with you a few events and pictures which depict quite lively the course of our revolution in the few months preceding the month of October and then that which took place precisely during the October days in Moscow, where I happened to be on party assignment. Comrades, if any one of you can remember what the situation was in the July days of 1917, he cannot forget (particularly if he is a Muscovite) the demonstration we made when we received the news of the semi-uprising in Petrograd. I remember this. The Moscow Committee sent me to one of the Moscow suburbs to attend a meeting. I am very bad in practical matters and I spent an extraordinarily long time walking down the tracks looking for the right car. Finally, with great difficulty I found a car which was going either to Kolomna or Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Suddenly, Comrade Amosov rushed to me saying, "Comrade Bukharin, you are being urgently summoned." She did not know why but said that something unusual, extraordinary had happened. I was extremely puzzled; after looking for such a long time for the right coach, all of a sudden I was told to forget it. I left the coach and came across Logashin, a comrade from the military organization, who happily said: "Apparently it has started, it has started in Petersburg," rubbing his hands. Finally, I realized what had started, I also realized that we too had to start doing something.

I rushed to the Moscow Committee and there we started rushing around from one office to another. There was an uprising in Petersburg. We decided to do something. The Moscow Soviet Executive Committee gathered. At that time we were still a minority in it, although a worker section had already been set up and our bolshevik part was growing exceptionally rapidly. However, without saying it, the menshevik section continued to behave as though it wanted to detain us. Rudnev and Isuv spoke for the S.R. It was clear to us that something reactionary would develop here. The supporters of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT⁷ were talking about locking each other up. I delivered the following speech which I remember almost word for word:

"You may wish to crack the whip but we will nonetheless answer with bullets. This is our international obligation and you cannot make us forget it."

The moment was exceptionally tragic. Today we can recall all this with a happy laughter but at that time the situation was exceptionally tragic.

We issued the proper order and then started the armed demonstration. We were in a strong position in the Khodynskiy Garrison and among a significant portion of the working class. Having called for an armed demonstration, we sat in the editorial premises of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, where we began to receive telephone calls informing us that a crowd of "blacks" were advancing toward the premises to wreck SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. At that time, in general, reactionary meetings were being held, partially supported by the S.R. and the mensheviks. Our virgins started rushing around. We decided to defend to a certain extent the honor of our bolshevik uniform and our banner. We left whatever defense forces we could in the editorial premises and came out on the square. What we saw was a reflection of the political mood which was felt at that time in Moscow. Very few of us rallied on the square but the public around us was reactionary, all of them against us, gathered in exceptionally large numbers. Raising our flag we stood surrounded by the crowd. The tense situation went on. A major clash was obvious. Suddenly, as though ordered, all those present began to holler, whistle and pull their tongue. I had never before heard such beastly howling and whistling. This was followed by a skirmish. At about the same time, at a meeting at the Serpukhovo Gate a citizen started saying that Lenin was a spy. A.I. Rykov went to him and asked him, stammering as usual, "could you tell us, citizen, your name?"

Rykov was pulled down from the rostrum, his shirt was torn and he was taken to the police station and beaten. It was simply by accident that he did not suffer rather severe consequences. He would not have been sitting today as member of the All-Union Sovnarkhoz Presidium had the events been slightly different. There, on the square, the situation was such that we were about to be beaten up most savagely. Only a few of us had weapons. We had no mass forces and our people had still not arrived. Our group consisted exclusively of workers, for at that time there were virtually no intellectuals in the Bolshevik Party. At that time the category of Soviet officials did not exist. There were only two or three intellectuals and the rest were workers. We would have suffered a great deal, for those people were on bicycles. The mensheviks and the entire S.R. Council were watching us from the windows of the building of the Moscow Soviet. They had forbidden us to conduct an armed demonstration but we started showing them the finger at Gubernatorskaya Square. These bicyclists were armed to the teeth and we would have had a hard time had, all of a sudden, at that very moment, our people, wearing soldier's uniforms, not arrived. They were marching in ranks, bearing weapons. Instantaneously the square was cleared and the only people left were we. This provides an entirely clear picture of the deployment at that time of the social forces. The very solid majority of workers and soldiers were for us. Meanwhile, at the Moscow Soviet, the worker section also rapidly grew, whereas we had no supporters at all in the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, for they had not run for elections for

such soviets and there, at the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, there were exclusively feldshers, dentists and other suspicious menshevik-S.R. elements who had nothing in common with the revolution. During the February Revolution as well they had sat it out, digging themselves in and could not be budged. Such was the mood at that time.

Allow me now to draw for you another picture of the period of the "Democratic Conference" in Petersburg....⁸ We move the action to Petersburg. Imagine the Winter Palace and inside Kerenskiy at the time when he, after his failed attempt at the Moscow Conference, where he was met by the entire proletariat with a general strike, while in the Metropoli flunkies and waiters refused to feed the gentlemen there, imagine that same Kerenskiy who had nonetheless organized the moving of representatives of the democratic groups—the holding of a "Democratic Conference" at one of the palaces in Petersburg.

Let me now tell you for the first time a confidential and small story of intraparty nature. At that time Comrade Lenin was in hiding. Prior to the convening of the "Democratic Conference," there was a party meeting held by the Central Committee which had been elected at the 6th Party Congress, when July was almost upon us. We gathered, as I recall, and held the session. At that time the tactics were quite clear. Development of mass agitation and propaganda, charting a course to armed uprising which was expected to break out any day.⁹ When I went there, suddenly Milyutin came to me and said: "You know, Comrade Bukharin, we received a little letter."

The letter read as follows: "You will be considered traitors and rogues if you do not immediately disperse the entire bolshevik faction in factories and plants, if you do not surround the "Democratic Conference" and do not arrest all the scoundrels." The letter was exceptionally violent and threatened us with all sorts of punishments. We were stunned. Until that time no one had raised this question so sharply. No one knew what to do. At first everyone was puzzled. Then, after consulting, we made a decision: perhaps this was the only case in the history of our party when the Central Committee unanimously resolved to burn Comrade Lenin's letter.¹⁰ At that time we did not make this public. Lenin said that then the right was on our side. I say this as proof of the fact that Lenin does not always preach moderation and precision but sometimes errs in a leftist direction.¹¹ At that time we rejected Lenin's demand on the grounds that, although we trusted that, unquestionably, in both Peter and Moscow we would be able to seize the power, we nonetheless believed that in the provinces we would be unable to hold on and that after seizing the power and dispersing the "Democratic Conference," we would be unable to establish our rule over the rest of Russia. However, a typical scene took place at the "Democratic Conference," which clearly revealed the then prevailing mood. After Kerenskiy's speech (after we had rejected the detention of the "Democratic Conference" and the

starting of an immediate uprising), Trotsky spoke. At that time Kerenskiy's entire assembly was surrounded by a patrol of seamen whom Kerenskiy had placed to protect the "Democratic Conference" from possible bolshevik action. I recall as though it was today, the way after his speech, L.D. walked on, followed by me and with the seamen behind us. After we crossed, and the meeting came to an end, those same seamen, placed by Kerenskiy to protect the "Democratic Conference" against us, turned to Trotsky and asked, waving their bayonets: "How soon can we use those?"¹² The greatest support which the Provisional Government had at that time was entirely gravitating toward us and at that time we could have seized power in Petrograd. However, we decided not to do so immediately, for we did not hope for any major success in the provinces.

Now comrades let me pass on to the events as they occurred in those October days in Moscow. At that time I was working in Zamoskvoretskiy Rayon, where our literary offices were located. We were printing leaflets and newspapers for all comrades who were on our side. We felt that absolutely all soldiers and workers were on our side. All that it took was for one of us to show up at a worker meeting and to say a few words to the effect that he was speaking on behalf of the Bolshevik Party, the moment the first syllable, the first three or four letters of the word "bolshevik" would be mentioned, we would be interrupted by thunderous applause. The reputation of our party was so high and the people were so united with us that we were unable to address them. Wherever we went we were in the majority. It was only in the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies that the number of bolsheviks was terribly small. At that time we held a garrison meeting. We held elections at the so-called garrison meeting, attended by all the bolsheviks. The true soldiers were represented at that garrison meeting. Meanwhile, we had already gained an overwhelming majority at the Moscow Soviet of Workers Deputies. Such was the case everywhere, in factories and plants. One could go in and be sure that no one would dare to speak against us. At the Moscow Soviet we pulled the type of stunt of which Moscow could be proud. It was precisely Moscow that issued the first Soviet decree even before there was a Soviet system in Russia.

At that time there was a conflict between the workers and the governments on the subject of recognizing the factory-plant committees. The struggle was stubborn. The Moscow entrepreneurs said quite clearly that if they would yield on this point they would be granting a concession of principle. In a factory in Zamoskvorechye, one of the representatives of the leather manufacturers fell in a tub filled with water (laughter) only because he was unwilling to make a basic concession to the workers and was unwilling to acknowledge the factory-plant committees at a time when it was quite clear that he would have to do so. The people were quite exuberant. They were much more joyful than today, for at that time all of us, bolsheviks, felt as though we had wings and were on the crest of a wave. Wherever we went the

sympathy that welcomed us was such that we moved ahead at a crazy speed. It was then that 2 weeks before the outbreak of military operations the leading group of Moscow bolsheviks, meeting in a private apartment, began to think of slogans. We spent the whole night in Lomov's apartment and, in conclusion, produced virtually nothing. On the next day I went to the Executive Committee to defend myself against the mensheviks who had attacked us. It was at that point that I thought of the factory and plant committees. We submitted to the Executive Committee a motion to arrest the capitalists who do not recognize the factory-plant committees. The mensheviks were disturbed. This was the equivalent of disarming someone. They said something which nobody could understand but in any case they defeated us at the Executive Committee because they were in the majority. We then called a meeting of the Moscow Soviet. You can imagine that there we were welcome with applause and incredible enthusiasm, when we submitted this plan to the worker masses. There was applause the moment we mentioned that if the capitalists are unwilling to recognize the factory-plant committees we shall arrest them. This created a great deal of excitement on the part of the workers who welcomed this suggestion quite expansively. The following day all bourgeois newspapers, RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI and others expressed their amazement. The worker masses (despite the arguments of all mensheviks who raised all kinds of unexpected arguments, such as where are you going to keep those capitalists? How will you arrest them?) were enthused by this project. Now this is laughable (applause).

On the following day, in the name of the Moscow Soviet, Decree No 1 was promulgated.¹³ Therefore, we had entirely firm support. All soldiers and workers were with us, with the exception of a very small handful of highly skilled workers such as the print setters at the Sytinskaya Printing Press who, among others, had to be persuaded and prevailed upon. They were unwilling to print our proclamations and, subsequently, with the help of our Red Guards, we took over this printing press during the fighting.

In the large worker districts, such as Zamoskvoretskiy, the entire fighting was short and sporadic, for there the workers were kings. No member of the bourgeoisie could go there. At that time I lived in Zamoskvorechye. The inscription on my apartment read: "Bukharin, bolshevik," but no one dared to object. Naturally, this was the greatest possible stupidity on the part of the bourgeoisie that they did not finish us off at that time. However, that is all over now. In fact, at that time there was such great sympathy for us among the workers that there was no serious opponent other than those cadets and some students and civilian militia who acted as the garrison and were the main armed group. All the soldiers and workers were on our side. No one could deny this, and that is the reason why our victory was so easy. If we compare our work, even in Moscow, where the struggle was so stubborn, with what took place in Germany, our casualties in the battles were a trifle, a drop in the bucket.

Naturally, we had some losses but compared to the cost of the civil war which raged on the streets of the German cities, these were trifles. Why? Because this was the only time when the working class, acting as a working class for the overthrow of a democratic bourgeois government, was so united. It is thanks to that unity that we won. We were carried on the crest of this huge wave because we were followed by all workers and all soldiers.

We are now playing the right game from the viewpoint of further considerations, properly bearing in mind the situation in which we find ourselves. We accurately charted a course but we must not forget that we are now faced with a greater danger than the one which faced us in October 1917. This requires much greater unity, even greater than the one displayed by the people of Dvinsk and the seamen when they stormed the capitalist fortresses. The reason is that all people, the Russian people in particular, can rally quite easily for a heroic upsurge but quite frequently surrender in the face of internal corrosion, in the course of daily petty actions. All of us have an excellent feeling when we chase our opponents off and we are pleased to remember this. At that time life was happier because we could hurl ourselves immediately into the attack. In a matter of a few minutes we take a step in which we either burn up or win everything. Now, we are forced to keep a low fire and, in order to achieve our final objective, we must be quite united not only in instant thrusts. We must maintain our iron ranks in daily work, even work such as the opening labor exchanges. We, communists, must deal with this dirty matter in order to master it and not let it conquer us. To this effect we need ordinary heroism 1,000 times more persistent than in the October days of 1917. That is why on the 5th anniversary of our revolution, when we remember our fallen comrades, when we assess our ranks, when we recall those who are no longer with us, our main wish which must be displayed firmly by all of us is for the next few years not only not to lose our responsiveness to our communist environment but also on each occasion to double, triple and increase tenfold the unity and firmness of our party which alone can ensure the final victory which will be much greater than the victory of October 1917.

PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA No 10, 1922, pp 316-322

From L.D. Trotsky's Answers to the 'Survey of the Participants in the October coup d'etat,' Requested by the VKP(b) Central Committee Istpart

May-October 1917

9. A number of documents which were made public by the bolsheviks in May, June and July 1917 were drafted by me or with my editorial participation. They include the declaration of the bolshevik faction at the Congress of Soviets on the prepared offensive at the front (1st Congress of Soviets), the letter to the Central Executive Committee by the Bolshevik Party Central Committee during the days of the June demonstration, and others. I

have also come across some bolshevik resolutions of that time which were written either by me or with my participation. It is common knowledge among all comrades that in all my speeches at meetings I identified myself with the bolsheviks.

10. Some kind of "Marxist historian" of a new type tried, quite recently, to find differences between me and Lenin on the subject of the July events. Everyone is trying to make his contribution in the hope of a substantial reward. We must surmount the feeling of squeamishness in order to refute such falsifications. I shall not refer to recollections but will cite documents only. In my declaration to the Provisional Government I wrote as follows:

"1. I shared the basic views held by Lenin, Zinovyev and Kamenev and developed it in the journal VPERED and, in general, in all my public speeches.

"My nonparticipation in PRAVDA and nonmembership in the bolshevik organization are explained not by political differences but by the conditions of our party's past which now have become totally meaningless...."

12. Lenin, as we know, hardly suffered from any tolerant trust in people when it was a matter of ideological line or political behavior under difficult circumstances, particularly when it came to revolutionaries who, in the preceding period, had remained outside the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. It was precisely the July events that brought down the final vestiges of the old barriers. In his letter to the Central Committee on the subject of the list of bolshevik candidates for the Constituent Assembly, Vladimir Ilich wrote:

"It is totally inadmissible to have such an excessive number of candidates among untested people who joined our party quite recently (such as Larin).... An emergency review and an amendment of the list are necessary...."

"It is self-evident that... no one would dispute a candidacy, for example, such as Trotsky's for, to begin with, immediately on arrival Trotsky assumed the position of an internationalist; second, he struggled for the merger among the rayons; third, during the difficult July days he proved to be on the level of the tasks and a loyal supporter of the party of the revolutionary proletariat. Clearly, the same cannot be said about the majority of people who became party members only yesterday and who are included in the list."¹⁴

14. On the subject of my participation in the October Revolution, the notes to the 14th volume of Lenin's works read as follows:

"After the Petersburg Soviet passed into the hands of the bolsheviks, (Trotsky) was elected its chairman and as such he organized and headed the 25 October uprising."¹⁵

What is here true and what is false, let Istpart determine, if not the present one then the future one. In any case, I

recent years Comrade Stalin has categorically disputed the accuracy of this claim. Thus, he said:

"I must say that Comrade Trotsky neither played nor could play any particular role in the October uprising for, as chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, he only obeyed the will of the respective party authorities which guided Comrade Trotsky's every step."

He also said:

"Comrade Trotsky, a man relatively new to our party in the October period, did not play or could not play any special role in the party or in the October uprising."¹⁵

It is true that, in this testimony, Stalin forgot that what he himself said on 6 November 1918, i.e., during the 1st anniversary of the coup, when the facts and events were still fresh in everyone's memory. Already then Stalin had started against me that same project which he is so extensively conducting now. At that time, however, he was forced to be much more cautious and covert. Here is what he wrote then in PRAVDA (No 241) under the heading "The Role of the Most Outstanding Party Leaders:

"All work on the practical organization of the uprising took place under the direct guidance of Trotsky, the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. One can confidently say that the fast conversion of the garrison on the side of the soviet and the able organization of the work of the party's Military-Revolutionary Committee are owed above all and mainly to Comrade Trotsky."

These words were by no means a laudatory exaggeration. Conversely, Stalin's objective was the precise opposite: in his article he wanted to "caution" against exaggerating Trotsky's role (which, actually, was the purpose of the article). Today these words sound incredible for they come precisely out of Stalin's mouth. At that time, however, there was no way of saying anything else! It has long been pointed out that the truthful person has the advantage that even if his memory is poor he does not contradict himself, while the disloyal, unconscientious and untruthful person must always remember what he has said in the past in order not to expose himself.

15. With the help of Yaroslavskiy, Comrade Stalin is trying to rewrite the history of the organization of the October coup d'etat, referring to the creation under the Central Committee of a "practical center for the organizational leadership of the uprising," in which, allegedly, Trotsky was not included. Nor was Lenin included in such a commission. That very fact indicates that the commission could have had no more than a subordinate organizational importance. No independent role was played by that commission. The legend of this commission is now being built only because Stalin was a member of it. Here is the membership of the commission: "Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinskiy, Bubnov and Uritskiy."¹⁷ However reluctant I may be to dig into the garbage, allow me, as a very close participant and witness to the events of that time, to indicate the following. Naturally, Lenin's

role does not need any explanation. I met with Sverdlov quite frequently at that time and turned to him for advice and support. Comrade Kamenev who, as we know, at that time held a special position, the erroneousness of which he himself recently acknowledged, was nonetheless participating most actively in the events of the coup. Kamenev and I spent the decisive night of the 25th in the premises of the Military-Revolutionary Committee, answering telephone questions and issuing orders.¹⁸ However much I may be stretching my memory, I am totally unable to answer the question of what, actually, was during those decisive days Stalin's role? Not once did I have to turn to him for advice or assistance. He showed no initiative whatsoever. He made not a single independent suggestion. No "Marxist historians" of the new school could change this.

Necessary Addition

As I said, Stalin and Yaroslavskiy spent a great deal of effort in recent months to prove that the Military-Revolutionary Center created by the Central Committee, consisting of Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritskiy and Dzerzhinskiy, allegedly managed the entire course of the uprising. Stalin comprehensively emphasized the fact that Trotsky was not a member of this center. Alas, as clearly missed by the Stalinist historians, in its 2 November 1927 issue PRAVDA (i.e., after this entire letter was written) published an accurate excerpt from the Central Committee minutes of 16 (29) October 1917. Here is what it said:

"The Central Committee sets up a military-revolutionary center consisting of Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritskiy and Dzerzhinskiy. **This center is part of the Revolutionary Soviet Committee.**"

The Revolutionary Soviet Committee is, precisely, the Military-Revolutionary Committee which was set up by the Petrograd Soviet. No other Soviet authority existed to manage the uprising. Therefore, the five comrades appointed by the Central Committee were to become additionally members of that same Military-Revolutionary Committee, whose chairman was Trotsky. Clearly, there was no reason for Trotsky to become yet once again a member of this organization whose chairman he already was. How difficult, it turns out, it is to correct history by hindsight! (11 November 1927).

History of the October Revolution

In Brest I wrote a short essay on the October Revolution. This booklet has been reprinted repeatedly in different languages. No one has ever told me that it includes a big gap, i.e., that nowhere does it indicate that the "Military-Revolutionary Center" which included Stalin and Bubnov was the main leader of the uprising. If I was so poorly familiar with the history of the October coup d'etat, why did no one give me some firm advice? Why is it that my booklet was studied without objections in all party schools in the first years of the revolution?

Furthermore, as early as 1922, the Central Committee Organizational Buro considered that the history of the October coup d'etat was quite well familiar to me. Here is a small yet eloquent confirmation of this fact:

"No 14,302

"Moscow, May 24, 1922.

"To Comrade Trotsky:

"Following is an excerpt from the minutes of the Central Committee Organizational Buro Session of 22/5 1922, No 21.

"Instruct Comrade Yakovlev to draft, by 1 October, and as edited by Comrade Trotsky, a textbook on the history of the October Revolution"

"Secretary of the Petrograd Propaganda Department (signature)."

This took place in May 1922. By then both my book on the October Revolution and my book on the events of 1905, which had undergone a number of printings, should have been well known to the Organizational Buro which, already then, was headed by Stalin. Nonetheless, the Organizational Buro deemed it necessary to entrust me with editing the textbook on the history of the October Revolution. Why was that? Obviously, the eyes of Stalin and the Stalinists were opened on the subject of "Trotskyism" only after Lenin's eyes were closed forever.

Lost Official Documents

16. It was already after the October coup that sharp differences arose within the party leadership concerning the other "socialist" parties (would there be a homogeneous bolshevik government or an agreement with the mensheviks and the S.R.?). Lenin spoke on this question on 1 (14) November at a meeting of the Petrograd Committee. The minutes of the Petrograd Committee for 1917 were published on the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution. Initially, this edition also included the record of the 1 (14) November 1917 Session. The heading of this record is given in the first printing. Subsequently, however, by instruction from above, the minutes of the 1 (14) November Session were deleted and concealed from the party. The reason is easily understandable. On the question of an agreement, Lenin said as follows at the session:

"As to an agreement? I cannot even speak seriously on this topic. Trotsky said a long time ago that unification is impossible. Trotsky realized this and since then **no one has been a better bolshevik.**"

The speech ended with the following slogan: "No agreement, but a homogeneous bolshevik government!"¹⁹

It is reported that the order to delete this record came from the Central Committee Istpart, for the reason that

"obviously" Lenin's speech had been recorded inaccurately. It is true that Lenin's speech is not consistent with the history of the October Revolution which is now being written.

17. Let us incidentally point out that that same record of the meeting of the Petersburg Committee proves the way Lenin reacted to the question of discipline whenever efforts were made to conceal a clearly opportunistic line by referring to discipline. Commenting on the report by Comrade Fenigshteyn, Lenin said:

"If there is a split, let it be. If you are in the majority, assume the power in the Central Executive Committee and act, **while we will go to the seamen.**"

It was precisely this daring, decisive and irreconcilable formulation of the problem that helped Lenin **to protect the party from a split.**

Iron discipline, but on the basis of a revolutionary line. On 4 April Lenin addressed the party conference (the minutes of which Stalin has concealed from the party), as follows:

"Even our bolsheviks are finding that there is trust in the government. This can be explained only by the zeal of the revolution. This would mean the death of socialism. You, comrades, may trust the government. If you do, this is not our way."

He also said:

"I hear that in Russia there is a trend toward unification with the supporters of defense. This means betrayal of socialism. I believe that it is better to remain alone, like Liebknecht: One against 110."²⁰

18. Why did Lenin raise this question so sharply: One against 110? Because at the March 1917 Conference those who were half-inclined to support defense and semi-conciliationist trends were quite strong. At that conference Stalin supported the resolution of the Krasnoyarsk Soviet of Deputies, which read as follows:

"To support the Provisional Government in its activities only to the extent to which it is meeting the requirements of the working class and the revolutionary peasantry in the revolution under way."²¹

Furthermore, Stalin favored unity with Tsereteli. Following is the accurate excerpt from the minutes:

"Tsereteli's motion of unification is on the agenda.

"Stalin: We must accept it. We must formulate our suggestion concerning the unification line. It may be possible to have a unification in the Zimmerwald-Quintal spirit."

To the objection of some participants in the conference in the sense that such unification would be quite heterogeneous, Stalin answered:

"We should not anticipate and prevent differences. There is no party life without differences. Within the party we can survive petty differences."

Stalin qualified differences with Tsereteli as "petty." In terms of Tsereteli's supporters, Stalin favored broad democracy: "There is no party life without differences."²²

19. Allow me now to ask you, comrades who head the Central Committee Istpart: Why are the records of the March 1917 party meeting still not seeing the light? You are sending survey forms with numerous columns and items and collecting all kind of petty information, some of which is totally insignificant. Why are you holding back the minutes of the March Conference, which is of tremendous importance to party history? These minutes show us the condition of the leading elements of the party on the eve of Lenin's return to Russia. I have repeatedly asked the Central Committee secretariat and Central Control Commission Presidium: Why does the Istpart conceal from the party a document of such exceptional significance? You are familiar with this document. You have it. It is not being published only because it most fiercely compromises Stalin's political line held at the end of March and beginning of April, i.e., at a time when Stalin **independently** tried to formulate the political line.

20. In that speech at the conference (4 April) Lenin said:

"PRAVDA is demanding of the **government** that it abandon annexations... this is a stupidity, this is a crying mockery over..."²³

The minutes were not edited and there are gaps. However, the overall meaning and overall trend of the speech are absolutely clear. Stalin was one of PRAVDA's editors. He wrote in PRAVDA semi-prodefense articles and supported the Provisional Government "to the extent to which." With some reservations Stalin welcomed the Kerenskiy-Tsereteli Manifesto to all nations. This was a false social-patriotic document which made Lenin indignant. This is the exclusive reason for which the Istpart comrades are not publishing the minutes of the March 1917 Party Conference, concealing them from the party.

Footnotes

1. The precise name of the central organ was RAB-OCHIY PUT. As to the time the printing press of the newspaper was occupied by the patrol of the Volynskiy Regiment, an inaccuracy has been allowed. The event occurred between 10:00 p.m. and midnight and not at 6:00 a.m. At that time the printing press had been occupied by a detachment of military cadets and the militia.

2. On the basis of other sources, above all news of the Petrograd press for 25 October 1917, the Petrograd news agency (the predecessor of ROSTA and TASS) was occupied at 9:00 p.m. on 24 October. Stark was a

delegate to the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and editor of the Helsinki bolshevik newspaper PRIBOY.

3. Error. The cadets' uprising occurred on 29 October 1917.

4. Obviously, this too happened on the night of 29 October 1917.

5. It is a question of the initiated talks with Vikzhel, as resolved by the RSDWP(b) Central Committee, on the creation of the so-called homogeneous socialist government from people's socialists to bolsheviks, to replace the Sovnarkom. D.B. Ryazanov participated in such talks on his own initiative as member of the Central Executive Committee and the AUCCTU.

6. The ultimatum drafted by V.I. Lenin of the Central Committee majority to the minority was presented on 4 November 1917. It was signed by 10 members of the RSDWP(b) Central Committee. Some Central Committee members and people's commissars signed under protest also a declaration of resignation in connection with the refusal of V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky to continue talks on replacing the Sovnarkom with a "homogeneous socialist government." On 4 November 1917 the Soviet All-Russian Central Executive Committee, 2nd Convocation, was satisfied with V.I. Lenin's explanations on the resignation of the people's commissars and their deputies, and instructed him to fill the vacancies. On 8 November Ya.M. Sverdlov was appointed chairman of the VTsIK, replacing L.B. Kamenev. At that time the opposition in the Central Committee was in the minority. Soon afterwards all of them submitted petitions to be given jobs.

7. SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT was a daily newspaper, organ of the Moscow Oblast Buro of the RSDWP(b) Central Committee, and the Moscow City and Moscow Okrug RSDWP(b) Committees. It came out in Moscow from 7 March 1917 to the middle of March 1918.

8. The Democratic Conference was convened by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies to decide the question of the organization of the system. It sat from 14 to 22 September 1917 at the Aleksandrinskiy Theater in Petrograd.

9. Actually, in the first 2 weeks of September 1917 an exceptionally important tactical change took place. On 1 September 1917 Lenin wrote in Helsinki the article "On Compromises," where he raised the question of reviving for a short while the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution. In this connection, he suggested that the party restore the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" and abandon the course of armed uprisings (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 34, pp 133-139). On 4 September Lenin was able to send this article to Petrograd. Although the editors of the central organ did not agree with Lenin's assessment of

the situation, he insisted that the article "On Compromises" be published. The article was published in RABOCHY PUT on 6 September 1917. The concepts expressed in the article triggered discussions in the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the RSDWP(b). By 10-11 September, however, the view that Lenin's idea of restoring the possibility of a peaceful development of the revolution was right, that it was to be adopted at the forthcoming Democratic Conference and that a compromise be offered to the menshevik and S.R. parties prevailed in both the Central and the Petrograd Committees. Therefore, Bukharin is not right by claiming that the tactic was "clear" and meant a course toward uprising. On the contrary, the Central Committee majority at the time when the session was held, i.e., on 15 September, was in favor of rejecting an armed uprising in the immediate future and favored a political alliance with the mensheviks and the S.R.

10. Reference to Lenin's famous letters "The Bolsheviks Must Seize the Power" and "Marxism and Uprising," which were written on 12-14 September and taken to Petrograd by I.T. Smilga, member of the RSDWP(b) Central Committee. On Lenin's request, Smilga printed 10 copies of each in Helsinki, for Lenin hoped that the Central Committee would immediately distribute them among the party organizations and had decided to help the Central Committee in this project. The essence of these letters was the statement that the S.R. and the mensheviks had already rejected the bolshevik offer of compromise. They had done this in articles in their own press organs RABOCHAYA GAZETA and DELO NARODA for 8-10 September, even prior to the opening of the Democratic Conference. Furthermore, it became clear that in both the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets the bolsheviks had been able to gain the political majority. Lenin, therefore, concluded that the bolsheviks could and should now seize the power. He suggested that a date be set and an armed uprising be launched against the Provisional Government while the Democratic Conference was in session. All of this was found unacceptable to the Central Committee members. By one vote majority the decision was made to preserve only one copy of the letter and to suggest to Lenin to develop his views in a separate pamphlet.

11. We hear in this sentence echoes of the discussions on the Brest Peace, when N.I. Bukharin headed the "left-wing communist" faction.

12. At the time of the struggle against the mutiny launched by General L.G. Kornilov, A.F. Kerenskiy turned to the seamen of the cruiser "Avrora" with the request to protect the premises of the Provisional Government in the Winter Palace. They agreed. However, after the resolution passed at the 2nd Congress of the Baltic Fleet expressing lack of confidence in the Kerenskiy 3rd Coalition Government, by the end of September 1917 the seamen withdrew their guards. Once again in the Winter Palace they joined the ranks of those who were storming it on the night of 26 October 1917.

13. Decree No 1, which stipulated, among others, the right of factory-plant committees to control the hiring and firing of workers, was ratified on 24 October 1917 at the joint meeting of the Moscow Soviets.

14. V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 34, pp 344-345.

15. N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov), "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works], vol XIV, part II, Moscow-Petrograd, 1923, p 482.

16. J.V. Stalin, "Soch." [Works], vol 6, pp 328-329.

17. The center, which was created by the RSDWP(b) Central Committee on the morning of 16 October 1917, was not a separate entity of the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. So far no proof has been found at all of the fact that it held its own meetings or issued guiding instructions to the Military-Revolutionary Committee. The members of the center continued to work in their areas of party assignments. It was only at the morning session of the RSDWP(b) Central Committee on 24 October 1917 that A.S. Bubnov and F.Z. Dzerzhinskiy, members of this center, were issued specific assignments related to the preparations for the uprising. According to the minutes, J.V. Stalin was not present at that session. In turn, L.D. Trotsky actively participated in the organization and activities of the Military-Revolutionary Committee. On his suggestion, in approving the stipulations on the committee at the 12 October Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee, a single name for it was chosen: "Military-Revolutionary Committee." A number of committee documents have been preserved, signed by Trotsky as its chairman.

18. Trotsky was wrong: the "decisive" night was the night of 24 October, when the forces of the Military-Revolutionary Committee captured the entire city other than a small part of the center.

19. The minutes of the Petersburg Committee, quoted by L.D. Trotsky, were not made public.

20. Trotsky was not entirely right. V.I. Lenin's report presented at the meeting of the bolshevik veterans of the All-Union Conference of the Soviet of Worker and Soldier Deputies of 4 April 1917, from which this and the previous quotes were borrowed, were published for the first time on 7 November 1924 in PRAVDA, No 255. See also V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 31, pp 106, 112.

21. "Revolutsionnoye Dvizheniye v Rossii Posle Sverzheniya Samoderzhadiya" [The Revolutionary Movement in Russia After the Overthrow of Autocracy]. Moscow, 1957, p 134.

22. VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS No 6, 1962, pp 139-140.

23. V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 31, p 107.

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IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, ASPIRATIONS

Three Views and a Commentary on the Reorganization of the Food Complex in Czechoslovakia

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[Article by Aleksey Valentinovich Ulyukayev and Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Shashkov, *KOMMUNIST* associates]

[Text] What is the food problem and is there such a problem in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic? Let us look at what should be considered a problem. If by this we mean the daily search for our daily bread (and only then the more daily meat, cooking butter, edible sausages and, horrible dictu, beer), such a problem, so well familiar to all of us, does not exist in that country.

Let us not repeat ourselves. Our journalistic colleagues have already written in substantial detail, for example, about the meat shelf of a typical (and not only in Prague) Czechoslovak store. It would include several varieties of meat, delicatessen, sausages, smoked products and by-products. This is not an exhibit but a regular sale, rated highly in three basic food "disciplines"—quantity, quality and variety—not in the least implying high prices. The variety of food products is consistent with the extensive range of retail prices: "good," i.e., entirely acceptable, and other. Naturally, there also are expensive products, such as dressed beef, smoke-cured pork, and some types of sausages, which could cost 100 or more korunas per kilogram (10 korunas equal 1 ruble). The main variety, however is in the 30-50 koruna range. Some items are even less expensive (but also of entirely acceptable quality).

The customer, whatever his rank, title or level of income, will always find in the nearest store a choice of products consistent with his likes and pocketbook.

In itself, the differentiation among retail food prices can be considered neither an achievement nor a shortcoming of the economic system. What matters is the criterion on which it is based, for in our country as well, despite the fact that there is virtually no variety of meat products, there is significant (up to eight fold) differentiation in retail prices. However, here it is based primarily not on the quality of the product but the category of the distribution system (ranging from a departmental cafeteria to cooperative prices). In Czechoslovakia, incidentally, market prices cannot exceed the level of state prices by more than 50 percent.

We believe that the Czechoslovak model of extensive differentiation in food retail prices, based on the quality of the product and demand for it (it could be based on other "non-quality" factors as well such as, for example, the fact that the highest quality mutton will not be more expensive than beef, for there is virtually no demand for

mutton) could be applied in our country as well in the course of the price reform which, although postponed for 2 or 3 years, is nonetheless inevitable.

The prices of the varieties of meat, cured meats and other meat products available in our retail trade are based on their condition and cannot be higher. It would be strange to raise the price of an almost inedible sausage. However, the average price level could be raised by introducing in broad retail trade meat products of average or high quality at higher and greatly differentiated prices.

However, we seem to have immediately taken precisely the path which we had decided to avoid and which is so widespread in political journalism: that of providing prescriptions for the Soviet economy on the basis of superficial comparisons with foreign experience. We actually wanted to begin with something else: with explaining the problems which face the Czechoslovak agrarian complex.

Therefore, problems exist although superficially they may seem entirely different from those in our country. The fact that today they essentially are not reflected on the dining table of Czechs and Slovaks is largely due to the steps taken to protect the domestic food market. This involves strict control over food exports, for even under the conditions of the new economic mechanism producers operating on a cost accounting basis cannot independently export any product of any significant role in terms of variety. This applies to imports as well.

Traditionally, in recent decades, Czechoslovakia has been a net importer of essentially tropical fruits, coffee, cocoa and tea. All such goods, including coconuts and bananas, are almost always available in the stores. Coconuts, for example, may not enjoy particular demand but in this case the mentality of the consumer is taken into consideration: as long as a commodity is available, I do not need it; the moment it disappears, however, I immediately feel an acute sense of discomfort and an urgent need for that product. An artificial demand develops which, under certain circumstances, creates a stir. At that point, in order to abate it, substantially greater purchases are required, compared with what is needed to prevent such excitement. Therefore, from the viewpoint of saving on foreign currency, it is much more advantageous to purchase coconuts than not to purchase them. In recent years the country has begun to import substantial volumes of grain as well, about half a million tons last year. This year meat is being imported as well.

Finally, Czechoslovakia also uses the traditional form of guaranteeing food consumption: subsidies to keep retail prices low despite increased purchase prices. At the present time the annual volume of such subsidies has reached 60 billion korunas. On a per capita basis they are even higher than in the USSR. The entire meat and dairy array is essentially subsidized. For example, the state

subsidy per liter of milk is 2.22 korunas; it is 29.91 korunas per kilogram of butter. This is quite substantial by any standard.

Such steps taken in solving the problem of the food complex are not directly realized by the consumer. On the level of agricultural production, however, and its efficiency, they exist and have become aggravated in recent years. This concerns the country's political leadership, scientists and economic managers.

The need to cope with the growing problems is what initiated the restructuring of agrarian policy and, above all, the shaping of the new economic mechanism of the food complex which began to operate this year. We can single out two main groups of problems: first, the slowdown in the growth of agricultural production, crop yields and cattle productivity and peasant labor productivity; second, the high and steadily rising level of agricultural production subsidies.

Naturally, the reduction of the pace is taking place from a high starting base. Thus, the average grain crop is about 48 quintals per hectare and milk production is nearly 4,000 liters. The annual output per person engaged in milk production is 13.5 thousand liters. As a result, per capita meat consumption is nearly 92 kilograms (it is true that if we use the same methodology for statistical computations as used in our country, excluding lard and by-products, as is the case in many other countries, what would be left would be roughly 77 kilograms).

These are impressive indicators. However, we must take into consideration the fact that the country reached that level essentially by the end of the last decade. Subsequently, the growth rates of output in crop growing began to decline.

The main thing, however, is that in Czechoslovakia, as is the case in other socialist countries, costs are quite high compared to global world standards (both in terms of physical and value indicators) in the production of agricultural commodities. This is related to the development of outlay trends in agriculture, the weak incentives for thrifty management, subsidies for underprofitable or simply losing farming practices of many cooperatives and state farms, and significant price increases of means of agricultural production (intensified of late in connection with the gradual reduction or actual elimination of state subsidies to purchasers of means of production, which averaged some 13 million korunas annually).

It is precisely the struggle against the outlay nature of the agrarian economy and increasing its efficiency that was in the minds of the creators of the new economic mechanism in the agricultural complex. The restructuring of the economic management mechanism in the agroindustrial combines is important both in and of itself and because it is the starting point of the general economic reform. In the other areas of the national economy the reform will be started in 2 years. It is

assumed that the experience in restructuring the agroindustrial complex would make it possible to correct the principles and methods to be applied in other sectors.

Why was the reform started with the agroindustrial complex? To begin with, the economic autonomy and foundations of cost accounting and self-financing here, particularly in the cooperatives (which account for most of the farm produce) had existed earlier as well, even under the conditions of the strengthening of the command system in the 1970s. Second, the organizational-production structure of agricultural unlike, let us say, industry, is already ready to work under the new economic conditions. The main unit here is the enterprise and there are no complex intermediary structures. Finally, there is an overall balance between output and demand for agricultural commodities. Therefore, unlike the conditions prevailing in our country, there is no need for a transitional period in the course of which the state must interfere in developing the production structure of agricultural enterprises, thereby largely limiting their autonomy.

The anti-outlay instruments are the foundations of the new economic mechanism: pay for manpower, fixed assets and natural resources. The pay for manpower will be based on a 50 percent tax on the payroll fund. In the past no such payments at all were made in agriculture. Payment for assets will be a 50 percent nondifferentiated profit tax. In agriculture alone a tax free minimum profit will be retained. According to the estimates of economists, this taxation system will increase withholdings from profits by more than 100 percent. Finally, payments for natural resources will be made in the guise of a land tax. There also are differentiated markups to purchase prices which will be paid to the farms operating under worse natural-climatic conditions.

This year the plan calls for increasing the land tax from 1.3 to 3 billion korunas and to lower differentiated markups from 12.3 to 7.3 billion korunas. The difference between the sum of markups and the tax, which will be subsidized by the state budget, will thus be reduced from 11 to 4 billion korunas. Whereas in the past only one out of three farms paid a tax, while the rest were given markups, now their correlation will be equalized.

Will the farms suffer from this? Unquestionably, their costs in all three areas will increase sharply. However, the sum of additional payments to the budget corresponds to an equal increase in purchase prices. As a result, the volume of non-price compensation for costs will be reduced by one-third which will mean that the effect of cost accounting principles will be intensified sharply.

These, however, are theoretical, a priori concepts. Efforts were made to understand, however, by approaching the problem from various sides, from the positions of the CZCP Central Committee, the Union of

Cooperated Peasants and, finally, the ordinary Czechoslovak cooperatives, the way the new economic mechanism would work out in practice, what were the conditions and prerequisites for its establishment, did it suit everyone, and did it provide realistic prospects for solving the republic's food supply problems.

Following are three viewpoints on the reform:

FIRST VIEWPOINT. M. Zaic, CZCP Central Committee secretary and chairman of the CZCP Central Committee Agriculture and Food Commission:

All of our contemporary achievements in agriculture are based on a sensible and, above all, a stable agrarian policy. We were able not only fully to implement but also to overfulfill the task of equalizing the living and growing standards of town and country. Currently the living standard in the countryside is higher than in the city. People continue to live and work in the countryside. There are no "ghost" villages. This is one of the most important achievements of our agricultural policy. Naturally, to this effect we had to solve the housing problem, the question of providing schools and children's preschool institutions, to develop trade and transportation, etc. As a result, the countryside does not have to face the problem of a manpower drain. Furthermore, a good age and skill population structure has developed in our countryside. The average age of people engaged in agriculture is lower than in industry (36 and 39 respectively). Currently there are more university trained specialists in agriculture than in industry per thousand employed people.

The countryside has a powerful material potential. The current value of agricultural production assets is approximately 400 billion korunas. Since the start of the 1960s agriculture has not only not been the target of extracting funds but, conversely, a priority target of investments. Auxiliary industries are being extensively developed in state farms and cooperatives. We are supporting this trend, for we believe that the agricultural enterprise should not be considered a classical structure exclusively engaged in agricultural production (to put it mildly, for it sometimes happens that in cooperatives it is precisely farming and animal husbandry that are the auxiliary enterprises. Thus, at the well-known Slusovice Cooperative, agriculture accounts for only 6 percent of the output! The rest is industrial production, including personal computers—authors). Yet, in order for life in the village to develop, it must have an adequate range of work opportunities where people could apply their talents. That is why we cannot let the people in the countryside to work only during the farming season. For example, since in crop growing one can work no more than 200 days per year, the people must be provided with other jobs for a minimum of another 100 days. Productive forces must be used maximally. Already now auxiliary industries account for 25 billion of the 115 billion korunas which is the annual output of state farms and cooperatives. This is a substantial amount. Their profitability is significantly higher than that of agricultural

production per se. We are seeing to it that our agricultural enterprises undertake projects in various areas, thus providing jobs in the countryside such as, for example, consumer services, have their own coffee shops, restaurants, etc.

Question. Why is this period of stable policy being interrupted now?

M. Zaic. Progress in agriculture depends, above all, on end labor results and on the attitude of man toward means of production and the land. A certain alienation of the person from the means of production took place in our country, although in Czechoslovakia there was no nationalization of the land, and, as in the past, the land remains the property of the members of cooperatives. We are currently working on surmounting this alienation, so that man will not feel himself like a kind of technological link in the production process. We are trying to make him feel that he is a true socialist entrepreneur in his small production microsystem, so that he can see and be aware of the specific end results of his toil and his contribution in the matters of the farm and be interested in entrepreneurial activities regardless of where he may be working, be it in crop growing or animal husbandry, truck gardening or orchardry. The person must be the true master of his production area.

The new economic mechanism creates stricter economic conditions for the producer. Under administrative-directive oriented conditions the people were poorly aware of the cost of human toil. Yet this cost is quite high. Through economic methods, a 50 percent payroll tax, we had to prove this to everyone. Those who use manpower thriftily and efficiently will benefit, for purchase prices have been increased. Furthermore, the purpose of this new development is to encourage scientific and technical progress as a labor conservation factor.

As to planning methods, this year only two plan indicators have been issued: grain and meat production. All the rest is determined by the agricultural enterprise itself on the basis of procurement-purchase contracts. Let me point out that the practical result of this new development has been even better than expected. This year contracts were signed with no problems whatsoever. The results have been much better than under the administrative-directive oriented management, when there were 18 indicators and virtually everything was planned. Contracts have been concluded on very good conditions and without any arm twisting. The economic pressure provided by the new mechanism has developed in the agricultural enterprises the need to seek all possible resources and opportunities at their disposal. Therefore, although no more than slightly over 4 months have passed, we can assert that the new mechanism has triggered an active search for ways of increasing production capacities in all areas. The agricultural enterprises are also beginning to undertake the processing of agricultural commodities and seeking other reserves. As a result, in the first quarter of this year, compared with last year, their income increased by 2 billion korunas.

In order to reduce to a minimum bureaucratic administration and interference in the affairs of the farmers, we reduced the personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture by one-half. Changing the work style of these administrative authorities is no simple matter. For many long years they had become accustomed to the command, the power method of management, trying to interfere in everything. Such management methods must be eliminated at all cost. The agricultural enterprises must be given scope and opportunities for initiative and enterprise. Even the very word "enterprise" contains the direct instruction of "undertaking something," of being "enterprising." In our country, however, quite frequently this basic function was forgotten. We would like for the department of the Ministry of Agriculture in the individual oblasts and rayons to deal only with the study of the effects of the new mechanism and to rally the efforts for the solution of problems of scientific and technical progress.

The main task is for every working person to apply cost accounting and not to become confused. Twenty percent of our farms are in the lagging group. What kind of cost accounting could there be in this case! Nonetheless, even in such farms the people will calmly answer you that they too are using cost accounting. However, such cost accounting has reached neither brigades nor links or individuals. It is precisely in this that we see manifested the fact that the person remains like an anonymous link in a technological chain. We believe that we would be able to achieve one-half of our restructuring plan simply by turning every working person into a socialist entrepreneur. This is a very important political problem for the solution of which we seek a variety of forms such as, for example, "socialist sponsorship" of the greenhouse, part of the cow barns, the livestock farm, the truck, the tractor, etc. All of this is clearly stipulated in the contract signed with the farm management such as, for example, the cost of maintaining and operating a tractor. For example, if you were to lower this cost by 10 percent, you could keep five percent for yourself. Some cooperatives have organized so-called small family enterprises. Such "little plants" or "family farms" can operate only within the cooperative. They obtain funds, raw materials, feed, and so on from the cooperative. However, they can sell their output only to the cooperative. Again in this connection I say that socialist ownership has a variety of forms of manifestation. However, we would like to keep all these different forms within the agricultural enterprises.

Question. Do agricultural enterprises have any autonomy in terms of foreign economic activities?

M. Zaic. Yes, they have the right independently to conclude international contracts. As a rule, the cooperatives must conduct their international commercial activities through the respective foreign trade organization. If the volume of foreign trade activities is greater, the cooperative may be given the right to export on the foreign market without middlemen. For the time being, there are only two such cooperatives: "Slusovice" and "Praca." To us this is an entirely new project, for this

concept was made functional in 1989. As a whole, however, the number of deals made by cooperatives through intermediaries is quite significant. Their volume of commercial contracts is already 2.5 billion korunas.

A number of projects are being drafted on joint enterprises as well; 23 farms have cooperation relations with foreign partners. For example, they export calves and import dry cows; they assemble hay mowers from parts which they obtain on the basis of cooperation agreements, and so on. Naturally, the Ministry of Agriculture and the foreign trade departments participate in the organization of such foreign trade relations.

Question. How is the process of introducing the new economic mechanism developing in agriculture?

M. Zaic. With difficulty. The CZCP Central Committee and the Ministry of Agriculture have received a great deal of letters complaining of the inadequacy of this system and the difficult situation in which the agricultural enterprises will find themselves due to the rather strict stipulations of the new mechanism, the fact that the farms will have no profit, the earnings of the peasants will drop, etc. Many such letters were signed by farm managers and heads of party committees. We invited some of the authors of such letters, together with scientists and specialists, for a meeting at the Central Committee. We said: Comrades, let us reach a consensus. Your plan this year was lower compared with last year's. It is even lower than the indicators of the previous 5-year period. All of this you explain with the fact that, allegedly, there is no other way of operating under the new economic mechanism. However, this will not solve the problem. The new system calls for the maximal utilization of all possibilities and all means at the disposal of the enterprises. Otherwise there will be losses.

Naturally, old habits remain very strong. We recently filed a complaint against a manager of the former oblast agricultural administration (today a department of the Ministry of Agriculture). He demanded enterprise managers to report to him whenever they left the central farmstead. This is a "throw back" not to the administrative system but even to feudalism.

Essentially, the enterprises are adequately adapting to the new conditions. The cooperatives are reacting much more quickly to the requirements of the new mechanism compared to the rayon and oblast administrative levels. The administrative units will require more time for restructuring their thinking and mastering the new political conditions. (Actually, the cooperatives as well do not always quickly reorganize themselves in accordance with the new conditions. As we found out, this year, as in previous years, many farms fell short of fodder for at least 2 months. Once again they came begging to the state authorities—authors).

We had a hard time at that Central Committee meeting I mentioned. Many leading personnel opposed us. Their main arguments were as follows: First, a number of agricultural enterprises will become unprofitable;

second, why was it necessary to destroy a mechanism which had functioned and yielded good results. I must admit that there was a great deal of such criticism. However, the fiercest critics were precisely those who, in the past, were among the lagging. The representatives of the strong farms had begun, already last year, to prepare themselves for the application of the new mechanism. Yes, there was talk of the fact that many types of items would disappear such as, for example, beets, cabbage, and so on, for everyone, it was claimed, would start cultivating crops which are less labor intensive and yield stable crops. Practical experience, however, refuted such "prophets." Incidentally, we found within the new mechanism a way of interesting people in producing difficult and labor intensive crops; in particular, this is the purpose of substantial price markups. These incentives yielded immediate results.

The ordinary workers as well were in no hurry. Extensive debates took place at the accountability and election meetings. It was said that the intention was to take funds out of the countryside or, at least, to limit investments. For the time being, however, it is still too early to draw any conclusions, although a calming-down trend has been clearly noticed. The initial economic results prove that many agricultural enterprises are already mastering the new mechanism and are indeed beginning to show a spirit of enterprise. This is what is most important.

SECOND VIEWPOINT: P. Jonas, chairman of the Union of Cooperated Peasants:

The successes achieved by Czechoslovak agriculture are largely linked to the traditions of the cooperative movement (the first rural credit cooperative was organized in 1845; by 1937 the republic had 11,500 peasant cooperatives). The cooperative system immediately gained the trust of the peasants. Attracting strong farmers to the cooperatives was no problem. They even joined them more willingly than did the poor.

Furthermore, although during the period of collectivization, naturally, there were excesses, there was no attempt at converting the peasantry. The land was not nationalized. Not a single person died. Our agriculture rests on a firm industrial base, state support, investments and credits.

In 40 years of cooperative farming we have ensured the main thing: we have preserved intrafarm democracy and protected the farms from gigantomania. The average cooperative today has 2,600 hectares of farmland. The manpower is stable. Of late the average age of people employed in the cooperatives has dropped by 5 years. However, restructuring farming is an objective need. Twenty percent of the cooperatives are still underprofitable. In order to upgrade production efficiency we need more autonomy for the cooperatives. This will be provided with the new law on the agricultural cooperative. This law intensifies the democratic principles of cooperation. It intensifies the democratic principles of the cooperative. The cooperatives have been given the right

to grant some land for temporary use by organizations and private citizens. The rights of production subdivisions are being significantly increased.

The Union of Cooperated Peasants initiated a number of changes. Thus, we were able to simplify planning and reduce the number of indicators down to two. However, a few features of the new economic mechanism concern us and make us fear for the future. We totally agree with the tax on the payroll fund. However, we object to a 50 percent profit tax. This could eliminate capital investments by cooperatives.

It is still too early to judge the results of the application of the new economic mechanism. We are following it very closely and will see to it that the living standard in the cooperatives does not decline.

During our meeting with Comrade Adamec, the premier, we agreed that should the restructuring trigger major negative consequences for the activities of the cooperatives, the various economic instruments would be amended. I would like to hope, however, that things will not reach that point.

THIRD VIEWPOINT. Rihta, chairman of the Knezmost Cooperative:

In terms of its economic indicators and problems, Knezmost is a typical Czechoslovak cooperative. It belongs in the upper half but is by no means considered a model. It is true that it is somewhat larger than the average for the country. It has 800 members, 4,400 hectares of land, and 4,000 head of cattle. Its annual output is worth 92 million korunas, 82 million of which comes from farming. The cooperative reached this level after 1975, when the process of unification of 22 previously autonomous cooperatives in the individual villages was completed (not one, however, of these villages was classified as "unpromising" or abandoned—authors).

In the past the cooperative was paying 3.3 million korunas of farm tax annually. Now, under the new economic conditions, according to our estimates, this tax will be doubled. Understandably, this cannot fail to concern us. Whereas in 1988 the cooperative earned 1 million korunas profit from farming, this year there are no profits and losses have already reached 5.5 million. We are purchasing the equipment without subsidies. The cost of spare parts and fuel has increased. Agrozet, the organization which provides technical services to agriculture, has the right, depending on the time spent on services and procurements, to raise its prices by as much as 30 percent. We are now also paying a tax on the payroll fund and on profits as well as a farm tax. Naturally, purchase prices have increased as well but they do not compensate for the increased outlays.

However, we do not reject the principles of the new economic mechanism. It nonetheless provides us with much greater autonomy. Only two mandatory indicators have been left. It is true that we cannot already today change the production structure, for long-term contracts

for the procurement of agricultural commodities have been signed until the year 1990. However, when the new contracts come up, we shall be able to review the structure. For example, we shall no longer grow sugar beets which currently occupy 30 hectares. This crop is underprofitable and does not fit our crop rotation system.

Yes, the new economic system makes us "twist around." We have difficulties but we also have ways of solving them. We have earmarked a program for adapting to the new economic conditions.

To begin with, we intend significantly to increase the volume of auxiliary industries, of nonagricultural activities. According to our estimates, by 1995 nonagricultural industries will be able to give us 10 million korunas in profit. In this connection we are promoting cooperation with the Skoda Automotive Plant. We hope that these industries will become our financial "stabilizers." We would like also to develop capacities for the production of agricultural commodities, something which we still do not have. Once the new purchase prices begin to encourage the sale of high grade produce, we shall develop a technological line for cleaning and raising the grain to the first category level. This will yield 900 korunas additionally per sold ton. We intend to process concentrated fodder (as a result of which its price will increase by 30 percent). This will provide us more than 1 million korunas annually.

Secondly, we shall intensify the production process, find reserves and reduce costs. Thus, by producing concentrated fodder for our own use and reducing its purchase, we hope to save substantial funds. We would like to use energy conservation equipment.

Third, we are contemplating steps for the development of intrafarm cost accounting. We already have two independent crop growing centers, an animal husbandry center and a mechanization center. Cost accounting relations are developing in the brigades as well.

Fourth, we are turning to the production of goods for foreign trade and for earning foreign exchange with which to purchase the necessary equipment, particularly what we need for grain processing. Thus, we shall sell vegetable oil worth 700,000 korunas in foreign exchange per year. We intend to develop a cooperative association for trade with other cooperatives as well.

Finally, since all these steps contemplated in our program will yield the desired results not immediately, while meanwhile we must cover our losses, we must as of now turn to the Ministry of Agriculture with a request to grant for this year to the cooperative the special financial system. If this request is met (and we hope it will be), we shall receive 13 korunas of differentiated markups per each 100 korunas of farm goods sold to the state.

In summing up the results of our meetings, we would like to comment on two or three aspects. We saw that the restructuring of the food supply complex is necessary

and that it is developing with difficulty and is by no means popular throughout the country. Finally, we realized that its objectives and tasks are similar to ours, for despite all the differences, our basic problem is the same: the outlays of the agrarian economy and the fact that we are in a vicious circle: costs-prices-subsidies-income-costs. The approach to restructuring as a process which covers production forces, production relations and party policy, is also the same.

The study of the Czechoslovak experience supports the understanding, based on the study of Soviet agriculture, that a solution to the food problem cannot be found exclusively within the APK. Actually, it is a general economic problem which involves the structure of investments, such as the shortage of capital investments in processing and the tremendous pressure of prices of means of production provided by industry (whereas in 1979 it took 43 tons of grain sales to purchase a tractor, today 94 tons are needed. Between 1954 and 1989 the cost per cattle-stall rose from 10,000 to 55,000 korunas).

Naturally, food sufficiency is directly related to the financial health of the country. Unless the inflationary spiral is stopped and the emission of money is not excessive, there is no overall scarcity of food products even with low rates of growth in agricultural output. Conversely, the moment inflation is no longer controlled even substantial increases in food stocks have virtually no reflection on the condition of the food market which is swimming in a "flood of paper money."

Here is another aspect: all the people with whom we spoke, be they peasants, economic managers, party workers or scientists, however critically they may have reacted to the new economic mechanism, all of them unanimously noted in terms of the practical work in public farming in general that in their country leasing or individual private farms would not work, they are simply impossible. Perhaps the people are against it. The term "leasing" is not used at all even in relations within farms. There is only talk of "socialist supervision" over means of production, emphasizing that what changes here is only the form through which socialist ownership is applied, but not its nature. These words are sincere and consistent with reality. Why? What is the "secret" of support of the "kolkhoz system?"

First. Socialized agriculture essentially solves the problem of food supplies (the country's level of self-support is about 98 percent), not only quantitatively but also in terms of quality and variety. The high cost and the higher payments made for this by society to the consumer are not obvious. Therefore, there is no pressure applied by public opinion or the criticism on all levels to which the agrarian system in the USSR is subjected.

Second. During all four postrevolutionary decades agriculture developed stably. The "kolkhoz system" here does not have the black marks left in the historical memory. There were neither human casualties nor mass

resettlements or removing the peasants from the land, hunger, or extracting huge funds for the needs of industrialization. There were no great shifts in reorganizations in subsequent years as well. It may be that the resolutions which were passed were not distinguished by their radical nature. However, they did not conflict with each other and were essentially implemented.

Third. The level of income and the real equality of life in the countryside are not lower but higher than in the city (although, naturally, the number of working hours in the villages is higher on an annual basis). For that reason the imperative of radical change and of revising the foundations of socialized farming are not to be found not only within the society but also among the rural workers themselves. They do not wish for something better. The secured cooperated farmer highly values his leisure time, mobility and the fact that he is not tied to the pigsty or the cattle.

The strongest impetus for restructuring for the producer would appear should he directly feel the pressure of high and steadily growing cost of farming. However, such costs are amortized by state subsidies, differentiated discounts and markups and non-price factors influencing farm income, such as the state fund for improving the fertility of the land, the manpower stabilization fund and the reserve fund of the Ministry of Agriculture for help to lagging farms.

Fourth. Under the existing system of the agrarian economy, all agricultural enterprises have auxiliary industrial production facilities, the level of profitability of which is significantly higher than that of agriculture itself. It is precisely they that appear to support a significant percentage of cooperatives and state farms. Understandably, a private farm of any kind, including one that is leased (particularly leasing the means of production directly from the state without intermediaries such as the public farms) cannot engage both in animal husbandry and crop growing and the types of actual industrial production facilities which ensure an acceptable level of overall profitability to cooperatives and state farms and which require high skills and specialized training. In other words, an individual or a lessee would be immediately deprived of those financial "floats" and objectively would have far fewer chances of engaging in profitable farming. Compensating for this factor with "self-exploitation," with hard 12 or 14 hour labor days is unrealistic, for against the background of the existing living standard and life style in the countryside this cannot attract the farmers.

Nonetheless, under the new economic conditions we could anticipate a certain increase in incentives for a radical agrarian restructuring, including the development of leasing or semi-autonomous family farms within the framework of a procurement-purchasing or production cooperative.

This view is reinforced also by the increased cost accounting pressure on existing structures, the greater

dependence on the level of production costs, created by the new economic mechanism, the reduced share of non-price cost compensations, and the sharply reduced redistributive support of dependent farms by the states.

The new economic mechanism and, above all, the new taxation principles equalize the economic status of strictly agricultural and nonagricultural production facilities in cooperatives and state farms. In other words, the significance of auxiliary industries, as highly profitable financial "floats," will decline and the chances of individual farmers and lessees will respectively increase.

In the foreseeable future, however, socialized farming, in its present aspect will, clearly, remain preferable to both producers and society.

Real economic pluralism presumes not replacing some dogmas with other but real competition among a great variety of economic forms under different economic conditions. Within the framework of the overall principles of socialist economic management even similar problems, such as food supplies and, more specifically, the problem of agricultural production efficiency and the elimination of outlay tendencies within it can be fully solved by developing significantly disparate agro-economic models. This enriches economic theory and practice. It enriches socialism and, in the final account, it provides conditions for a better life for every individual.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

The Usefulness of Their Experience

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[Article by Nina Vasilyevna Simakova, scientific secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Soviet Sociological Association Moscow Department, candidate of philosophical sciences, and Igor Grigoryevich Usachev, doctor of historical sciences, professor at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs NGIMO]

[Text] Our party and Soviet people have undertaken the establishment of a socialist rule of law state. This state must be of good quality and encompass both our own experience as well as everything that has been tried and is of positive value acquired by other countries and nations.

Naturally, we do not call upon the members of the supreme state authority mechanically to duplicate foreign models. This would be senseless and harmful, for it is a question of establishing a rule of law socialist state, i.e., of creating an original mechanism which would ensure and guarantee full socialist democracy. Nonetheless, it would be futile in the development of such a mechanism to engage in reinventing any one of its

elements, units, and forms, analogues of which have already been created at different times and in different countries, and ignoring or rejecting this experience merely on the grounds that it was acquired somewhere abroad.

The people's deputies have an infinite area of work and we shall allow ourselves to draw attention to a single problem: the establishment of a constitutionally authorized mechanism for the discussion and making of foreign policy decisions and control on the part of the authority elected by the people over the implementation of these resolutions within the framework of democratic procedures.

Naturally, it is best of all to analyze the problem on the basis of specific examples. Are there elsewhere in the world examples of the successful functioning of a constitutionally authorized mechanism for formulating and making foreign policy decisions and for supervising their execution? Unquestionably, yes. Specifically, it is found in a number of developed Western countries with parliamentary traditions.

Let us caution the readers in advance: we set the question of the merits and faults of bourgeois democracy aside. The founders of Marxism provided in their works exhaustive definitions of its true nature, purposes and limitations. Nonetheless, they taught the proletariat as, for example, did Lenin, to make use of all democratic institutions created by the bourgeoisie (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 30, p 71). In general, Lenin believed that the rule is to learn from another country and to accept anything useful it could contribute to the cause of socialism.

Are there reasons to reject such sensible advice? We believe that there are not. Conversely, it would not be bad to learn from our opponents, the way they learned from us, particularly in the social area, with a view to reducing the gravity of class contradictions in their own countries. Is it sensible to reject the use of someone else's experience in the development of a democratic procedure for the making of foreign policy decisions? Let us emphasize that such experience must be used critically and creatively.

In our subsequent analysis we shall focus our main attention on the experience of the United States, as the most indicative from the constitutional viewpoint in the contemporary world. The U.S. Constitution is by no means impeccable. However, it celebrated its bicentennial and, in terms of age, the only constitution which could challenge it would be that of Great Britain, had the latter been a written document and not a code of traditions and customs. We must also bear in mind that the American Constitution has left its mark on the supreme laws of the majority of bourgeois states. Its influence can be easily seen, in particular, in the constitution of the 5th French Republic, which was adopted in 1958.

What characterizes the American system? It is the stability of political institutions and the ability to ensure a sufficiently stable support of the governmental authorities in their policy by the active population strata. In the past 200 years the fundamental stipulations of the U.S. Constitution have remained unchanged and the 26 amendments which have been passed during that time made the constitutional mechanism flexible, making it consistent with the changed conditions of life in that country.

Let us give its proper due to the members of the U.S. Constitutional Convention, which was held in 1787, and who were able to develop such a durable document. Clearly, it would be useful to consider what contributed to the success of their work. As is frequently the case in life, in our view, it was a simple matter: a sober consideration of previous historical experience, above all that of representative powers of ancient Greece and ancient Rome, the British parliamentary system and the achievements of the then progressive social philosophy reflected in the works of Montesquieu, Bacon, Locke, Milton and others. In particular, the clear separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial, the system of "checks and balances," which ensured means to balance political interests and to stabilize the body politic, were borrowed.

We have absolutely no desire to idealize the activities of the Constitutional Convention. The Constitution it drafted was a class-oriented nature, which codified the power of the rich minority. Nonetheless, the Bill of Rights which was adopted in 1789 as its supplement (the 10 first amendments to the Constitution) offered constitutional guarantees of bourgeois freedoms. This was a major gain for the democratic forces. It is useful to remember that the 5th Amendment, which prohibits anyone to testify against himself, was extensively used by those who, during the McCarthy era, became victims of political persecution for their progressive views.

It is obviously unnecessary to prove to the readers the complexity of the entire period after World War II. We still remember the grave international crises which disrupted the world and took it to the brink of a nuclear precipice: the Korean War, the Suez crisis, the war in Vietnam, the Caribbean crisis, the Middle East conflict, etc. These crises inflicted severe losses to the makers of American foreign policy. What was indicative, however, was that it was only during specific critical periods, particularly during the war in Vietnam, that the official political line clashed with the opposition of the "lower strata." At other times, and even more so during relatively calm periods, as a rule Washington's foreign policy course enjoyed the support not only of big business but also of the broad business, scientific, journalistic and other "middle class" circles and did not trigger any whatsoever strong protests on the part of the bulk of ordinary Americans.

During the period of stagnation, our information media either ignored these facts or pushed them aside, with

references to the "passive" and "apolitical" nature of American society, manipulations with the awareness of the masses, and so on. The new political thinking and the task of establishing a rule of law state demand of us to look at the world, at our partners and rivals, without any filters, and to see them as they truly are.

In his book "*National Leadership and Foreign Policy*," which is a study of the question of ensuring public support for the course followed by the United States in the international arena, James Rosenow, the American political expert, writes: "The content and effectiveness of foreign policy... may be depicted in the guise of different characters and forms of behavior. The following characters and groups make their contribution to defining the nature and to the success of American foreign policy: the personnel of the foreign policy establishment who **evaluate** the situation abroad and **undertake** the formulation of options for respective actions; high government officials who **suggest** the choice of a given course of action; nongovernmental leading groups who **impose** a veto or who **support** a given option; the broad public, which **limits** the number of acceptable alternatives; high representatives of the executive branch who **decide** which option is to be accepted; the members of the legislative branch who **modify** the chosen option; the local officials who **implement** it and are at the tail end of the policy-making process."

We quoted this excerpt for the reason that it reflects clearly and in its entirety the system itself applied in the formulation of foreign policy decisions in Washington and the range of people who participate in this process. Its fault is that it does not provide a clear picture of the real influence of each of the units in this process, which is very important. Clearly, such an "omission" was not accidental, for it would have greatly helped to highlight the "inner springs" of action. It is well-known, however, that in a presidential system, as is the case in the United States and in France, the final say in decision making is that of the President.

Presidential power in the United States is centralized. It is precisely this power that controls the main instruments of power, serving the interest of the ruling elite. It is exercised by three subgroups: the cabinet, the executive machinery under the presidency and the federal bureaucracy. In the postwar years the latter has developed in a widespread mechanism which has become an important element in the U.S. political system. The ordinary Americans do not shy at referring in unflattering terms to their bureaucracy. Frankly speaking, however, the latter cannot be refused a sufficiently high degree of professional competence. The existing system of "checks and balances" largely allows the American public to erect quite efficient barriers to block various bureaucratic attempts.

This system plays a key role in preserving the support of the bourgeois-democratic forms which provide political stability to the entire society and to solving the difficult problem of taking virtually any kind of foreign policy

step, in terms of the manifestation of a national consensus. Let us note in this connection, without ignoring the axiomatic stipulation of the class nature of American foreign policy, that under contemporary conditions, in our view, it has developed as a resultant force in the complex struggle among the interests of all social classes and various groups which exist within such classes and, above all, in the ruling class but not exclusively within it.

Let us go back to the quotation borrowed from James Rosenow and consider the numerous components of the process used in formulating foreign policy options. Is this a plus or a minus?

Naturally, those who believe that a large number of units involved in the process of foreign policy decision making protract it are right. Yes, this is indeed the case but, on the other hand, the more balanced a decision is the broader becomes its support, the better it corresponds to the real needs of the country and the less likely becomes an error which later could turn out to be very costly. The representative system, which includes conflicting components, is able, thanks to this, to solve sometimes even contradictory problems which necessitate the consideration and determination of the disparity of socioclass interests and maintaining a stable balance within the framework of inevitable historical changes.

However, it would be a mistake to believe that the American foreign policy mechanism is excessively slow. The extensive rights granted to the President enable him to act with great efficiency. Thus, for example, President Ford colorfully describes in his memoirs the way, within the narrow circle of the National Security Council, the decision was made to free the crew of the "Mayaguez," which had been captured by the "Khmer Rouge." The congress or, more specifically, 21 congressmen, were informed essentially after the fact, after the operation which cost the lives of 41 Americans (the entire crew of the Mayaguez numbered 39) was already in full swing. The delayed reaction in the congress was largely negative.

We believe that as we undertake the establishment of a socialist rule of law state, we should not ignore the fact that the constitutional-representative system existing in other countries imbues within it general democratic and universal human gains which took many centuries to develop. Socialist democracy must accept anything positive created by preceding forms of democracy, for they were advances in the development of human civilization.

From this viewpoint, what interests us most in the process of developing a rule of law state should be the elements of the American system which help to identify common features within the conflicting interests and wishes of different population groups, take into consideration sociopolitical changes in the society, and ensure a steadily functioning "feedback." A reliably functioning

channel of "direct" and "inverse" contacts and information "from above" and a response "from below" are among the prime attributes and guarantees of democracy.

The American bourgeoisie found ways of keeping its fingers on the pulse beat of the country and quickly to react to breakdowns which threaten the disruption of the political health of the regime. What, for example, is a characteristic professional feature of the members of the U.S. Congress? It involves considerable experience in political activities and managerial or legal training. Let us not even mention the fact that the congressmen use the services of their staffs knowledgeably in areas of modern jurisprudence, knowledge of politics and other areas as needed in order to run the society and the state.

The limitations of a single article prevent us from describing in detail the functioning of the two chambers of the U.S. Congress. Let us merely emphasize the great role played by the different committees and commissions which specialize in specific problems and areas. As to foreign policy, the Senate has its Foreign Affairs Committee and the House of Representatives has its International Relations Committee. Both chambers have special committees on matters of armaments. The high level of competence of the legislators who specialize in foreign policy (not least thanks to the efforts of a support staff of highly skilled specialists in that area) enables them to engage as equals in a dialogue with the executive authorities and to exert their influence on the latter's views.

The objection to this may be that this is the influence of a narrow group of the elect. Such is by no means the case. A place in the U.S. Congress is by no means a guaranteed lifetime sinecure. It is dangerous for the political career of a congressman to alienate himself from the voters, for which reason he is forced always to balance the national with the local interests. This provides efficient incentive for contacts with the voters and with business circles, for purposes of determining the public's views and respective reactions. Let us cite a single example: In the 1970s American congressmen visited their districts an average of 35 times a year. Among others, this makes it possible to carry information from the center to the outlying areas and back.

The importance of such a connection is convincingly illustrated by the following example: by the turn of the 1970s, under the pressure of mass anti-war movements, a group developed in congress which opposed the escalation of the war in Vietnam. The Nixon administration tried to ignore the demands of the congressmen. Their response was a draft bill which restricted the right of the President to use U.S. Armed Forces abroad. At the start of October 1973 the resolution on war rights was passed by both chambers of congress and, overriding the presidential veto, became law. It stipulates that if a president decides to activate the American Armed Forces he must mandatorily inform and consult with the congress. After 60 days, should the congress fail to declare war or express

its agreement on the use of force in any way, all operations must be stopped. After that the President has yet another 30 days to withdraw the forces. Among others, this resolution erected a barrier to the U.S. intervention in Angola, which was to the liking of the White House and the special services. The use of this law also complicated the activities of the Republican administration in 1983, during the intervention in Lebanon.

The Soviet reader has been quite thoroughly but negatively informed of the phenomenon known as lobbying. There is no smoke without fire and this concept of the lobbyists is not deprived of reasons. The desire to influence the legislators at all cost, particularly when it is a question of the interests of powerful corporations and groups, is by no means kept within the bounds of moral purity.

Lobbying is extensively used by business circles who want access to defining the overall outlines of the country's foreign policy strategy. The lobbyists are the transmission mechanism between these circles and the legislators in the congress. Furthermore, the business circles, in which the biggest financiers and industrialists assume the highest positions, try to put their own people in key positions in foreign policy departments, consultative committees and groups in the White House. Powerful organizations, such as, for example, the Business Council, which was founded as early as the 1930s, have great influence on the President on matters of domestic and foreign policy. In the 1960s the council started the practice of holding joint closed sessions with government officials, in the course of which exchanges of views and information inaccessible to others because of its confidential nature, began to be exchanged. No single postwar U.S. President has taken any somewhat important foreign policy action without the approval of the Council.

The lobbying activities of right-wing sociopolitical organizations and groups, such as, for example, the Committee on Present Danger, the Heritage Foundation, the American Conservative Alliance and others, are well-known. They have applied a great deal of efforts (by no means unsuccessful) to spoil Soviet-American relations and to prevent their development.

However, it would be hardly to, our benefit if such very negative aspects of lobbying would prevent us from understanding its historically developed purpose. Let us not forget that the United States is a country with a tremendous number of various nongovernmental organizations. In addition to a large number of big corporations, operating on the national level are some 6,000 entrepreneurial unions and professional associations and several hundred public organizations. Understandably, each one of them has its own not necessarily coinciding interests and objectives. Under such circumstances, lobbying has become an instrument which supports and defends their special interests. In order to provide a

balanced assessment, let us add that not only conservative-reactionary but also liberal-progressive groups promote their views on foreign policy problems with the help of lobbyists.

Today competence and professionalism are inconceivable without the extensive use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and the efficient use of scientists in solving arising problems. We must recognize that the American ruling circles have properly mastered this truth and are actively using science in the foreign policy area.

Every year some 2,000 different books and tens of thousands of articles are published on matters of foreign policy in the United States. Thick journals and collections published by different scientific centers include debatable and theoretical articles which, in a number of cases, play the role of "trial balloons" which makes it possible to put in circulation, for the purpose of their further development, a variety of ideas and concepts on foreign policy problems. They include FOREIGN AFFAIRS and FOREIGN POLICY in New York, ORBIS in Philadelphia, DEDALUS in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and others. Particularly noteworthy is the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS, which enjoys a high international reputation and has a major influence on the process of shaping Washington's foreign policy. It publishes articles by major political personalities, scientists and journalists, American as well as foreign, who present their own sometimes diametrically opposite views. Such debates not only increase the interest in the journal but make it possible to analyze, on a high professional level, current problems of international relations and foreign policy of the United States and other countries.

In formulating foreign policy decisions, the executive branch, represented by the President, the National Security Council, the Department of State and other departments, rely on a widespread network of scientific centers engaged in the study of international problems. Let us enumerate no more than a few: Columbia and Cornell universities in the New York area; Johns Hopkins and Georgetown universities in the Washington area; Harvard and Princeton universities and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, on the Atlantic seaboard, outside the New York and Washington areas; the universities of Illinois, Indiana and Michigan in the Northwestern states; the University of California at Berkeley, the Stanford Institute and the Hoover Institute on Problems of War, Revolution and Peace and others, in the Southwestern states, not to mention the already well-known Rand Corporation. We believe that the reader now can understand why the excerpt we quoted from Rosenow's work persistently mentions options. The multiplicity of scientific centers contributes to the appearance of a variety of ideas and considerations on how to solve any one foreign policy problem. The usefulness of such suggestions is obvious.

The question naturally arises of what is the situation in our country? To what extent is scientific thinking used

and what is the situation with the formulation of alternative ideas and options? In our view, matters are by no means favorable and scientific thinking is still poorly used in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. Scientific research institutes which deal with such problems exist. Essentially, however, they are found in one place only, in Moscow. We thereby deliberately deprive ourselves of the use of the intellectual potential of our huge and many-faceted country. Why, for example, is it necessary for the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Institute to be located in Moscow and not in Vladivostok or Khabarovsk? This, in our view, would reflect a trend toward increasing the political and economic importance of the Far Eastern and Pacific areas.

Furthermore, why not have a scientific center on problems of Asia in one of our Central Asian republics? In that case, perhaps, we would have been better familiar with the true situation in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and other countries in the area. What is preventing us, for example, from having in Odessa a center on problems of the Balkans and the Mediterranean Basin? Or else, in Leningrad, perhaps even a branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute? The concentration, essentially, of all research activities on problems of international relations within a single center, in Moscow, even if it is in different scientific institutes, creates objective difficulties for the development of daring creative thinking and the manifestation of the variety of scientific schools, concepts, and alternate ideas, thus inevitably triggering equalization and conformism.

In our view, the time has come to enhance the involvement of scientific forces of the country not only in the propaganda of Soviet foreign policy but also in its study, with a view to formulating original suggestions and developing lively creative debates. One way of solving this problem would be the creation of a Soviet foreign policy association which would become the center attracting broad scientific and social forces interested in the study of the complex international problems of the contemporary conflicting, interdependent and integral world.

In this area the United States has several organizations, above all the Council on Foreign Relations which, for a number of decades, has been a center helping the official authorities in developing the foundations of long-term U.S. foreign policy and strategy. This council, which was created in 1921, includes, in addition to representatives of business and political personalities, the best specialists in the country in the area of foreign policy. Working individually or collectively, they make forecast studies of foreign policy and international relations, which are then used in formulating current foreign policy. The council is an elitist organization of some 2,000 members and, according to some information, has lent during the postwar years some 1,500 of its own specialists to the government. The council is connected with the U.S. Foreign Policy Association, which deals with the foreign policy education of the broader population strata, including the young, and organizes conferences and

seminars, oriented toward university circles and trade unions, and popularizes concepts in the spirit of the prevailing world outlook.

Without an efficiently functioning feedback, any reliable governmental management system is doomed to failure. This conclusion was true yesterday and is 100 times more relevant today, when the scientific and technical revolution has put on the agenda the question of becoming a scientific-information society. A well-organized exchange of information between the highest authorities and the population has become a mandatory requirement of life.

We already pointed out the great importance which elected individuals in the United States ascribe to maintaining systematic personal contacts with the voters. We shall not cite figures illustrating the extent of their correspondence in order not to sadden our own deputies for they are indeed huge. Nonetheless, the American ruling elite does not consider sufficient such ways of determining the moods of the voters and makes active use of sociological research and surveys with a view to determining the public opinion in the country.

Starting with the 1930s, the American Institute of Public Opinion, which was founded by George Gallup, has been functioning in the United States. It has adapted so successfully to the country's sociopolitical structure that it has become an accepted authority whose help and expertise are being willingly used by both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Its example has led to the organization of a number of similar centers engaged in the study of public opinion, such as the Daniel Yankelovich and other organizations. The independent status of the Gallup Institute and other centers for the study of public opinion is their decisive advantage.

The most pernicious monopoly in a democracy is that on information. The aspiration, whatever the reasons, to conceal the results of sociological studies which have established negative social moods and adverse assessments of various aspects in the country's life, cause mainly harm to the interests of society for it deprives it of the possibility to look at itself, to engage in self-analysis, without which its normal development is inconceivable.

Government leaders in the United States, who by no means always obtain results of public surveys favorable to themselves, nonetheless regularly resort to them, for the reason that in order to maintain the political and social stability in the country, they must follow a course which enjoys the support of the majority of the socially active population. From that viewpoint the professional sociological determination of public opinion is very useful: it efficiently indicates the direction in which it has become necessary to change a course of action.

The following fact is noteworthy: Last year, in the course of the U.S. electoral campaign, the Yankelovich group, together with three other organizations engaged in the

study of public opinion, conducted a series of studies with a view to determining the views of the American electorate on problems of national security. The studies were initiated in October 1987 and, by election time, in November 1988, nine reports had been drafted, which were immediately sent to the electoral campaign committees of the Republican and Democratic parties. Therefore, by the time that he assumed his position, the new President of the United States, together with the members of his administration already had extensive data giving them a sufficiently clear idea of the feelings of the American public, which were taken into consideration in formulating their foreign policy program.

Characteristically, three of these nine reports in the "Americans Speak About Security" series, directly dealt with problems of Soviet-American relations. The first was a study of the views held by the American public of the results of the meetings between Gorbachev and Reagan in Washington in December 1987; the second dealt with its perception of the world situation on the eve of the Moscow Summit (1988); the third was the attitude toward changes in Soviet-American relations from confrontation to cooperation. The positive changes in the views of the Americans have already been covered in our press and there is no need to repeat them. Let us particularly note, however, the considered consistency in conducting a series of sociological studies to which great political attention was paid.

Once again we return to the idea of the role and significance of a democratic institution such as a sociologically accurate, i.e., a scientifically organized study of public opinion. In order to solve one of the most important problems of a socialist rule of law state—involving the broad social strata in the process of shaping foreign policy and ensuring control by the elected representatives of the people over foreign policy activities—in our view it is necessary to develop a certain system of surveys of the Soviet public under the conditions of glasnost and fast publication of results. Surveys and studies which were previously undertaken in our country remained, as a rule, known only to a small circle of people and the publication of their results in collections and monographs, if it had any consequences at all, occurred with considerable delays.

Understandably, a socialist rule of law state cannot be established with a single legislative act. This will require both time and a series of well-planned and purposeful actions and a thorough check of each step we take. This is a large-scale task affecting all areas of governmental and social life and could prove to be quite difficult precisely in the foreign policy area.

As it engages in a profound restructuring of all areas of activities in the country, the CPSU has firmly charted a course of having the Soviet people become actively and truly involved in international affairs and so that the manifestation of their will become a reliable guideline in our foreign policy. The very formulation by the party of the question of the priority of universal human interests

in international relations also implies the right of every person, regardless of his status, to make his contribution to the formulation and implementation of these principles. This can be achieved by establishing a constitutional-legal mechanism for the discussion and formulation of decisions, democracy and glasnost, through the active and direct participation of the people's deputies in the formulation of foreign policy and control over its implementation.

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Developing the Theory of Self-Management of the People

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[Review by G. Gabrichidze, doctor of juridical sciences, of the books: I.P. Ilinskiy. "Sotsialisticheskoye Samoupravleniye Naroda" [Socialist Self-Management of the People]. Mysl, Moscow, 1987, 237 pp.; "Samoupravleniye: Ot Teorii k Praktike" [Self-Management: From Theory to Practice]. Yu.A. Tikhomirov, G.Kh. Shakhnazarov, editors. Yuridicheskaya Literatura, Moscow, 1988, 208 pp.; A.P. Butenko. "Vlast Naroda Posredstvom Samogo Naroda" [Power of the People By the People Themselves]. On socialist self-management. Mysl, Moscow, 1988, 203 pp.; Yu.I. Skuratov. "Sistema Sotsialisticheskogo Samoupravleniya Sovetskogo Naroda" [System of Socialist Self-Management of the Soviet People]. Problems of constitutional theory and practice. Izdatelstvo Uralskogo Universiteta, Sverdlovsk, 1987, 352 pp.; V.F. Sirenko. "Sotsialisticheskoye Samoupravleniye Naroda" [Socialist Self-Management of the People]. Naukova Dumka, Kiev, 1988, 160 pp]

[Text] The upsurge in the political activeness of the Soviet people has sparked a growing interest in the theory and practice of self-management of the people. This is understandable, since the currently occurring processes of establishing and developing it are an inalienable element of the democratization and renovation of society. In the course of decades, not only were the ideas of self-management not put into practice, but were even considered something odious and alien to socialism. Under the situation of the cult of personality and stagnation, under the dominion of the administrative-command system and the governmental regulation of social life, this Leninist idea was not even interpreted in theory. Now the situation has changed and the attitude toward self-management is different.

What is this phenomenon and how does it relate to fundamental categories, such as socialist democracy and the political system? The answers to these questions enable us to advance in developing the concept of

self-management, and thus to solve practical problems more confidently. Just what is the state of the theory today?

The books under review were published after the 27th CPSU Congress, and while they still lack an integral concept, they nonetheless have brought to light many important features of this complex, multi-faceted phenomenon, and a serious increase in knowledge on the subject is noticeable in a whole range of problems.

First, on understanding the term "self-management" itself. Here, all the authors essentially are united in interpreting the Leninist thought: self-management is the power of the people by means of the people themselves.

This definition, of course, requires specification. The authors study the correlation between self-management and socialist democracy and the political system, and note that these are institutions which unite people into a single, common circle. However, the books propose variants of the definitions of the essence of socialist self-management by the people which reflect the multi-faceted nature and multiple aspects of the problem and, in a number of cases, require additional and more persuasive argumentation. In the opinion of Yu. Skuratov, the definition of the essence of this phenomenon, contained in the new version of the CPSU Program, proceeds from its twin nature (see p 20), based on the fact that it is a specific measure, a method of combining and uniting democracy with management (see p 22). The author supposes that the basic forms (types) of socialist self-management by the people are state and public management, which act as its outward expression (see pp 33-34). Of course, such an approach is possible. However, a question arises: how can state management be a form or outward expression of the socialist self-management by the people, and how do said two forms correspond to each other? What are the diverse forms of public self-management—general meetings, rural assemblies, public committees and councils—attributed to in this regard, to the first or to the second form? Apparently, these questions require additional clarification.

The correlation between the system of socialist self-management by the people and the political system is a complex problem. In the opinion of I. Ilinskiy, the system of socialist self-management mainly and basically coincides with the political system of Soviet society, although there are several differences: thus, the sphere of administrative and political management goes beyond the framework of self-management (see p 78). The book "Self-Management: From Theory to Practice" expresses a somewhat different view: "It is barely possible to identify these concepts, ... it is more correct to proceed from the existence within the political system of socialist self-management, which incorporates interrelated forms," to which are related: social and class self-management in the form of the soviets; national and state self-management; the CPSU, people's control, and associative self-management in the form of mass public

organizations, self-management by labor collectives, and institutions for direct democracy (see pp 59-60).

The problems of self-management cannot be studied without analyzing their connection to civilian society and the rule of law state. This is a highly significant, independent question which has not, unfortunately, received the requisite reflection in the works under review. Let us single out a few questions that merit study: the correlation between civilian society as a definite type of social system for the relations and joint activity of people (according to Hegel, as spheres of economic relations where the dependency of everyone on everyone is comprehensively interwoven (see "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 7, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, p 223)) and of the rule of law state; the revelation and characterization of the role of such a state in this commensuration; and the influence and place of self-regulating principles and processes and of the elements of direct state management and compulsion. Evidently, a genuine civilian society, the rule of law state, and self-management by the people are parts of a complex, multifaceted, integral whole—a system of socialist democracy. Said categories and political-legal institutions cannot exist in isolation from each other: they are interdependent and interconnected. In order for the real dialectics of combining self-management with the state system and the state to appear, the latter should be converted into a rule of law state and not preserved as a hyperstate with the statist tendencies and features acquired during the years of the cult of Stalin's personality and in many ways maintained to this day.

The authors of the books under review justly emphasize the important role of the socially active individual in developing self-management. In addition to this, it is impossible not to consider the serious psychological barrier obstructing the path to introducing millions of people to the idea and practice of self-management. This cannot be overcome immediately. Raised for decades on Stalinist ideology and the ways and methods of the administrative-command system, many leaders and "rank-and-file" citizens are simply unable immediately to reject the habit of waiting for instructions from above on all matters, are often passive, and temporize. The elimination of social apathy and the acquisition of initiative and an active civic stance, which was brilliantly displayed in the elections of USSR people's deputies and in the course of the first Congress of People's Deputies, is one of the sure ways to involve the working people in the self-management process.

A. Butenko expresses an interesting and unusual, albeit debatable, view on the essence of the state and power and on the correlation of the state system and self-management by the people. Are the above-mentioned concepts and institutions compatible in general? Do they not contain internal contradictions with respect to one another? This question has many levels and its answer is far from simple. The author asks: "Why does the state, in the course of its own development, estrange itself increasingly from society? Could this be the quality of a state of only a certain type? K. Marx and F. Engels did

not think so," they "shared, along with all socialists, the criticism of the state as such," believing that the "existence of a state as a parasitic growth on society at any stage of social development is fraught with special dangers" (p 37). Of course, if one has in mind the Stalinist and subsequent deformations of the state and the excessive governmental regulation of our social life, this conclusion does not seem debatable. Evidently, one should also remember that, given all the distortions of the Leninist concept of a Soviet socialist state, it nonetheless did a tremendous amount of constructive work to organize a new economy, culture, social relations, and defense. The definite contradictory nature of the author's opinions is also displayed when he, recalling the well-known thesis expressed by M.S. Gorbachev, that "self-management principles are developed not outside, but within our state system," refers to the fact that for Marx and Engels, state management and apolitical self-management were mutually exclusive (see p 55). It seems, the above thesis does not give rise to questions, since the development of self-management and the socialist state system is organically interconnected within it, and it is a question of forming and developing the self-management by the people under the conditions of the profound democratization of the socialist state system intended by restructuring. In his attempts to approach the problems of correlating the state and self-management in a new way, A. Butenko, it seems, somewhat absolutizes the forcible aspect of the state's activity, which really has done irreparable harm to our society at infamous stages of our history. At the same time, apparently, his creative principle, which was displayed especially boldly in V.I. Lenin's lifetime, should not be underestimated.

The following is also very important. The books by V. Sirenko and Yu. Skuratov speak of the constitutional bases and principles for the socialist self-management by the people. However, the analysis of the content of the 1977 USSR Constitution shows that so far the basic origins and principles of self-management have not, unfortunately, been reflected in the Basic Law. Most likely, this will be done in the next stages of political reform. Even taking the latest changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution into account, the term "socialist self-management by the people" is absent in its text and only the preamble speaks of public communist self-management, as though of a task for the distant future. Therefore, Yu. Skuratov's conclusions on constitutional support for the self-management by the Soviet people (see pp 141-174), on the constitutional regulation of the relations of socialist self-management, and on the principle of its constitutional support (see p 204), suffer from a certain strained interpretation and exaggeration. A mechanism for reliable guarantees of self-management still remains to be created and legally reinforced in the constitution and in other laws. One presumes that it includes new phenomena and institutions, such as self-regulation, regional and local cost-accounting, the

socialist pluralism of opinions, competition and electivity, alternative candidates participating in elections, referendums, and other forms of direct democracy.

Naturally, the books cover far from all problems of self-management which are advanced by restructuring. Thus, the scientific and theoretical development of the problems of local self-management as a component part of socialist self-management by the people is extraordinarily topical. Formerly, local self-management was mentioned rarely and in passing. The resolutions of the 19th Party Conference newly illuminated the nature and significance of this problem. The development of a draft law on local self-management and local administration is being completed, and the draft General Principles for Restructuring the Leadership of the Economy and Social Sphere in Union Republics has been published. In context with these and other related documents a great deal still remains to be interpreted in the theory and practice of self-management.

The study of the problems of self-management presumes an analysis of the potential of the corresponding institutions, agencies and public associations. The books under review contain interesting generalizations on these questions and express different, sometimes contradictory and debatable opinions. I. Ilinskiy, as well as the authors of the book "Self-Management: From Theory to Practice," speak of the soviets as the main link of self-management. However, it is far from always clear why precisely the soviets form this core, and not other agencies or organizations. For example, V. Sirenko explains this status of the soviets by their basic functions, each of which is one of the directions for implementing self-management principles in the work of the soviets. Is this so? Only partly, it seems. The main point lies not in the functions, but in the nature itself of the soviets, which act simultaneously as state agencies and as mass organizations of the population. In this lies the essence and basic property of the soviets as a new form of power for the working people, which essentially has to be revived anew. The soviets are called upon to constantly intensify living contact with the working people and to be an accumulator of social activeness and thus, as M.S. Gorbachev said, "to unite the idea of a state system with the ideas of popular self-management."

Labor collectives have considerable self-management potential. In connection with the radical economic reform and the passing of the Law on the State Enterprise (Association), production self-management, one of the agencies of which is the labor collective council, is receiving increasingly greater development. However, along the path of developing self-management in production, many obstacles and problems are appearing which for some reason escaped the attention of the authors of the books under review. Strangely, even the book "Self-Management: From Theory to Practice," which is closest to the realities of the self-management system that is taking shape, to a certain extent replaces the study of the specific political, legal and organizational problems of the labor collective council with speculative opinions on the role and nature of the

labor collective, labor, and the "comprehensively developed individual" (see pp 114-130).

As before, the arsenal of direct democracy remains a virtually untouched field in our studies. The authors of the books under review also had nothing to say on this subject. Yet, after all, the potential of direct democracy is great. A number of its basic institutions, including universal discussions of the most important problems of state life and universal voting (referendum), have a constitutional status. Popular discussions are now legally registered in Union and republic laws on them and have already received extensive development. Their self-management authority is great, but many possibilities for raising it remain.

Referendums have been juridically legalized, but for the time being have not been implemented, which cannot be deemed normal under the conditions of glasnost and the formation of a rule of law state. The time has come to develop and pass laws on the referendum, which regulate in detail its tasks, functions, and procedure of conduct. Unfortunately, the authors of the books under review did not speak out on this problem either.

Today the problem of the gradual transfer of a number of functions of state agencies to public organizations, which had withdrawn "into the shadows" after the distortions of the 1950s-1960s, is taking on important significance. These are different times, and the views and approaches to the problem are changing. I would like to draw the attention of scientists who work on the theoretical aspects of self-management to this problem.

Completing this review, a general conclusion can be made: in spite of all the debatable assumptions and disappointing gaps noted above, the books under consideration increase our knowledge of socialist self-management by the people now taking shape and make a definite contribution to developing its theory. They give impetus to the formulation and solution of a number of new theoretical and practical problems advanced by life in this important sphere of renovating socialism, and enable the further advancement of work to extend self-management principles throughout our entire political system.

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Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors

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[Text] "The Human Factor and the Problem of Its Enhancement" was the topic of a roundtable which took place on 1-2 June in Hanoi, the capital of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It was sponsored jointly by TAPTI KONGSHAN, the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee journal, and *KOMMUNIST*, the CPSU Central Committee journal. The roundtable meetings

were attended, in addition to editors and personnel of TAPTI KONGSHAN, by senior associates of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee, Vietnamese ministers and social scientists. On the Soviet side, the participants in the discussions included associates from KOMMUNIST and the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The featured speaker at the roundtable was Ha Suan Chiong, Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee candidate member and TAPTI KONGSHAN editor-in-chief.

The KOMMUNIST delegation was received by Dao Xui Tung, Politburo member and Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee secretary. He discussed problems being solved by the VCP and the people of the country at the present stage.

Jaime Perez, secretary general of the Uruguayan Communist Party Central Committee, who is visiting the USSR, described, at a meeting in the premises of KOMMUNIST, the condition of the labor movement in his country, the features of the work of Uruguayan communists under present conditions, and the growing interest shown in Latin America in perestroika in the Soviet Union. Several theoretical problems which are facing the Uruguayan communists in connection with the new stage in the life of the land of the soviets and the processes of renovation of socialism were discussed.

The editors were visited by Konrad Schuler, member of the presidium of the board of the German Communist Party and editor-in-chief of the German Communist Party central organ the newspaper UNSERE ZEIT. They discussed the implementation of the radical economic reform and of a program of measures for the financial improvement of the Soviet national economy.

The journal was visited by Darambazar, responsible secretary of NAMYN AMDRAL, the journal of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. The Mongolian journalist studied the work of the editors in covering the course of perestroika. An exchange of views on the development of cooperation between the two fraternal party publications took place.

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